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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Louis B. Livingston for the Master of Arts in History 
presented October 14, 2010. 
Title: Theodore Roosevelt on Labor Unions: A New Perspective 
Historical studies of Theodore Roosevelt's views about labor and labor 
unions are in conflict. This was also true of contemporary disagreements 
about the meaning of his labor rhetoric and actions. The uncertainties revolve 
around whether or not he was sincere in his support of working people and 
labor unions, whether his words and actions were political only or were based 
on a philosophical foundation, and why he did not propose comprehensive 
labor policies. 
Roosevelt historiography has addressed these questions without 
considering his stated admiration for Octave Thanet's writings about "labor 
problems." Octave Thanet was the pseudonym of Alice French, a popular 
fiction writer during Roosevelt's adult years. Roosevelt on several occasions 
praised her knowledge of factory conditions and discussions of labor 
problems, and he invited her to the White House. The thesis analyzes her 
labor stories, Roosevelt's comments about her labor writings, and their 
relevance to how he responded to the growth and tactics of organized labor. It 
also addresses the influence on Roosevelt of contemporary writing on labor 
unions by John Hay, Henry George, and Herbert Croly, as well as his 
relationship with labor leader Samuel Gompers. 
The thesis concludes that Roosevelt was sincere about improving the 
social and industrial conditions of workers, primarily through government 
action. It further concludes that his support of labor unions in principle was 
genuine, but was contingent on organized labor's repudiation of violence and 
attempts to justify violence; and that he opposed union boycotts and 
mandatory union membership as inimical to his vision of a classless society. 
The thesis additionally considers the extent to which Roosevelt's views were 
embodied in national labor legislation after his death. 
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I. Introduction 
Theodore Roosevelt's description of his early success in politics, that 
he "rose like a rocket," is an apt simile for his nearly forty-year trail through 
public affairs, from the early 1880s until his death in 1919. It was not merely a 
boast, because he conceded that it caused him to lose "perspective," which in 
turn also taught him "by bitter experience the lesson that I was not all-
important and that I had to take account of many different elements in life. "1 
Roosevelt's simile and the ensuing lesson could also describe the course of 
America's labor movement during those years. Sometimes following the same 
trajectory and sometimes seeming destined to crash, the two rockets changed 
the relationship between government and organized labor. This study is about 
one of the mysteries they left behind, namely, the nature of Roosevelt's view 
of labor unions. 
The mystery remains unsolved after a century of Theodore Roosevelt 
scholarship. Organized labor regarded his words and actions as mixing 
favorable and unfriendly elements. These are both legitimate interpretations 
that also perplexed Roosevelt's non-union contemporaries and continue to be 
a cause of debate among historians. One clue that has not been pursued in 
TR historiography has been a fundamental component of Roosevelt's 
intellectual and emotional orientation toward organized labor, namely, his taste 
1 TR letter to his son Theodore, October 20, 1903, in Elting E. Morison, ed. , The Letters of 
Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951}, 3:634--635. 
2 
in literature about "labor problems." Accordingly, it is appropriate to reconsider 
Roosevelt's views about labor unions in light of this previously unexamined 
evidence. 
A brief review of what others have said about Roosevelt and labor is in 
order, beginning with Richard Hofstadter's characterization of the labor subject 
as "[o]ne of the best indices of Roosevelt's place in the political spectrum." 
Hofstadter minimizes Roosevelt's pro-labor reputation as the result of 
animosity by some businessmen, notably the mine operators whom he 
declined to champion in the 1902 anthracite coal strike. Such business 
opposition "provided the dramatic foil that enabled him to stay on the stage 
plausibly as a reformer." Looking backstage, Hofstadter questions the 
motivations behind Roosevelt's ostensibly pro-labor actions- whether his 
intervention on labor's behalf in the 1902 strike showed sympathy for the 
strikers or fear of socialistic action, and whether his support of workmen's 
compensation legislation showed concern for crippled wage earners or fear 
that Democratic politicians would occupy the field if he did not. Thus, 
Hofstadter doubts that Roosevelt deserved "his reputation as a strenuous 
reformer."2 
2 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: 
Vintage, 1948), 217, 223, 225, 230-231. An early Roosevelt biography takes the Hofstadter-
like position that TR used his intervention in the 1902 anthracite coal strike to make the 
political claim that he had defended the legitimate rights of labor. Overall, however, the 
biographer regards TR as a centrist who "bared his white teeth at the conservatives on the 
right and the liberals on the extreme left." Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography 
(San Diego: Harvest, 1956), 145, 195. 
3 
Putting aside the question of the historical legitimacy of elevating 
uncertain personal motives over known facts, the reality is that Roosevelt 
scholarship subsequent to Hofstadter's speculations contains major 
disagreements about Roosevelt's attitude toward labor and labor unions. For 
example, William Henry Harbaugh describes Roosevelt's intervention in the 
anthracite coal strike as a "great service" to the American labor movement and 
Roosevelt as "the first great President-reformer of the modem industrial era, • 
because he encouraged, "however cautiously, the growth c:i countervailing 
labor unions [in a capitalistic society]." Roosevelt was, Harbaugh argues, "the 
first President, in fine, to understand and react constructively to the challenge 
to existing institutions raised by the technological revolution. oo3 
In contrast, Kevin Phillips contends that Roosevelt's predecessor in the 
White House, William McKinley, did more for labor than Roosevelt because 
McKinley as a lawyer provided pro bono legal services for strikers accused of 
rioting, as a congressman and governor of Ohio pursued federal and state 
• 
systems of labor arbitration, and as governor supported workmen's 
compensation and union non-discrimination laws. Phillips diminishes 
Roosevelt's labor record as "half-submerged in an upper-class derogation of 
labor unions."" 
• William Henry Harbaugh, The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York; Collier, 
1963), 179. 492-493. 
• Kevin Phillips, William McKinley (New York; Times Books, 2003), 32-33, 37, 39, 111, 118. 
Phillips' biography enthusiastically attempts to redeem President McKinley from the shadows 
4 
Conflicting interpretations about Roosevelt's real intentions toward 
organized labor also mark the work of the two historians who made 
Roosevelt's labor record their central scholarly concern. Howard Lawrence 
Hurwitz's study of Roosevelt's pre-presidential labor attitudes acknowledges 
TR's labor-friendly evolution from early anti-unionism, but he attributes it to 
political motives. According to Hurwitz, the second-place showing of a union-
backed candidate in New York City's 1886 mayoral election, with Roosevelt in 
third place, alerted TR to the political strength of unions. The positive 
treatment of unions that he displayed thereafter, Hurwitz contends, w~s the 
result of TR's desire to avoid jeopardizing his political career. Hurwitz also 
argues that Roosevelt never understood that strikes were "labor's chief means 
of bringing about an adjustment of grievances," that labor violence arose from 
"existing inequalities," that organized labor should have "bargaining power with 
rights equal to those of employers and government," and that TR's emotional 
opposition to strike violence reflected his frustration that unions did not 
appreciate his efforts on behalf of working people.5 
cast by TR's popularity as McKinley's successor. To a similar effect, but without analysis, see 
Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life (New York: HarperCollins Perennial Paperback, 
1992), 377-378 ("Basically, Roosevelt's aim was to prevent radical change."). 
5 Howard Lawrence Hurwitz, Theodore Roosevelt and Labor In New York State, 1880-1900 
(New York: AMS Press, 1943; reprint, 1968), 100 ("anti-labor bias"), 138 (election lesson), 
197-199 (gubernatorial enforcement of labor laws), 217-219 (friendly interactions with labor 
leaders), 238 (political decision-making), 278 (importance of labor vote), 285 (violence and 
"existing inequalities"), 289 (political jeopardy of antagonizing unions), 292 (labor's use of 
strikes), 297 (union bargaining rights and TR's frustration at being unappreciated). 
Concentrating on the final two years of the period covered by Hurwitz, another historian 
reaches different conclusions. G. Wallace Chessman, Governor Theodore Roosevelt 
5 
Irving Greenberg's appraisal of Roosevelt's presidential and post-
presidential labor record takes issue with Hurwitz's finding of TR's coolness to 
unionism. Greenberg accepts the sincerity of Roosevelt's distinction between 
the positive underlying value of organized labor and the negative of union-
related violence. He argues, contrary to Hurwitz's and Hofstadter's 
interpretations of TR's motivation, that Roosevelt's goal was to secure laborers 
"all just and proper consideration."6 
Much harder on Roosevelt than any other critic, the Marxist labor 
historian PhilipS. Foner has nothing favorable to say about TR's labor record. 
He gives Roosevelt little credit for settling the 1902 anthracite coal strike or 
attempting to moderate the use of judicial injunctions against labor, preferring 
instead to accuse him repeatedly of being a tool of anti-union employers. Even 
when Foner praises the Progressive Party platform on which Roosevelt ran in 
1912, he dismisses Roosevelt as a captive of capitalist millionaires who were 
trying to stave off social revolution? 
There is ample interpretive space between such conflicting views. Thus, 
Edward Wagenknecht concludes that "Roosevelt's essential moderation is 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 304-305, 320. Roosevelt's labor program, 
Chessman argues, was the same as his "square deal" approach to most issues, namely, not 
allowing any interest group to dictate policy that endangered the public good. 
6 1rving Greenberg, Theodore Roosevelt and Labor: 1900-1918 (New York: Garland 
Publishing Co. , 1988), 74, 76-77. As evident from the titles of the Hurwitz and Greenberg 
books, they cover different periods of time; consequently, neither work analyzes the 
consistencies and evolution of Roosevelt's thinking during his full career. 
7 Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, (New York: International 
Publishers, 1947-1980), 3:51, 301 , 310-311 , 5:108, 110-112. 
6 
seen most clearly in connection with his attitude toward the problem of capital 
and labor." Wagenknecht's appraisal of Roosevelt from multiple angles 
includes the proposition that TR's study of the declines of ancient and 
medieval republics led him to a labor policy based upon "his desire to avoid a 
class war." His interpretation is that Roosevelt adopted "middle-of-the-roadism 
on capital-labor problems," i.e., friendliness to labor unions tempered by fear 
of labor tyranny and insistence on enforcement of the law whenever labor 
acted unlawfully, regardless of labor's rationale. More recently, H. W. Brands 
likens Roosevelt's "steering a middle course in labor-management disputes" to 
his foreign policy approach: "Just as Roosevelt aimed for a balance of power 
between Russia and Japan, so he sought a balance of power between 
management and labor."8 
The discord among historians about Roosevelt's attitude in labor 
matters echoes comparable disagreements during his lifetime, when he was 
the object of attacks by some business organizations and newspapers for 
excessive pro-unionism and by some union leaders for excessive anti-
unionism. Roosevelt dismissed both sets of attackers as standing on "a plane 
of mendacity," a word he enjoyed using to describe his critics.9 "Honest 
8 Edward Wagenknecht, The Seven Worlds of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Longmans, 
Green, 1958), 210, 216-219; H. W. Brands, TR. : The Last Romantic (New York: Basic Books, 
1997), 508, 542-543. 
9 See, for example, Theodore Roosevelt, American Ideals (New York: Putnam, 1897), 174; 
and TR's letter to his son Kermit, November 14, 1907, in W ill Irwin, ed. , Letters to Kermit from 
Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-1908 (New York: Scribner, 1946), 222. 
workingmen are misled," he said, "into believing that I am an enemy of labor 
by [Eugene] Debs' [newspaper] Appeal to Reason, and other men are misled 
into believing that I am an improper friend of labor. "10 Apparently relishing the 
variance in press interpretations of his labor actions, Roosevelt observed that 
one New York newspaper accused him of "truckling to capital" while another 
New York newspaper regarded the same set of facts as proof that he was 
"truckling to labor."11 
Both the historical and contemporary variances in respect to 
Roosevelt's attitude toward organized labor can be traced in part to the two-
sided nature of what he had to say on the subject. A dichotomy between his 
embrace and critique of organized labor appears repeatedly in his public 
remarks. "I believe emph_atically in organized labor," President Roosevelt told 
railroad union members in 1902, but he cautioned them that his praise of 
union organizations was conditional. "To call an organization an organization 
does not make it a good one," he continued. "The worth of an organization 
depends upon its being handled with the courage, the skill, the wisdom, the 
spirit of fair dealing as between man and man, and the wise self-restraint 
which, I am glad to be able to say, your Brotherhood has shown."12 In other 
7 
10 TR letter to Pennsylvania progressive Thomas Robins, January 2, 1912, in Morison, Letters 
ofTR, 7:471-473. 
11 TR letter to Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, August 2, 1904, in 
Morison, Letters of TR, 4:878. 
12 TR speech to Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, in Chattanooga, September 8, 1902, in 
Hermann Hagedorn, ed. , The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, National Edition (New York: 
Scribner, 1926), 16:152. 
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words, he refused to find virtue in unionism per se. A union had to earn and to 
keep earning his approval to prove its worth. 
Roosevelt proudly trumpeted his honorary membership in the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, but he coupled it with the assertion that, 
as he explained in 1910 after leaving the presidency, this was "because the 
organization is fundamentally managed as an organization should be - in 
conformity with the law and in conformity with the interest and best judgment 
of the American people."13 The editors of the indispensable eight volumes of 
Roosevelt's letters note "the Rooseveltian manner" of referring "to the rights of 
the laboring man and labor unions on the one hand, and, on the other, to theii' 
obligations. •M 
Missing from both the historical appraisals and the contemporary 
reactions has been Roosevelt's admiration for the labor writings of Octave 
Thanet. A conservative and popular short-story writer of Roosevelt's era, she 
is virtually forgotten today. Roosevelt historiography either ignores his esteem 
for her depiction of "labor problems" or simply does not bother to study what 
her views were.15 This study tries to fill that gap, as a means to understanding 
Roosevelt's rhetoric and actions regarding organized labor. 
I 13 TR speech in Freeport, Illinois, September 8, 1910, in Hagedorn, Works of TR, 16:160-161. 
14 Morison, Letters of TR, 5:796n. 
15 This oversight is true even of Wagenknecht's comprehensive review of Roosevelt's reading 
interests. Wagenknecht, Seven Worlds of TR, 44-76. He groups Thanet with other women 
writers at page 76 for the general proposition that the "social usefulness of literature is 
stressed heavily in what he [TRJ has to say" about them, without any indication of Thanet's 
focus on labor matters or TR's reaction to it. 
9 
In his efforts to resolve what Thanet called "labor problems," Roosevelt 
seems to have been guided by his distinction between "politics and applied 
ethics," even while arguing that they "ought to be interchangeable." His ethical 
approach transcended his enthusiasm for politics, the latter of which he 
equated with "the same kind of interest one takes in big game hunting, or 
football, the kind of interest quite compatible with doing excellent work but 
which cannot inspire the highest kind of work." In contrast, applied ethics led 
him to be "deeply and indeed painfully impressed with the tremendous 
problems of our social and industrial life." For Roosevelt, it was not enough to 
have "a material and economic foundation [essential] for every successful 
civilization," because even a successful civilization could not survive without 
"lofty disinterestedness and power of community feeling."16 
Grappling with the tension between politics and applied ethics, 
Roosevelt embraced organized labor's aspirations for the material and 
economic progress of working people, but he was troubled by unethical 
methods employed by some unions. As a master of practical politics, he 
cultivated some (but definitely not all) labor leaders and accommodated 
organized labor with vigor, unless its methods and goals conflicted with his 
16 TR letter to the author Rider Haggard, June 28, 1912, in Morison, Letters of TR, 7:567-568. 
For TR's enthusiasm for big game hunting, see his Outdoor Pastimes of an American Hunter 
(New York: Scribner, 1923), and African Game Trails, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1923); and 
for football, see his letter to Walter Camp, the "father of American football," March 11, 1895, in 
Morison, Letters of TR, 8: 1434. 
10 
opinion of what ought to be. The ethicist in him insisted that his endorsement 
of unionism had to be conditional. 
In reconsidering Roosevelt's labor views, we should keep in mind 
Roosevelt's watchword for historians. He once told another eminent 
politician/historian that "it is one of the commonest and cheapest of all forms of 
intellectual entertainment to hold up to ridicule and reprobation a man who in 
the past has done a very great work, because he does not come up to the 
ideas which are indispensable for the present."17 Roosevelt was a man of his 
time, not ours. In our time, labor unions have achieved political and economic 
power far beyond what they possessed in Roosevelt's day, and the praise and 
criticism directed at them now are different from then. Yet, Roosevelt's 
engagement with labor questions and problems remains exciting to read -- for 
his insights, his willingness to question traditional responses to labor issues, 
his determination to explain his views logically, his style, and his wit-- whether 
our experience leads us to agree or disagree with him. 
17 TR letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, June 27, 1907, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:696. 
Figure 1 
THEODOJU: ROOSEVELT, 
Presideat of lhe United Statu. 
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11. "Curious Signs of Demoralization": Unions by the 1880s 
In theory, American labor unions had won their rights to exist and to 
apply economic pressure through strikes and other means by the time of 
Theodore Roosevelt's birth in 1858. Sixteen years earlier, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, in the landmark case of Commonwealth v. Hunt, held 
that unions were lawful entities and strikes were lawful union actions. But the 
case also reconfigured the labor battlefield, by suggesting that government 
might still constrain union actions, including some strikes, if they were deemed 
socially undesirable.1 
Commonwealth v. Hunt was a criminal case in which the state alleged 
that members of the Boston Journeymen Bootworkers' Society had unlawfully 
conspired among themselves not to work for employers who also employed 
non-members of the union. After being convicted by a jury, the accused 
members of the Society won reversal on appeal to the state's highest court, 
which held that employees could lawfully insist upon a shop limited exclusively 
to unionized workers. The court said this was because it was "useful and 
honorable" to assist fellow union members in times of poverty, sickness, or 
distress; raise their intellectual, moral, and social conditions; or improve their 
work. In that sense, said the court, union encouragement of its members' 
1 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Metcalf) 111 (1842). Labor history treats the case as 
the first in which "the highest court in a state had finally recognized the right of workers to 
organize" and as commencing four decades of protecting unions from litigation based on 
unlawful conspiracy. Foner, History of Labor Movement, 1:164; Selig Perlman, A History of 
Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1923), 25-26, 151-152. 
13 
refusal to work with a non-member was no more unlawful than a refusal to 
work with an intoxicated co-worker. Although a strike might economically harm 
the targeted employer, it was lawful because it was like "all competition in 
every branch of trade and industry" where the ultimate object was "meritorious 
and public spirited. n 
Despite this holding, the court articulated two reasons why its decision 
did not end disputes about the legality of union activity. First, if the union had 
"purposes of oppression and injustice," rather than useful and honorable 
goals, then it might still be liable. Second, the court warned that even when 
strikers pursued lawful ends, they could not utilize unlawful means. The court 
identified a few such unlawful means, namely, violating the strikers' own 
contracts of employment, seeking an employer's violation of cohtracts with 
other employees, engaging in one of the three F's (fraud, force, or falsehood), 
or- albeit imprecisely and tautologically- "other crime or unlawful means." A 
fuller definition of what purposes and means would be considered unlawful 
was left for future cases, but the key point was that the right to strike was not 
absolute. 
As a result, what remained in play was whether or not both the purpose 
and the means of union activity were legitimate.2 Since the court declined to 
uphold the jury's verdict, it would be up to judges to decide questions of 
legitimacy as a matter of law. The implication was, as a later commentator 
2 45 Mass. at 122. 
14 
observes, that "the rights of labor are determined quite as much, if not more, 
by the social and economic philosophy of the judges as by so-called 
immutable principles of the law." Subsequent exercises of judicial power to 
determine labor rights were to raise the hackles of Theodore Roosevelt. On its 
face, however, the holding of Commonwealth v. Hunt clothed most labor 
unions in legitimacy and authorized them to engage in effective economic 
actions against employers, while the court's language warned that there were 
some actions, largely undefined, that unions could not pursue.3 
If we fast forward to Roosevelt's pre-presidential years as an adult, 
1880 to 1900, we can see that legitimizing unions did not guarantee labor 
tranquility. During those years, there ·were twenty-three thousand strikes in the 
United States, 75 percent of which occurred in the main industrial states of 
Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Labor history 
refers to the turbulence in the middle of the 1880s as the "Great Upheaval. "4 In 
1885, railroad workers represented by the Knights of Labor forced a major 
railroad operator to negotiate the end of a strike, what one historian identifies 
3 Alpheus T. Mason, Organized Labor and the Law (Durham: Duke University Press, 1925; 
New York: Amo, 1969}, vii-viii, 65-67, 90-91. Although this decision applied only in 
Massachusetts, the same tension existed in the labor jurisprudence of the other major 
industrial states of the period. Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 48 
(1889) (unlawful secondary boycott); Flaccus v. Smith, 199 Pa. 128 (1901) (unlawful to 
organize employees who had employment contracts promising not to join a union); National 
Protective Association of Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315 (1902) (lawful to strike for a 
closed shop); People v. Hughes, 137 N.Y. 29, 37-39 (unlawful to threaten boycott); Wilson v. 
Hey, 232 Ill. 389 (1908) (unlawful secondary boycott). 
4 Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 11-12; Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 90-91 ,106. 
One effect of the "Great Upheaval" was increased judicial and legislative efforts to control 
labor militancy through the use of injunctions and criminal penalties. Ibid., 154-158. 
15 
as "the first such demonstration of union power in American history."5 Another 
labor dispute, leading to violent May 1886 demonstrations in Chicago, is of 
particular interest to any labor study of Roosevelt because of his reaction to 
what he regarded as its unacceptable manifestations. 
Organized labor's long-time campaign to limit the legal workday to eight 
hours had reached a crescendo with union calls for a national strike beginning 
on May 1, 1886. An estimated three hundred fifty thousand workers heeded 
the call. Many employers acceded to the eight-hour demand, but in Chicago 
the strike took a violent turn. There, during a violent demonstration against 
strikebreakers at the McCormick harvesting machine factory, the police fired 
into the crowd and killed four demonstrators. On the following day, at a mass 
meeting in Chicago's Haymarket Square to protest the shootings, a police 
contingent of nearly two hundred officers appeared and ordered the crowd to 
disperse. Someone threw a bomb toward the police, killing six policemen and 
injuring another four dozen. The police retaliated, causing more deaths and 
injuries.6 
Although the actual bomb-thrower was never identified, Roosevelt 
shared the nationwide public and press disapproval of the bombing as part of 
labor agitation. Eight Haymarket rally supporters were indicted for murder on 
5 Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny.(New York: Knopf, 1952; Vintage, 1956}, 34. 
6 Foner, History of Labor Movement, 2:99, 103-107. Foner's editorializing about violence 
during labor disputes is highly colored in favor of victimized workers and against capitalist 
treachery, but his work provides wide-ranging details. Compare the treatment of the May 
violence in Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 92-93. 
16 
the basis that they had instigated the bombing. All were convicted, and seven 
were sentenced to die by hanging. Arguing that an unfair trial and overly 
severe punishment undermined the cause of labor, many labor organizations 
supported demonstrations urging clemency for the Haymarket defendants. In 
1893, three defendants were pardoned by Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld, 
on the basis that they were innocent and had been victimized by a packed jury 
and biased judge. Elements of the press, including the New York Times and 
Chicago Tribune, protested the pardons. Roosevelt never forgave Altgeld.7 
Meanwhile, the labor movement was undergoing transformation in its 
strategies and organization. Beginning in the early 1880s, labor unions 
publicly sought and politically achieved a "laborer's national holiday" to be held 
on the first Monday in September.8 In 1886, unions throughout the nation 
undertook to form independent labor parties and to run pro-labor candidates 
7 Foner, History of Labor Movement, 2:108-112, 114; Melvyn Dubofsky, Industrialism and the 
American Worker, 1865-1920 (Arlington Heights, Ill. : Harlan Davidson, 1975), 43; TR letter to 
his sister, May 15, 1886, in Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., Letters from Theodore Roosevelt to 
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 1870-1918 (New York: Scribner, 1924), 80-81 . Also unsympathetic to 
the Haymarket defendants was the leadership of the Knights of Labor, the largest national 
union of the day, who condemned the "Haymarket anarchistsn for placing the union movement 
in jeopardy. Foner, History of Labor Movement, 162-163. Roosevelt variously condemned 
Altgeld for pardoning "the Anarchist bomb throwers," openly sympathizing with "the Chicago 
mob," practicing politics that led to McKinley's assassination, contributing to "unhealthy 
sentimentality and morbid 'class-consciousness,'" and even making it impossible for Roosevelt 
to appoint a former Altgeld associate because employers would protest that "This is 
Altgeldism." TR letters to Jacob Riis, January 23, 1899; Edward N. Buxton, November 19, 
1900; William Allen White, September 7, 1901; and Lyman Abbott, April13, 1906, in Morison, 
Letters of TR, 2:921-922, 1427, 3:140, 5:219. 
8 In 1887, Oregon became the first state to make Labor Day an official holiday; and in 1894, 
Congress and President Cleveland made it a national holiday. Foner, History of Labor 
Movement, 2:96-98. 
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for political office.9 As discussed below, Roosevelt was a mayoral candidate in 
the election that best illustrates the labor party trend. 
Perhaps most significantly, in December 1886, dozens of labor unions 
created the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Its purposes included 
formation and unification of trade unions, lobbying for pro-labor legislation, and 
emphasis on the autonomy of each skilled trade. The AFL was formed in 
reaction to what its member unions perceived as major shortcomings, 
particularly insufficient labor solidarity, of the dominant labor organization of 
the day. An ideal of that organization, the Knights of Labor (KOL), was 
replacement of the existing wage system with a more cooperative society. 
Unlike the KOL, the AFL began by stressing confrontation within the wage 
system by "oppressed" laborers against "oppressor'' capitalists.1° For reasons 
beyond the scope of this study, the KOL declined from seven hundred 
thousand members in 1886 to less than a third of that number in 1888. In 
contrast, by the end of the decade, the AFL claimed that its own membership 
had more than quadrupled.11 
9 1bid., 2:119, 129-1 31. 
10 Another distinction was the AFL's emphasis on worker representation by craft and the 
KOL's philosophy of representing a broad constituency of skilled and unskilled workers. A 
caveat to distinguishing the two organizations by these tests is that they also shared practical 
and idealistic goals, as well as parallel membership components like the AFL's representation 
of unskilled laborers in its "trade" unions and the KOL's trade-specific "assemblies." Robert E~ 
Weir, Knights Unhorsed: Internal Conflict in a Gilded Age Social Movement (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 2000), 16, 18, 36-37, 43-44. · 
11 AFL membership figures for the period are reputedly unreliable. Foner, History of Labor 
Movement, 2:141-144, 157-158, 171 . See also Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 71-72, 
78-80, 100-101, 121. 
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A contemporary establishment response to strikes, labor violence, and 
the growing influence of organized labor came from John Hay, an old friend of 
Roosevelt and later a key member of his presidential administration. Hay was 
a formidable nineteenth-century personage. He had served as one of 
President Lincoln's two private secretaries and co-authored a massive Lincoln 
biography; worked as editor of Horace Greeley's New York Tribune; wrote 
popular poetry and non-fiction; and had filled high-ranking diplomatic posts for 
the United States in Spain, France, and Britain before becoming secretary of 
state under McKinley and Roosevelt. Roosevelt regarded Hay as "one of the 
most delightful of companions, one of the most charming of all men of 
cultivation and action."12 
In late 1883 and January 1884, Hay anonymously wrote a popular 
novel, The Bread-Winners, using as background a fictional short strike in the 
1870s. Hay had experienced such a strike during a two-week period in the 
summer of 1877. It began as a railroad strike over wage reductions in 
Maryland and West Virginia and then became a national strike that a labor 
historian describes as "one of the most widespread and militant strikes" in the 
nation's history. Assigned to establish order, some local militias killed 
demonstrators and were in turn besieged, while other militias fraternized with 
the strikers. At the request of governors in affected states, President 
12 William Roscoe Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915), 
1:90 et seq., 334, 355, 360, 403, 405; 2:9, 173-175, 268; Theodore Roosevelt, An 
Autobiography (New York: Macmillan, 1913; DaCapo Paperback, 1985), 399. 
Rutherford B. Hayes dispatched federal troops to restore order. Newspapers 
treated the strikes as insurrections and a "labor revolution."13 
Hay's novel first appeared in magazine installments and then in book 
form during Hay's lifetime in 1884, 1893, and 1899. None of these versions 
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identified the author. An early Hay biographer says that the magazine success 
of the novel "outran that of any previous American novel," in part because of 
the mystery about the author's identity and in part because the novel was "the 
first important polemic in American fiction in defense of Property."14 
On its face, The Breadwinners satirizes the romantic entanglements of 
two beautiful women, one from the working class and the other from the 
propertied class. Each woman resolves her multiple relationships in the 
aftermath of a strike marked by rioting, damage to homes of the wealthy, and 
violence inflicted on or by their true loves. One of the working-class heroine's 
admirers is a villainous, self-styled "Labor Reformer," Ananias Offitt, who leads 
a tiny union called the Brotherhood of Bread-winners. Hay depicts Offitt as a 
13 Foner, History of Labor Movement, 1:464-474, 506-507; Perlman, History of Trade 
Unionism, 58-60; Dubofsky, Industrialism, 39-40. 
14 My references to the novel are to the posthumous edition. John Hay, The Breadwinners: A 
Social Study (New York: Harper, n.d.), which is notable as the first to carry Hay's name as the 
novel's author. Although undated, it was published during or after 1915, because the first page 
of the Introduction quotes from 1915's Thayer, Life and Letters, 2:8-9, 15; Robert L. Gale, 
John Hay(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978), 87 (dating its publication as 1916).1n an 
anonymous letter defending his right to be an anonymous author, Hay explained that as a 
businessman his "standing would be seriously compromised if it were known that I had written 
a novel." Tyler Dennett, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New York: Dodd Mead, 1933), 
114-115. Hay was a vivid writer. He is sometimes remembered today for his felicitous phrase-
making, including his description of the Spanish-American War as that "splendid little war" and 
his laconic instruction to the American consul in Morocco on how to handle the kidnapping by 
the Moroccan bandit Raizuli of a supposed American citizen named Perdicaris ("Perdicaris 
alive or Raizuli dead"). Thayer, Life and Letters, 2:242, 337, 383. 
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physically repulsive ("oleaginous") thief, attempted murderer, conscienceless 
liar, and potentially fatal betrayer of the workers he purports to lead.15 
Neither Hay nor William Dean Howells, a literary contemporary and 
friend of Hay, regarded the novel as anti-union. In an anonymous preface to 
the 1899 edition, Hay insisted that the novel expressed "no opinion" of labor 
unions in general. "I have told about a little society," he wrote, "organized for 
his own ends by a criminal, who uses the labor-reformers' slang and 
something of their methods to swindle a few workmen out of their money." 
Howells, who favored the right to strike, wrote that the novel "shows no strong 
antipathy to strikers till they begin to burn and rob and propose to kill ."16 
Rather than specifically anti-union in content, construction, or style, the 
novel is an egalitarian parody of many social institutions and classes. Its 
principal symbol of capital, a factory magnate, is lampooned for his inability to 
speak without cursing, his inclination to unnecessary violence in defense of 
property, and his complacency about use of industrial and social spies. The 
15 The Breadwinners, 75, 81 , 90, 166, 208, 221 , 223-225, 238-239, 260, 27 4, 276. 
16 (John Hay), The Bread-Winners (New York: Harper, 1899), v-vi; George Monteiro and 
Brenda Murphy, eds., John Hay-Howells Letters: The Co"espondence of John Milton Hay and 
William Dean Howells 1861-1905 (Boston: Twayne, 1980), 135. For a contrary interpretation, 
see Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Cu"ents in American Thought, vol. 3, The Beginnings of 
Critical Realism in America 1860-1920 (New York: Harcourt, 1930), 173-179. The novel 
continues to invite conflicting social interpretations. Kenton J. Clymer, John Hay: The 
Gentleman as Diplomat (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 37, 224-225, shares 
the Parrington view. Dennett, John Hay, 103-104, 107, regards the novel as a sarcastic 
critique of Cleveland society, which Hay had experienced through his wife's family. In a third 
interpretation, Howard I. Kushner and Anne Hummel Sherrill, John Milton Hay: The Union of 
Poetry and Politics (Boston: Twayne, 1977), 53, 55, argue that the novel reflected Hay's Civil 
War orientation contrasting the national Union with labor unions by reflecting "the dangers 
posed by a working-class revolution [that] seemed to undercut the basis of national power and 
the Union's victory. • 
novel also pillories public officials for their self-serving use of patronage, as 
well as for their platitudinous embrace of labor against capital until laborers 
literally get in their way .17 
Contrary to the satirical treatment of these targets, the novel treats 
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striking workers almost sympathetically. The mass of strikers are good-natured 
and "ma[k]e no threats," and the strike does not cross law-and-order 
boundaries until the union leadership loses control because "a few tonguey 
vagrants and convicts from the city and neighboring towns" begin to exercise 
"wholly unexpected authority." The factory magnate directs his concern about 
violence at "a lot of bad eggs among the strikers- not the unionists proper." 
As for the villain's Brotherhood, it is a fringe group of a few disreputable men, 
does not have any leadership role in beginning the strike, and self-destructs 
when it stumbles in its effort to transform the strike into mob destruction of 
property because of personal grudges or opportunities for theft.18 
Instead of attacking the labor movement as such, the novel's more 
subtle point is that worker strikes unintentionally open a Pandora's box of 
misfits and attitudes that jeopardize society as a whole. The strike leads, even 
among non-strikers, to "curious signs of demoralization, as if the spirit of work 
was partially disintegrating."19 
17 The Breadwinners, 148-151, 183-187, 301 . 
18 1bid., 184, 215-216, 253-254. 
19 1bid., 191-192, 223-225, 234. 
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Hay's dismay about strikes reflected his personal assessment of the 
1877 railroad strikes that had turned into mob riots. In contemporaneous 
letters to his businessman father-in-law, he described the nation as "at the 
mercy of the mob" with the government "utterly helpless and powerless in the 
face of an unarmed rebellion of foreign workmen, mostly Irish." There were, 
Hay noted, "plenty of scoundrels to encourage them [workingmen] to all 
lengths." In an anonymous letter defending his novel, Hay argued that "no 
important strike has ever been carried through without violence." Privately, 
Hay expressed labor concerns that went beyond strikes, complaining that 
unions interfered with employees' rights to make their own employment 
agreements and select the trade they wanted.20 
In essence, Commonwealth v. Hunt and Hay's novel both seem to be 
asking how to approve of unions as societal partners while simultaneously 
preventing union tactics from harming either social norms or other segments of 
society with whom unions were supposedly not in conflict. Neither offered a 
solution. This was the labor context in which Roosevelt began his rise to 
political power. 21 
20 Thayer, Life and Letters, 2:1-2, 5; Dennett, John Hay, 112. 
21 One commentator argues that Hay's novel "offered a solution" of uniting the wealthy and 
wise at the lowest level of politics, in order to reconstitute "an eroding deference system.· 
Clymer, John Hay, 46, 47. There is, however, little evidence in the novel that Hay regarded his 
satirized propertied class as capable of solving either its political or social shortcomings. In 
contrast, another commentator observes more persuasively that Hay "stated vividly a problem 
which he could not solve: Dennett, John Hay, 117. Roosevelt's reaction to the novel and 
Hay's labor attitude is addressed below in the section on Octave Thanet. 
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Figure 2 
Ill. "A Little Loose on the Relations of Capital and Labor'': Pre-
Presidency 
In his 1913 Autobiography, Roosevelt seemed to divide his views of 
labor issues into two phases. As a young man, he was obtuse about social 
problems. As he matured, however, he became socially conscious. The 
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division is marked by changes in his understanding of the relative importance 
of individual responsibility and collective power. In the initial phase, 
individualism was triumphant, which he attributed largely to his Harvard 
education. What Harvard taught him was that "the whole duty of the man lay in 
thus making the best of himself," a duty that did not include joining with others 
"to make things better for the many by curbing the abnormal and excessive 
development of individualism in a few." In political economy, that meant 
devotion to "canonical" /aissez-faire doctrines. The Harvard of his day offered 
"almost no teaching of the need for collective action, and of the fact that in 
addition to, not as a substitute for, individual responsibility , there is a collective 
responsibility. "1 
In 1881 , not long after his Harvard graduation and at the age of twenty-
three, Roosevelt was elected to the New York State Assembly, one of the 
state's two legislative houses, where he was to serve for three years. He 
admittted in his Autobiography that he was not then "alive to social and 
industrial needs which (three decades later] we now all of us recognize." To be 
' Roosevelt, Autobiography, 27-28. 
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sure, the young legislator believed in "the virtues of consideration and fair 
dealing in business as between man and man, and especially as between the 
man who is an employer and the man who is an employee." That being said, 
however, Roosevelt underscored his lack of responsiveness to social reform 
by remembering that "as yet I understood little" of the effort "to secure a more 
genuine social and industrial justice."2 
It is therefore not surprising that Roosevelt's New York legislative votes 
did not often suggest progressivism on labor matters. He opposed union-
supported abolition of cheap convict contract labor; pay increases for city 
laborers, police, and firemen; limitation of daily work hours; and premium pay 
for working more than a specified number of hours. He did, however, vote for 
union-supported protective legislation for women and children, safety 
regulations for workers in various industries, and the establishment of a 
bureau of labor statistics. 3 
Intentionally or not, Roosevelt's autobiographical reminiscences of his 
early years of public service depict a snob at work.4 For his "slowness in 
grasping the importance" of controlling big business, he offered a "partial 
reason" that was not "an excuse or a justification." The reason was "the 
2 Ibid., 63, 79-80. 
3 Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 93-103, 106-107. Hurwitz characterizes Roosevelt's 
"anti-labor bias" as an accompaniment to his "guardianship of the public purse." Ibid., 100. 
4 Historians have documented his snobbish tendencies at Harvard and immediately 
afterwards. Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Coward, McCann, 
1979; Modern Library ed., 2001), 58, 99, 163-164; Wagenknecht, Seven Worlds , 111. 
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corrupt and unattractive nature of so many of the men [whom he did not 
identify] who championed poputar reforms, their insincerity, and the folly of so 
many of the actions ~hich they advocated." He blamed unnamed hypocritical 
demagogues, who openly defended labor and privately deserted it, for 
arousing his "indignant and contemptuous dislike," which in turn "prevented 
those of us whose instincts were sound from going as far as we ought to have 
gone along the lines of governmental control of corporations and 
governmental interference on behalf of labor. "5 
Roosevelt's Autobiography employs the mea culpa description of his 
early public service years to set the scene for his eventual epiphany, namely, 
his first personal experience of social injustice. He was appointed to a 
legislative committee studying a bill to prevent the manufacture of cigars in 
tenements where families also lived. The bill was sponsored by the Cigar 
Makers' Union, and driven largely by one of its officers, Samuel Gompers, the 
future president of the American Federation of Labor.6 Roosevelt initially 
regarded the bill as "contrary to the principles of political economy of the 
laissez faire kind; and the business men who spoke to me about it shook their 
5 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 80-81 , 92. 
6 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (New York: Dutton, 1925), 1:526. 
Interestingly, Roosevelt's Autobiography does not mention Gompers by name in connection 
with the tenement-house bill. Morris questions Roosevelt's assertion that the tenement-house 
bill was a turning point in his attitude toward labor and argues that "he 'matured' in this respect 
very slowly." Morris, Rise of TR, 810. 
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heads and said that it was designed to prevent a man doing as he wished and 
as he had a right to do with what was his own." 
Roosevelt's investigative visits to tenement houses shocked him to a 
new viewpoint. His "practical common sense" told him that th~ crowded, 
unhealthy conditions he witnessed made it impossible for the children living 
there to "grow up fitted for the exacting duties of American citizenship." 
Consequently, he successfully championed passage of the bill and then, at the 
request of "the battered, undersized foreigners who represented the Union and 
the workers," personally appealed to Governor Grover Cleveland to sign it. 
Cleveland signed the bill, but the highest court in New York State later 
declared it unconstitutional in the Jacobs case as a deprivation of personal 
liberty and property rights.7 Roosevelt, dismayed by the court's decision, said 
that the case "first waked me to a dim and partial understanding of the fact that 
the courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done to 
better social and industrial conditions."8 
7 1n the Matter of Application of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). The court refused to find that the 
statute's alleged protection of public health in tenement houses trumped personal and 
property rights, on the basis that cigar manufacturing was allowed elsewhere. Roosevelt's 
reference to the "battered, undersized" union representatives can be interpreted in a number 
of ways - disparaging, sympathetic, or factually consistent w ith the vivid physical description 
of Gompers in William Aile n VVhite, The Autobiography of William Allen White (New York: 
Macmillan, 1946), 580-581 . 
8 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 81-82. During his presidency, when a court used a freedom of-. 
contract argument to invalidate legislation beneficial to workers, Roosevelt belittled "the 
freedom of contract under which a half-starved and ignorant girl deprives herself of the right to 
protest against her employer's brutal disregard of the appalling danger to life and limb in which 
he has placed her." TR letter to William Howard Taft, July 15, 1907, in Morison, Letters of TR, 
5:719-720. Roosevelt reviled the legal formula of "liberty of contract," when used to invalidate 
worker-protection laws, as standing for the proposition that "men must not be deprived of their 
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In Roosevelt's tenement-house narrative, we can see a number of labor 
attitudes that surfaced throughout his career. He was sympathetic to workers 
who were mistreated. He regarded the government as the proper forum for 
correcting such abuses. Unions served a valuable purpose when they brought 
unfair working conditions to the government's attention. The courts could not 
be counted on to do right by workers. On the contrary, cases like Jacobs 
(echoing the effect of the Dred Scott decision before the Civil War) constituted 
"bars across the path of social reform" that "brought to naught so much of the 
effort to secure justice and fair dealing for workingmen and workingwomen, 
and for plain citizens generally. ,.g 
Labor reform to the Roosevelt of this period did not. however, depend 
on unions and certainly did not imply approval of union tactics. 10 As 
mentioned above. in 1886, two years after leaving the New York legislature, 
Roosevelt condemned Chicago's strike-related Haymarket Square bombing by 
focusing on the strikers. Writing to his sister, he said: 
My men here [on the ranch] are hard working, labouring men, 
who work longer hours for no greater wages than many of the 
strikers; but they are Americans through and through; I believe 
nothing would give them greater pleasure than a chance with 
their rifles at one of the mobs. When we get the papers, 
especially in relation to the dynamite burners, they become more 
' liberty' to work under unhealthy conditions.' Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism (New 
York: Outlook, 1910), 40-41. 
• Roosevelt, Autobiography, 83. 
10 Roosevelt's sense of the propriety or impropriety of a bill was Independent of union 
sponsorship. "For the labor unions, per se, I care absolutely nothing," he told the Assembly in 
1884, in explanation of his legislative philosophy. Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 15. 
furiously angry and excited than I do. I wish I had them with me 
and a fair show at ten times our number of rioters; my men shoot 
· well and fear very little.11 
This statement has come down to us as a blot on Roosevelt's labor 
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record.12 Its intemperate tone, however, rarely recurred in his later utterances 
about strikes, although its substance contains several themes that did. He 
regarded mob violence as un-American, and he associated it with strikes. 
When the two occurred together, Roosevelt was inclined to consider force or 
the threat of force as justifiable in order to suppress strike-related violence. 
Yet; we should not presume that the excited remark of the twenty-
seven-year-old Roosevelt, about a deeply shocking and unpopular incident, 
meant that he would always be violently predisposed against unions. Contrary 
to such a presumption, we know that Roosevelt used similar violent imagery to 
emphasize his feelings about a host of issues. For example, in the same year 
as the letter suggesting he would shoot rioting strikers, he made a speech 
saying hyperbolically that as an elected official he would "chop [the] head off' 
any public servant who was dishonest. Hofstadter, a less than admiring 
historian of Roosevelt's career, cuts TR some slack for his rhetorical ferocity 
11 TR letter to his sister Anna, May 15, 1886, in Cowles, Letters from TR, 80-81 . In 1884, 
Roosevelt had declined to run for another legislative term and moved from New York to North 
Dakota to become a cattle rancher. His escape from New York followed the double tragedy in 
February 1884 of the deaths of his mother and first w ife, who had just given birth to Alice, the 
first of TR's children. Morris, Rise of TR, 229-230, 248-249, 268-269, 829-830n. 
12 Harbaugh, Life and Times, 70. · 
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by observing that he discharged his penchant for violence "on a purely verbal 
level, appeased by exploding in every direction at once."13 
In another incident, Roosevelt used similarly violent language in 
connection with the 1912 Republican national convention at which he was 
defeated for the presidential nomination by then-President William Howard 
Taft. Alleging that the ·convention deployed police and barbed wire to 
intimidate Roosevelt supporters, he blamed such actions partially on the 
convention's chairman, Elihu Root, his formerly trusted friend and cabinet 
officer. He said that he ''wanted to take a pistol and go into the convention," 
where, if trouble started, "by George, I wouldn't have wasted a bullet on a 
policeman. I would have got Root and got him quick." The outburst was, 
however, evanescent. An observer noted that Roosevelt almost immediately 
metamorphosed into a smiling TR, "his rage being spent." Root acknowledged 
that, after the 1912 presidential campaign ended, he and TR became political 
confidants and "friends again without any discussion of the past."14 
In the same year as Roosevelt's 1886 violent outburst against the 
Chicago strikers, he became a central player in one of the era's most dramatic 
political confrontations between labor and capital, and he did not repeat the 
anti-striker tirade. Republican leaders in late 1886 persuaded the young 
13 Hagedorn, Works of TR, 14:73*74; Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, 228. 
14 White, Autobiography, 469, 494-495. Roosevelt's generally sympathetic biographer, 
Harbaugh, points out that TR was always "an extremist in speech when the battle was on," 
which can be read as a suggestion that his violent language was more of a tactic than an 
expression of enduring conviction. Life and Times, 141 , 292*293. 
Roosevelt to run for mayor of New York City. His opponents were a strong 
Democratic opponent, Congressman Abram S. Hewitt, and Henry George, a 
union-backed independent.15 
George had written a popular book, Progress and Poverty (1879), in 
which he blamed material progress for causing poverty and attributed this to 
the private ownership of land. His theory was that some landowners 
deliberately failed to make improvements on their land, speculating that land 
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values would inevitably rise. The result was lack of productive opportunities for 
both labor and capital, leading to the spread of poverty. George believed that 
the real "antagonism of interests" was land ownership vs. labor and capital, not 
labor vs. capital. His proposed solution was abolition of all taxes except a 
single tax on "land values, irrespective of improvements," which would 
encourage landowners to generate income by making improvements on their 
land, and thereby lead to more jobs with higher wages and investment of 
capital- and neither labor nor capital would have to pay taxes on their gains.16 
As noted earlier, the election year of 1886 was a time of widespread 
labor disturbances. In addition to the May strike accompanied by the 
Haymarket bombing, there had been approximately fifteen hundred strikes 
15 The campaign was short, Roosevelt and Hewitt having been selected by their parties' 
leaders less than a month before the election. Hewitt's biographer says that "never before or 
since have men of such ability" contended for the New York mayoralty. Allan Nevins, Abram 
S. Hewitt (New York: Harper, 1935), 460, 463. 
16 Morris, The Rise of TR, 339-341 ; Henry George, Progress and Poverty (New York: Modern 
Library ed., 1929), xi-xii, 9, 227, 252, 264, 272, 282, 418, 436, 438. 
nationwide and strike violence in New York City. George seized the moment 
as a time for change in New York governance and accepted the invitation of 
union leaders to run for mayor as an Independent Labor Party candidate, on 
condition of pledges of support from thirty thousand workingmen. Thirty-four 
thousand made the pledge. As a mayoral candidate, George called for "the 
ending of industrial slavery." Gompers, shortly to become president of the 
newly formed AFL, actively campaigned for George, and organized labor 
helped to fund George's race by levying a twenty-five cent per capita 
assessment on union members.17 
The paradox of George's union alliance was that George had grave 
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concerns about organized labor's effectiveness in solving social problems. He 
believed that unions' potential benefit to working people was "extremely 
limited" because wage increases achieved for workers in a particular trade 
increased prices and therefore tended to lessen demand for what they 
produced, and their wage gains were further diluted by attracting an excess of 
workers to that trade. Although proud of his former union membership, George 
openly frowned on strikes, notwithstanding his recognition that they were the 
essential method for union action, because they were "necessarily destructive" 
17 Morris, Rise of TR, 349, 829-830n; Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 114-117; Nevins, 
Hewitt, 461 ; Foner, HistoryofLaborMovement, 119-120, 123,125. 
of worker wealth and, like organizing for war, "necessarily tyrannical" as an 
infringement on personal freedom. 18 
The Democratic candidate, Hewitt, was the perfect counterpoint to 
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George and his labor supporters. A wealthy iron magnate as well as a member 
of Congress, Hewitt the businessman personified principles of social justice, 
having protected the jobs of his employees despite operating losses during the 
depression of the 1870s. He believed that strong unions could advance 
workers' economic interests, but he regarded a labor-dominated political party 
like that supporting George as representative only of one class of citizens. His 
fear was that this would undermine good government and the rights of other 
classes. He and George engaged in a public debate that a Roosevelt 
biographer summarizes as "a stately series of open letters which expounded 
the philosophies of Labor v. Capital [George arguing for social justice, Hewitt 
warning about the dangers of unionized politics] so brilliantly that Roosevelt 
himself suggested they should be published in book form."19 
The George-Hewitt labor debate was not a triangular correspondence. 
For reasons still not clear, Roosevelt was less confrontational than Hewitt 
about George's labor support. Nevertheless, both Roosevelt and Hewitt 
18 George, Progress and Poverty, 312-316. His alliance with unions was short-lived. After the 
election, trade unionists distanced themselves from George and his single-tax theory. FoneJ, 
HistoryofLaborMovement, 147-148, 152; Perlman, HistoryofTrade Unionism, 104. 
19 Nevins, Hewitt, 465-466; Morris, The Rise of TR, 353. Henry Adams, the intellectual in 
residence across the square from the White House, described Congressman Hewitt as "the 
most useful public man in Washington." Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Sentry ed., 1961), 294-295. 
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repudiated "class" politics. When Roosevelt in his writings invokes "class," 
whether based on wealth or occupation, he means it as a curse. He regarded 
class interests as a substitute "for devotion to the interest of the state and to 
the elementary ideas of morality." To him, division along class lines leads 
"inevitably" to the anti-democratic triumph of one class-based party over 
another and "the supremacy of a part over the whole," whether the ultimate 
result is oligarchy or "mob rule." In response to George's faction-directed claim 
that he ''would make a better mayor for the working men" of New York, 
Roosevelt simplified the philosophical divide between them, asserting that the 
issue was who would be the mayor for "every citizen of New York."20 
Apart from his use of coded language about "class," Roosevelt's 
campaign approach adhered to his earlier views that "individual setf-help" was 
the cure for social evils. Notwithstanding his espousal of the tenement-house 
bill, Roosevelt wrote a public letter arguing that class legislation was not the 
answer to social ills, any more "than you could do away with the bruises which 
you receive when you tumble down, by passing an act to repeal the laws of 
gravitation. "21 
20 Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life (New York: Century, 1900), 74-75, 78-79; 
Hagedorn, Works of TR, 14:74-76. 
21 Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 124 and n.66; Morris, Rise ofTR, 344-345. In an article 
he wrote then and republished in book form a decade later, Roosevelt expressed sympathy for 
working men while cautioning that "the state cannot ordinarily attempt to better the condition of 
a man or a set of men, but can merely see that no wrong is done him or them by anyone else." 
Roosevelt, American Ideals, 103. Roosevelt's preferred approach to advancing worker 
interests was his own experience in which his ranch employees had "some interest in the 
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Partially because of the Republican Party's last-minute decision to 
recommend shifting votes from Roosevelt to Hewitt in order to ensure 
George's defeat, Roosevelt ran third in the mayoral race, with 60,435 votes to 
Hewitt's 90,552 and George's 68,110. Roosevelt's interpretation of George's 
strong showing was that labor was "a new element to be bid for by the old 
parties." In an analysis of the election, Hurwitz argues that what Roosevelt 
learned "was to be more careful of public statements on his attitude toward the 
labor movement."22 We should, however, be wary of the implication that 
Roosevelt's subsequent statements and views about labor unions were based 
only on political considerations. 
From the time of Roosevelt's mayoral defeat in 1886 until his 
appointment as a New York City police commissioner in 1895, he did not hold 
a position from which he could act on matters of social justice or labor unions, 
but his reported comments indicate very little change in his generally negative 
attitude about organized labor.23 His reaction to the national government's 
handling of the Pullman strike and boycotts in 1894 shows not only his attitude 
profits" or had the opportunity to invest in the business. TR letter to a Henry George Campaign 
Club, October22, 1886, in Hagedorn, WorksofTR, 14:71. 
22 Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 137-138, 278; Nevins, Hewitt, 468. 
23 On December 9, 1894, Roosevelt wrote and later published a misanthropic letter to 
Columbia professor Brander Matthews that included but was not limited to organized labor. He 
wrote, "I know the populists and the laboring-men well, and their faults; I like to see a mob 
handled by the regulars, or by good State guards, and not over-scrupulous about bloodshed; 
but I know the banker, merchant and railroad king well too, and they also need education and 
sound chastisement." Roosevelt, American Ideals, 6-9, 13; Morison, Letters of TR, 1 :412. I do 
not interpret this as announcing a double standard based on class. Rather, Roosevelt was 
justifying bloodshed to control undesirable union behavior (an interpretation supported by the 
fact that he never equated union existence with mob status) while deeming less violent 
measures as appropriate responses to the state of being a capitalist. 
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at the time, but also provides a useful comparison to how (as we will see) he 
responded as president to another national crisis eight years later during the 
1902 anthracite coal strike. 
In 1894, workers employed by the Pullman sleeping-car manufacturer 
joined Eugene Debs's recently formed American Railway Union to protest rent 
increases in their company-supplied housing, alleged workplace abuses, and 
wage reductions. After a month on strike against the Pullman employer, the 
union decided to boycott any railroad that handled Pullman cars, eventually 
expanding the strike nationally to one hundred fifty thousand railroad workers. 
The boycotts substantially halted rail traffic, despite the continued work by 
members of traditional railroad brotherhoods (organized by craft in 
contradistinction to the American Railway Union's one-big-union policy of 
admitting to membership any railroad worker, skilled or unskilled). 
At the direction of President Grover Cleveland's attorney general, the 
national government obtained a sweeping court injunction against the strike 
and boycotts, in part because mail could not be delivered to some railroad-
served localities. Regarding the injunction as fatal to their strike and boycotts, 
Debs and his union disobeyed it and were held in contempt of court. President 
Cleveland then sent federal troops to enforce the injunction by force of arms, 
and Debs and other labor leaders were arrested.24 
24 Foner, History of Labor Movement, 2:255, 261 , 263-267, 269-270; Perlman, History of 
Trade Unionism, 137-139. 
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The United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld the injunction 
and contempt citations. Disapproving of settling labor disputes "by the club of 
the policeman and the bayonet of the soldier," the Court nevertheless declared 
that traditional criminal trials by local juries "would be doomed in advance to 
failure" when "the whole interests of the nation in these respects would be at 
the absolute mercy of a portion of the inhabitants of that single state." Since 
the Court knew that the Debs injunction had been enforced by club and 
bayonet, its reliance on judge-issued labor injunctions as a preferred 
pacification of labor disruption seems in retrospect to have been a triumph of 
wishfully selective thinking. In any event, the Pullman strike and boycotts 
ended in defeat for the American Railway Union, which soon disappeared. 
Roosevelt supported as "admirable" the Cleveland administration's "quick" and 
"emphatic" use of the labor injunction and federal troops, on the basis that it 
averted a repetition of the Paris Commune and "fierce social war."25 
As of 1895, Roosevelt still admitted only to. "dimly realiz[ing]" that 
beyond improvement in political conditions, there was a need "to improve 
economic conditions, and to secure social and industrial justice, justice as 
between individuals and justice as between classes." Assuming the duties that 
year of an appointed New York City police commissioner, Roosevelt coupled 
his "ignorance" of the full scope of causes of social injustice with being "well 
25 1n re Eugene Debs et al., 158 U.S. 564, 581-582, 583 (1895); Foner, History of Labor 
Movement, 276; Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction (New York: 
Macmillan, 1930), 17-19; Roosevelt, American Ideals, 6-8. 
awake to the need of making ours in good faith both an economic and an 
industrial as well as political democracy."26 
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From then until he was elected as President McKinley's vice president 
in 1900, Roosevelt held in succession four government offices- one of the 
four New York City police commissioner positions, assistant secretary of the 
navy, lieutenant colonel (promoted to colonel) of the Rough Rider cavalry 
regiment in the Spanish-American War, and governor of New York. In the first 
and last of these, Roosevelt built a more complicated intellectual structure in 
respect to social reform and labor unions. 
It is useful to begin a discussion of this period with Roosevelt's 
definition of "social and industrial problems," what he called in his 1913 
Autobiography "the most interesting and important of the problems with which 
our public life must deal." He described these problems as "the protection of all 
the crushable elements of labor," not just women and children; obtaining 
justice between "the big corporation" and its employees, its smaller rivals, its 
customers, and the general public; addressing concerns when rising dividends 
accompany falling wages; sharing the benefits of improved machinery with the 
workers who use the machinery; and creating "some correspondence" 
between rewarding workers and the value of their work. 
Organized labor could as easily have issued such a to-do list, but 
Roosevelt did not mention labor unions or their role in this discussion of "social 
26 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 162. 
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and industrial problems." Instead, Roosevelt delineated a non-union ranking of 
responsibilities to handle these problems: government first, then individual 
action ("the most vital of all factors" being individual character), and then non-
governmental "collective action" and specifically a "body of public opinion" that 
will"in the end transform, and be transformed by, the gradual raising of 
individual standards of conduct. "27 As shown by the Autobiography's later 
references to organized labor, he did not exclude unions from playing some 
role, but he was not inclined to put the union movement on the marquee. 
During his police commissionership, however, he found ways to relate 
to union leadership that he had not pursued since his tenement-house bill 
cooperation with the Cigar Makers' Union. He modified his prior attitude that 
many union leaders possessed a "corrupt and unattractive nature. "28 Instead 
of his statement as a mayoral candidate that legislation could no more cure 
social ills than it could repeal the laws of gravity, he also acknowledged that 
"sometimes [as expressly distinct from "always"] human affairs can be much 
bettered by legislation."29 
His old and newly emerging attitudes were not mutually exclusive. They 
converged in Roosevelt's handling of the police response to New York City 
strikes. During the winters of 1895.-1896 and 1896-1897, Roosevelt displayed 
his old attitude by assigning both uniformed and plainclothes policemen to 
27 1bid., 162-163. 
28 Ibid., 80-82. 
29 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 211 . 
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protect the cabs and other property of struck taxi companies. When a union 
official complained about such a police presence in the absence of rioting or 
mob violence, Roosevelt expanded his rationale for government action to 
prevent violence, by pointing to prior "brutal assaults on the peaceable 
employees of the New York Cab Company" plus his concern about "the 
slightest danger of one repetition of such an assault." He said that "if any man 
is incited to violence by the presence of an officer of the law, the very fact 
affords proof that he is of disorderly and vicious character. "30 
Yet, two weeks after making that statement, Roosevelt demonstrated 
his new attitude by meeting with union leaders to discuss the matter. ''We 
talked for over three hours with entire courtesy and also entire frankness," he 
told his si.ster, "and we got along together much better than I had expected. In 
fact, I think we parted distinctly pleased with one another."31 Roosevelt's 
powerful and persuasive personality probably contributed to the friendly 
outcome of his meeting with the New York labor leaders.32 Beyond that, he 
also assured the union leaders that the labor men "were allowed to picket just 
30 Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 168-170; TR letter to union official Jacob E. Bausch, 
January 12, 1897, in Morison, Letters of TR, 1:575-576. As police commissioner, his 
"sympathy was for the friends, and not the foes, of order. If a mob threatened violence we 
were glad to have the mob hurt." Roosevelt, American Ideals, 166. 
31 TR letter to sister Anna, January 31, 1897, in Cowles, Letters from TR, 203. 
32 A Kansas newspaper editor remembered his first meeting with Roosevelt in 1897 as having 
set the editor "afire with the splendor of the personality I had met." White, Autobiography, 297. 
Wagenknecht describes his effect on people as "all tonic." Seven Worlds, 10-11, 107-108. On 
a more subdued note, even the "peevish" Henry Adams (to use D. W . Brogan's word), who 
knew TR well and famously mocked him as "pure act" {"the singular primitive quality that 
belongs to ultimate matter -the quality that mediaeval theology assigned to God"}, also 
recognized Roosevelt as "always an amusing talker" whose "vigor of view" one had to admire. 
Adams, Education, xi, 417, 464. 
so far as under the law picketing could be permitted, so that the strikers had 
ample opportunity peacefully to persuade other labor men not to take their 
places." But even then he insisted upon "the keeping of order" as a 
prerequisite to resolving "all other questions" and said that "no rioter was 
permitted to masquerade under the guise of being a friend of labor or a 
sympathizer with labor."33 
In his Autobiography, written sixteen years after this labor meeting, 
Roosevelt emphasized his friendliness to organized labor. "By this time," he 
wrote, "I was becoming a strong believer in labor unions. a strong believer in 
the rights of labor." On that score, the Autobiography took some historical 
liberties, because at the time of the labor meeting he had also written that 
labor leaders were "the worst foe of the poor man• when they taught that the 
poor were victims of "conspiracy and injustice." He regarded the "average" 
labor leader as uncooperative in helping to achieve civic improvements and 
largely "sullen," "shortsighted," and unpatriotic.34 
Despite the inconsistency between his contemporary writings and his 
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later Autobiography, Roosevelt seems to have found a formula for dealing with 
union leaders, namely, openly embracing both the leaders and the principle of 
unionization without abandoning his law-and-order approach to strikes. 
Roosevelt believed this had persuaded some labor leaders to accept his 
33 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 207. 
34 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 212, 214. 
42 
sincerity, because when he left the police commissionership in April1897, 
several of them told him they were sorry to see him depart. One of them wrote 
that he was "particularly grateful for your liberal attitude toward organized 
. labor, your cordial championship of those speaking in behalf of the toilers, and 
your evident desire to do the right thing as you saw it at whatever cost. "35 
Roosevelt nevertheless firmly believed that prevention of labor violence 
involved more than suppressing violence after it occurred. It also required 
action in anticipation of lawbreaking. If, as his taxi strike approach showed, his 
goal was to prevent violence, then a relevant question is how far he thought 
government should go. While police commissioner, Roosevelt opposed 
legislation that would have prohibited using detectives to infiltrate 
organizations in order to obtain evidence to convict potential lawbreakers. 
Explaining his position, he used a labor example. He referred to "[t]he 'Molly 
Maguires' who terrorized a large section of Pennsylvania through murder, 
arson, and violence of every kind, [and] were broken up by the employment of 
the very means which these bills would forbid the police force of New York to 
employ."36 
35 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 207. 
36 TR letter to Francis M. Scott, February 11 , 1896, in Morison, Letters of TR, 1:513. Dubofsky, 
Industrialism, 34-38, provides a brief history of the labor conflict in Pennsylvania's anthracite 
coal fields in the 1870s, culminating in the trials of violent members of the Irish secret society 
known as the Molly Maguires, whom the prosecution linked with the miners' union. Roosevelt 
wrote elsewhere that "the function of the detective is primarily that of the spy" and that it was 
"absolutely necessary to employ him." Roosevelt, American Ideals, 163. Side by side with his 
belief that government's duty was to keep militant labor in check, Roosevelt at this period of 
his life seemed still to harbor doubts that labor unions were necessary. He wrote to a British 
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After the election of McKinley as president in 1896, the new 
administration in Washington appointed him to federal positions that allowed 
him to gain political respect and national fame during 1897-1898. His cunning 
advocacy of naval preparedness as assistant secretary of the navy in 
Washington and especially his Rough Rider heroism in Cuba during the war 
with Spain led to Roosevelt's election as governor of New York State in 
1898.37 
One of the most intriguing contemporary statements of Roosevelt's 
labor attitude occurred in the spring of 1899, when Roosevelt ~ad been 
governor for only a few months. Senator Thomas C. Platt, the "Boss" of New 
York State's Republican Party, wrote to him and alluded to "many views" at the 
time of the gubernatorial nominating process that Roosevelt was "a little loose 
on the relations of capital and labor, on trusts and combinations, and, indeed, 
on those numerous questions which have recently arisen in politics affecting 
the security of earnings and the right of a man to run his own business in his 
own way, with due respe.ct of course to the Ten Commandments and the 
Penal Code." Platt grouped this somewhat vague catalogue under the vaguer 
friend in 1897 that "in our country at any rate, I am convinced that there is no real oppression 
of the mass of the people by these capitalists. The condition of the workman and the man of 
small means has been improved." TR letter to Cecil Spring Rice, May 29, 1897, in Morison, 
Letters of TR, 1 :620. See also Roosevelt's 1894 comment that "The workingman is, on the 
whole, better fed, better clothed, better housed, and provided with greater opportunities for 
pleasure and for mental and spiritual improvement than ever before." Roosevelt, American 
Ideals, 264. 
37 Although beyond the scope of this study, Roosevelt's pre-gubernatorial career during 1897-
1898 is elegantly summarized in Morris, Rise of TR, 592-633, 643-644 (Washington) and 670-
676, 681-688 (Cuba). 
44 
notion that "a number of business men" believed that Roosevelt "entertained 
various altruistic ideas."38 
The reason behind Platt's letter was not a labor issue. Its genesis was 
Governor Roosevelt's having, "at the last moment" of the New York legislative 
session, done "a thing which has caused the business community of New York 
to wonder how far the notions of Populism, as laid down in Kansas and 
Nebraska, have taken hold upon the Republican party of the State of New 
York." The "thing" that Roosevelt had done was to support, strongly and 
successfully, a bill to tax the franchises granted to corporations that operated 
electric street car lines in big cities like New York and Buffalo.39 
Roosevelt seized upon the labor reference to defend himself by 
insisting that his attitude toward organized labor actually proved his support of 
business interests. He reminded Platt of his response as governor to a recent 
strike by seven thousand dock workers in Buffalo, when he had stood ready to 
call out the National Guard to "intimidate" any labor man "anxious to commit 
lawlessness." Roosevelt argued that taxing corporations would make the 
Republican Party "all the stronger when we declare that the laborers shall 
38 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 307-310. TR in his first annual message as governor on January 
2, 1899, did speak favorably of what "organization and association, as has been shown by the 
careers of many of the trade-unions and labor federations," might do to "supplemenr 
individual self-help. Hagedorn, Works of TR, 15:9. Platt did not refer to the message in his 
"little loose" letter. 
39 Roosevelt , Autobiography, 308; TR letter to his sister Anna, May 1, 1899, in Morison, 
Letters of TR, 2:1000. When Roosevelt later discussed his disagreements with Platt and the 
latter's reasons for wanting TR out of the governorship in 1900, TR did not mention labor 
matters. TR letter to Herbert Croly, December 20, 1911, in Morison, Letters of TR, 7:458. 
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commit no disorder and that we are utterly against any attack on the lawful use 
of wealth." There were evils to be corrected, he wrote to Platt, and he urged 
that "whereas the populists, socialists and others really do not correct the evils 
at all ... on the contrary we Republicans hold the just balance and [should] 
set our faces as resolutely against improper corporate influence on the one 
hand as against 'demagogy and mob rule on the other.'140 In other words, 
Roosevelt portrayed his tough stance against union militancy as redeeming his 
tough stance against corporations. 
Although the absence of violence and a relatively quick labor settlement 
made it unnecessary for him to send troops to the Buffalo dock strike 
mentioned in his letter to Platt, Roosevelt turned threat into action the following 
year, in April 1900, when he sent thirteen hundred National Guardsmen to 
police a strike by non-union workers constructing the Croton Dam. The troops 
kept the strikers from gathering in crowds, protected the few strikebreakers, 
and arrested strike ringleaders. Writing to a friend after one of the soldiers had 
been shot, Roosevelt admitted that the cause of the strike might well have 
been employer unfairness to the workers, but ''where the riotous Italians [who 
preponderated in the workforce] have begun by assassinating one of the 
40 TR letter to Platt, May 8, 1899, in Morison, Letters of TR, 2:1004-1 006; Hurwitz, TR and 
Labor in New York, 244-245; Chessman, Governor TR, 149-150, 215-217. 
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National Guard ... we have got to put them down and shall do it at any 
cost."41 
Just as Roosevelt insisted that he provided assistance to corporations 
through governmental restraint on organized labor's militancy, he utilized a 
similar backdoor argument to show his support for unions. Governor Roosevelt 
contended that "I have been all along the staunchest believer in the immense 
possibilities for good through the organization of labor," based on his support 
of labor actions that paralleled union goals, namely, limiting daily hours of 
work, elimination of sweatshops, efficient government enforcement of a factory 
inspection Jaw, and appointment of union men to various state jobs.42 
Roosevelt's pro-labor self-justification, although generally accurate,43 
requires some qualification. His support of worker legislation did not arise in 
lockstep with its endorsement by organized labor. On the contrary, in 1899 he 
vetoed a union-supported bill limiting the hours of drug clerks, based on 
concerns about its effect on smaller druggists and his characterization of the 
41 Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 251-253; TR letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, April17, 
1900, in Morison, Letters of TR, 2:1265; Chessman, Governor TR, 221-223. Although 
Roosevelt told his sister that sending the militia to Croton Dam had angered "the federation of 
labor," Chessman argues that there was little union support for the non-union Italian workers, 
because they were difficult to organize, were ineligible to vote, and competed for union 
members' jobs. TR letter to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, April 30, 1900, in Morison, Letters of TR, 
2:1277; Chessman, Governor TR, 223. 
42 TR letters to Edward M. Brown, July 27, 1899; and William Webster, railroad union member 
and diplomat, April16, 1900, in Morison, Letters of TR, 2:1042, 930n, 1264 ("You know how 
heartily I sympathize with what is known as the labor element and I have tried in every way 
both in my administration and in the procurement of legislation to do everything I can for them; 
but order must be maintained and violence checked at the very outset of the slightest 
faltering .") 
43 Chessman, Governor TR, 202-204, 207-212; Morris, Rise of TR, 735. 
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bill's union advocates as showing only that "they go for anything that calls for 
shorter hours.'144 He did not hesitate to look behind union rationales for 
particular pieces of legislation, as in his determination to veto a union-
sponsored bill designed to transfer non-union prison manufacture of school 
furniture to private manufacturers. Despite his stated desire "to do anything I 
properly can for'' the unions, "it seems to me that this bill is really in the interest 
of one big furniture firm and that we ought to be very cautious about breaking 
down our present system of employment in the prisons."45 
Similarly, although Governor Roosevelt sought to amplify his outreach 
to union leaders that marked his police commissionership, by following their 
recommendations for appointments to state jobs, he bowed to political and 
practical obstacles. Thus, he withdrew the appointment of Henry White, a 
founder of the United Garment Workers union, as chief factory inspector, when 
"Boss" Platt objected. Even when he was able to appoint wageworkers 
recommended by labor leaders, he was frustrated by their performance. "What 
I did not foresee," he lamented, ''was their intense jealousy of one another." 
This persuaded him that in the future he should appoint the best 
administrators "without regard to whether these men were wageworkers or 
44 TR letters to his friend and social reformer Jacob Riis, May 11 and 13, 1899, in Morison, 
Letters of TR, 2:1010, 1012. In 1900, Roosevelt signed another bill establishing a seventy-
hour per week work limitation for drug clerks. Ibid., 2:101 On; Chessman, Governor TR, 204-
205. 
45 TR letter to Joseph Bucklin Bishop, May 12, 1900, in Morison, Letters ofTR, 2:1282. 
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not.'>46 By the time of his New York governorship, therefore, Roosevelt was no 
longer a snob about social issues or labor unions. He was instead treating 
organized labor as a mechanism to be used for achieving his broader 
policies.47 Hurwitz contends that the gambit "failed to win the support of either 
labor or capital," but by 1900 it did not inhibit the Republican Party from 
nominating TR to run for vice president on McKinley's re-election ticket.48 
46 Morison, Letters of TR, 2:946n; TR letters to Josephine Shaw Lovell, February 20, 1900; 
and Thomas A Fulton, April14, 1900, in Morison, Letters ofTR, 2:1194-1195, 1261-1262. 
See Chessman, Governor TR, 200-201, for Roosevelt's early gubernatorial consultation on 
labor matters with White and other "prominent trade unionists." 
47 1n the second year of his governorship, Roosevelt even argued that strikes in New York 
State proved that prosperity had arrived, because they were predominantly for wage 
increases, rather than against wage reductions. TR's annual gubernatorial message, January 
3, 1900, in Hagedorn, Works of TR, 15:48. · 
48 Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New .York, 255. As noted, Greenberg's analysis of Roosevelt's 
labor views expressly disagrees with Hurwitz's overall conclusions. Greenberg, TR and Labor, 
76-77. Hurwitz's more specific interpretations have also been criticized , including with respect 
to his treatment of organized labor as monolithic, instead of divided by religious and political 
issues; his "intimation" that TR's personnel decisions were exclusively political; and his 
"exaggeration" of labor protests against TR's military response to the Croton Dam labor 
dispute. Chessman, Governor TR, 207n, 209-210n.15, 223n.43. Labor issu~s may not have 
had anything to do with TR's vice-presidential nomination. Historians concur that "Boss" Platt 
supported the nomination in order to .get Governor Roosevelt out of New York. Harbaugh, Life 
and Times, 130-134; Pringle, TR, 151-155. 
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IV. The Labor Union "Has Come to Stay": Presidential Rhetoric 
From the time he became president in 1901 upon the death of the 
assassinated President McKinley, Roosevelt often spoke favorably, if 
qualifiedly, about labor unions. A characteristic statement was included in his 
acceptance of the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1904, when he 
declared, "We recognize the organization of capital and the organization of 
labor as natural outcomes of our industrial system." A few months earlier, he 
had written to a supporter, "I want it understood that I am not against unions 
any more than I am against corporations." But he revealingly added, "I am 
against abuses in both."1 
Roosevelt made a more detailed statement of his qualified 
endorsement of organized labor early in 1904, when he wrote to his eldest 
son, then sixteen years old, about how to discuss unions. "I would not discuss 
the labor-union question from the side that labor unions are harmful," he wrote. 
"I think they are beneficial if handled as they should be, and that the attack 
should be made, not upon the principle of association among working people, 
1 TR letters to Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon, September 12, 1904; and Herman 
Kohlsaat, July 20, 1904, in Morison, Letters of TR, 4:927, 862. In his book about Roosevelt's 
presidential years, a recent biographer opines that middle age and the Spanish-American 
War's democratizing effect "had moderated his [TR's] attitude toward organized labor'' by the 
time he became president. Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex (New York: Random House, 2001), 
32. The biography, however, is short on analysis of Roosevelt's labor views, an omission that 
the biographer hopefully will rectify in an anticipated third volume of his TRilogy (following The 
Rise of Theodore Roosevelt and Theodore Rex) covering the post-presidential years. 
so 
but upon the abuses in the manifestation of that principle. "2 He realized that 
this was a challenging distinction. As he told a favorite correspondent in 
England after the 1904 election, "Somehow or other we shall have to work out 
methods of controlling the big corporations without paralyzing the energies of 
the business community and of preventing any tyranny on the part of the labor 
unions while cordially assisting in every proper effort made by the 
wageworkers to better themselves by combinations."3 
There is in these letters a sense that unions, as well as big business, 
tend toward abuse, even evil, and need to be "handled" or managed by 
government. Indeed, in another letter to the same English correspondent, 
Roosevelt explicitly argued that both corporations and labor unions "are potent 
weapons for evil, when under the control of unscrupulous men.'"' Roosevelt 
was skeptical that Americans could count on the fairness or public spirit of 
either business managers or union representatives, and he sought to stake out 
a position where he was not the political agent of either side in labor conflicts. 
He told a journalist who requested a statement of Roosevelt's real views about 
organized labor, "My action on labor should always be considered in 
connection with my action as regards capital , and both are reducible to my 
2 TR letter to Theodore Jr., January 29, 1904, in Morison, Letters ofTR, 4:713 {emphasis 
added). 
3 TR letter to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, March 9, 1905, In Morison, Letters of TR, 4:1133. 
• TR letter to Trevelyan, May 13, 1905, in Morison, Letters of TR, 4:1174. 
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favorite formula- A square deal for every man. "5 No wonder that 
contemporaries found, and historians have continued to find, difficulty in 
defining Roosevelt as either pro-union or anti-union. 
We can observe President Roosevelt trying to define his labor views in 
each of his eight year-end official messages to Congress. The purpose of the 
messages was to describe what he considered to be the issues of the moment 
and to suggest ways of dealing with them.6 Every message contains 
references either to labor matters in general or to organized labor specifically, 
and sometimes to both. What is remarkable from the perspective of our 
current union-saturated legal environment is how little legislation Roosevelt 
proposed for the benefit of organized labor, as distinct from legislation 
beneficial to workers generally, and how he inevitably balanced praise for 
organized labor with cautionary words? 
As the starting point of his first message, Roosevelt drew lessons from 
the assassination of President McKinley. Pointing to "the reckless utterances" 
of anarchists who inflamed the assassin by appealing "to the dark and evil 
spirits of malice and greed, envy and sullen hatred," he argued that 
5 TR letter to Ray Stannard Baker, August 27, 1904, in Morison, Letters of TR, 4:908. 
6 President Roosevelt sent over four hundred messages to Congress. Lewis L. Gould, The 
Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1991 ), 11 . 
7 The absence of union-focused legislative proposals reflected to some degree the political' 
realities of TR's time. Congressmen like Speaker of the House Joe Cannon opposed any 
government support for labor unions. From a very different standpoint, the AFL distrusted 
government regulation and also preferred to keep government from taking the lead ahead of 
organized labor in establishing labor improvements. Greenberg, TR and Labor, 347, 355-356, 
455, 460-461 . 
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inflammatory speech was dangerous to society. This was an accusation that in 
later years he would apply directly to public statements of labor leaders. 8 "The 
wind is sowed by the men who preach such doctrines," he warned, "and they 
cannot escape their share of responsibility for the whirlwind that is reaped." 
On labor matters, however, Roosevelt spoke positively. He told 
Congress that the purpose of American political institutions was to "afford 
opportunity to every honest and intelligent son of toil." In that spirit, he 
proposed that the government regulate the labor of women and children, as 
well as the hours of work and the sanitary conditions of all employees of the 
government and its contractors. He proposed a department of commerce and 
industries to concern itself with, among other business issues, "whatever 
concerns labor."9 
As for labor unions, "[v]ery great good has been and will be 
accomplished" by them, provided -- and here, again, is the dichotomy in 
Roosevelt's labor union rhetoric -- that they are "managed with forethought, 
and when they combine insistence upon their own rights with law-abiding 
respect for the rights of others."10 While repeatedly recognizing in later 
8 For example, in his famous "man with the muckraken speech, on April 14, 1906, Roosevelt 
included a reference to "the so-called labor leader who clamorously strives to excite a foul 
class feeling on behalf of some other labor leader who is implicated in murder." Hagedorn, 
Works of TR, 16:420. 
9 Hagedorn, Works of TR, 15:84, 93-94. These were legislative goals that TR repeatedly 
proposed; in subsequent messages he added recommendations for safety, employers' 
liability, workers' compensation , unemployment insurance, and old-age pension legislation. 
Ibid., 15:218, 283-284, 358-359, 435, 437-438, 501-502. 
10 Hagedorn. Works of TR, 15:84, 93-95 (emphasis added). 
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messages that America was in "an era of federation and combination" of both 
capital and labor that should not be attacked "as such," he continued to 
emphasize the dichotomy. Both kinds of combination could do good, but "as a 
necessary corollary they can both do evil." He called for opposition to 
"whatever is bad in the conduct of any given corporation or union," identifying 
the "bad" as including "arbitrary or tyrannous interference with the rights of 
others."11 
These are, of course, abstractions that do not define what constitutes 
"evil" or the "bad," the boundaries of labor rights vs. public or employer rights, 
or how to resolve conflicts between opposing assertions of right. Moreover, 
despite his personal intervention to resolve the 1902 anthracite coal strike (as 
discussed below), Roosevelt seemed reluctant to have the national 
government either define or police such issues. In his 1904 message, he 
asserted that the states had "primary control of the police power," which meant 
that federal interference should be limited to "altogether extreme" 
circumstances either for labor rights or against "unruly persons who shield 
themselves behind the name of labor." The only extremes he acknowledged 
as sufficient to invoke federal power were interference with federal property or 
rights, or if a state called for federal help in a crisis. Even then, federal 
intervention to assist_ the states should be restricted to "restoring order without 
11 Ibid. , 15:148, 171. 
regard to the questions which have caused the breach of order . .. all other 
questions sink into abeyance until order has been restored. "12 
In Roosevelt's final four annual messages (1905-1908), there was a 
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definite shift in tone and content that did not favor organized labor. Roosevelt's 
perception was that labor disputes were tending to degenerate into class 
conflict, which he warned was a threat to the republic. He began the shift by 
condemning as "most unwise" organized labor's efforts to have Congress 
legislate limits on the judiciary's power to grant injunctions in labor disputes. 
Although he recognized that the injunctive power had sometimes ·been 
misused, that did not "justify a denial of the power any more than an improper 
exercise of the power to call a strike by a labor leader would justify the denial 
of the right to strike." He did, however, suggest imposing on the courts a 
requirement of due notice to adverse parties before granting a labor injunction. 
In addition, rather than limiting federal intervention in labor disputes to extreme 
circumstances, Roosevelt began to call for a greater federal role in labor 
disputes. He advocated federal investigation of the issues in "any great labor 
disturbance," followed by publicity about its findings.13 
In 1906, he intensified his opposition to organized labor's desire to 
abolish labor injunctions. "It is criminal to permit sympathy for criminals to 
weaken our hands in upholding the law," he said, "and if men seek to destroy 
12 1bid., 15:215-216. 
13 1905 message in Hagedorn, Works of TR, 15:284, 286-287. 
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life or property by mob violence there should be no impairment of the power of 
the courts to deal with them in the most summary and effective way possible." 
In an echo of his attack on preachers of violence whom he had accused of 
provoking McKinley's assassin, he inveighed against preaching "mere 
discontent" by men "who seek to excite a violent class hatred against all men 
of wealth." Accompanying such heated language was the most far-reaching 
legislative proposal Roosevelt had yet made to deal with labor disputes. He 
called it "compulsory investigation" of labor disputes, in which the parties 
would be required to explain their respective positions to a non-binding but 
"unprejudiced body representing the nation," thereby enabling public opinion 
to "crystallize and thus to exert its full force for the right. "14 
Whether or not "compulsory investigation" and a "crystallized" public 
opinion could ever be sufficient to achieve labor peace, Roosevelt's embrace 
of these notions demonstrated recognition that labor conflict was increasing. 
His 1907 message spelled out the magnitude of the dilemma posed by a more 
militant form of organized labor. During the five years ending on December 31 , 
1905, Roosevelt noted, the number of strikes and lockouts was double the 
number of those in the preceding five years and greater than in any prior ten-
year period. The trade union, like the corporation, "has come to stay," he 
14 Hagedorn, Works of TR, 15:347, 356, 361-362. 
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observed, and both shared responsibility with politicians for labor problems.15 
The president's 1908 message to Congress seems notable today for its 
despair over both conservative business interests and militant labor leaders. 
On one side, "a blind and ignorant resistance to every effort for the reform of 
abuses and for the readjustment of society to modern industrial conditions 
represents not true conservatism, but an incitement to the wildest radicalism." 
On the other side, "certain leaders of organized labor" were still attacking the 
judiciary's power in labor matters, "refusing all compromise," and seeking an 
outcome that would legalize blacklisting, boycotts, secondary boycotts, and 
giving juries power in contempt of court trials that was previously the 
responsibility of judges. This was "the enthronement of class privilege in its 
crudest and most brutal form, and the destruction of one of the most essential 
functions of the judiciary in all civilized lands." 
Unions' class-selfishness, he feared, would lead to a division of society 
and "would inevitably in the end cause a violent reaction." He continued to 
propose worker-friendly legislation and "some way" to limit the abuse of labor 
injunctions, but he also suggested blurring the distinction between employer 
and employee, by giving the latter the opportunity to "own a far greater share 
than at present of the wealth they produoe."16 
15 Ibid., 15:4 13, 436-439. Roosevelt also used the "come to stay" phrase years earlier in a 
letter to a journalist. TR letter to Ray Stannard Baker, October 21, 1903, in Morison, Letters of 
TR, 3:636. 
16 Hagedorn, Works of TR, 15:499-501 , 505-506. 
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In late January 1908, Roosevelt sent Congress a special message 
containing strong criticisms of business. Roosevelt advocated expansion of 
government supervision over virtually all aspects of railroad operations and 
chastised great corporations and their representatives for teaching dishonesty 
as the path to business success. This did not mean elevating the power of 
unions as a counterweight to corporations. "If a labor union does wrong, we 
oppose it as firmly as we oppose a corporation which does wrong," he said, 
"and we stand equally strongly for the. rights of the man of wealth and for the 
rights of the wageworker."17 
Roosevelt's reactions to two Supreme Court decisions that had been 
issued earlier in the month of his special message suggest where his labor 
priorities resided. Both cases had declared federal labor legislation 
unconstitutional on the ground that the laws sought to regulate intrastate 
actions, because congressional authority was limited to interstate commerce. 
In the Howard case, the Court struck down an employers' liability law that 
provided compensation when railroad employees were killed on the job due to 
the negligence of others. Although the employee in the case was on an 
interstate trip, the Court said the statute was also broad enough to cover 
employees who worked excl usively in a single state. Since such employees 
were constitutionally subject only to state law, this "interblending" of interstate 
17 The special message is published in Morison, Letters of TR, 6:1575-1577, 1580, 1582; see 
Gould, Presidency of TR, 275-276. 
and intrastate workers rendered the statute unconstitutional.18 Roosevelt 
asked Congress for a new law covering only those employees engaged in 
interstate commerce. 
In the other case, Adair, the Court struck down a statute making it a 
federal crime to discharge an employee, even if engaged exclusively in 
intrastate work, because of union membership.19 That decision had an 
obviously negative impact on unions. Roosevelt circumspectly urged 
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Congress's "careful consideration" of the case while he decided "in what way 
to call the matter to your attention."20 One explanation for the circumspection 
is that the case was decided only a few days before, in contrast to the several 
weeks during which he had to consider the first case. That being said, 
however, there was a level of urgency in Roosevelt's request for new 
legislation addressing employee safety that did not appear with respect to 
replacing a law that primarily benefited union interests. 
18 Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1908). As explained in the dissent by 
Justice Moody, a Roosevelt appointee to the Court, the majority decision blocked Congress's 
intent to provide greater protection to employees in four instances disallowed by the CQmmon 
law and not otherwise covered by state law. The federal statute would have allowed recovery 
for death in addition to injury, when the injury or death was caused by the negligence of 
another employee, when the injured/killed employee's own contributory negligence was 
relatively slight, and in spite of employment contracts that purported to waive the employee's 
r~ht to damages. 207 U.S. at 536-537. 
1 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
20 Morison, Letters of TR, 6:1572-1575. 
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Presidential words provide important clues to what Roosevelt thought 
abOut unions, but behind his words was what he liked to call his big stick, 
which leads next to examination of how he wielded that stick in labor matters.2' 
21 Roosevelt wrote to Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University on August 29, 1903, that 
his speeches necessarily dealt in generalities. but that his actions •are concrete and speak for 
themselves." Morison, Letters of TR, 3:579. 
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V. '~Each .Given Case As It Arose": Presidential Actions 
In his Autobiography, Roosevelt wrote that when he became president, 
he believed in efficient government, in industrial and political democracy, in 
people's rights, and "in invoking the National power with absolute freedom for 
every National need." But as to his realization of these high-minded 
abstractions, " [i]n internal affairs I cannot say that I entered the Presidency 
with any deliberately planned and far-reaching scheme of social betterment." 
Instead, "I was content to wait and see what method might be necessary in 
each given case as it arose."1 Action "in each given case as it arose," 
however, begs the question of what principles held the cases together. 
Like his carefully balanced labor rhetoric, President Roosevelt's labor 
actions do not fully answer the question. His actions in respect to seven union-
related subjects underscore the puzzle created by his words. These subjects 
are labor legislation and enforcement that improved American conditions of 
work; intervention to resolve the 1902 anthracite coal strike; use of the military 
in labor conflicts; resistance to organized labor's goal of mandatory union 
membership of all employees whom they claimed to represent; criteria for 
Supreme Court nominations; modification rather than (as unions wanted) 
elimination of judicial injunctions against union conduct; and the creation and 
demise of a Foundation for the Promotion of Industrial Peace. 
1 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 400-401. 
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A. Labor Legislation and Enforcement 
The Autobiography's chapter on "Social and Industrial Justice" begins 
by emphasizing government action for the betterment of working people. 
There is no mention of legislation to assist unions or union organization, one 
reason being that President Roosevelt had not sought such legislation. His 
recital of the actions he took as president "to fight for the rights of the 
workingman" were making the national government "a model employer of 
labor," seeking "good laws" for workers wherever the national government had 
power, and enforcing the existing eight-hour workday law. The meaning of 
"labor'' in reciting his commitments to social and industrial justice simply does 
not include labor organizations.2 
More specifically, the "good laws" mentioned in the Autobiography are 
workmen's compensation for federal employees, health protections for miners 
in the territories and for motormen and conductors on street railways in the 
District of Columbia, supervision of District employment agencies, safety 
requirements for factory employees in the District and for interstate railway 
employees, and a new employers' liability law for interstate railroads after the 
courts had declared a prior law unconstitutional. All of these laws and actions 
2 Roosevelt as president offered a similar recital in a long Jetter he wrote to a railway union 
member and then released publicly as a campaign document in support of Taft's presidential 
candidacy. Apart from an introductory statement of his pride at being an honorary member of 
a railway union and a discussion of the legal right of uworkingmen" to strike and picket, most of 
the letter is devoted to what his administration had done for workers and what he expected 
Taft to continue doing if elected. Union contributions were treated as little more than incidental 
to worker betterment. TR letter to P. H. Grace, October 19, 1908, in Morison, Letters of TR, 
5:1295-1302. 
were expressions of Roosevelt's feeling "most strongly that all that the 
government could do in the interest of labor should be done."3 
It was not merely a stylistic choice that Roosevelt began his 
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autobiographical chapter on labor matters without mentioning labor unions. It 
reflected the substantive advice he had given in 1904 to his former attorney 
general, Philander C. Knox, upon the latter's election to the Senate. Roosevelt 
was then at the height of his power and fame, having overwhelmingly been 
elected president the week before, and his letter reads like an anointment of 
Knox as his senatorial tribune. He told Knox that the great challenge of the day 
was that the organized labor movement was growing as "a factor of vital 
importance" in American society and politics. In response, continuation of a 
conservative, business-first Republican hostility would lead to "a radical and 
extreme democracy with a crash which will be disastrous to the Nation." 
Roosevelt feared the "dreadful calamity" of a nation divided between two 
parties: property owners and conservatives against wageworkers and the less 
prosperous. 4 
Having dramatically described the challenge, Roosevelt went on to 
share with Knox his conceptual cure. He concentrated on government's 
beneficence to working people, not on what their representatives in organized 
labor could do for them. "We must not only do justice," he wrote, "but be able 
3 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 476-478. See Gould, Presidency, 106-107. 
4 TR letter to Knox, November 10, 1904, in Morison, Letters of TR, 4:1022-1024. 
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to show the wageworkers that we are doing justice . . . [W]hile we 
unflinchingly demand good conduct from them, yet we are equally resolute· in 
the effort to secure them all just and proper consideration." His credo was the 
golden rule, not collective bargaining, because "here. in this republic it is 
peculiarly incumbent upon the man with whom things have prospered to be in 
a certain sense the keeper of his brother with whom life has gone hard." 
Although the letter began with "the great problem of organized labor," 
Roosevelt returned to unions only toward its end, obliquely and without 
enthusiasm, suggesting that Knox "could get in tovch with some of the labor 
people." That was not because they had solutions to offer, since "you might 
find that you had to go against most of what they wished." It was because "I 
would like you to know what they desire to do - what their real feelings are." 
President Roosevelt believed that organized labor performed an educational 
role that could be useful in solving labor problems, but that employers and 
ultimately the government should play the lead roles in reaching solutions. 
This was not just cant. Roosevelt tried, as we would now colloquially 
express it, to walk the talk. When he visited the Panama Canal construction 
zone in late 1906, he personally met with machinists and other workers whose 
complaints about working conditions had been transmitted to him in part by the 
International Association of Machinists (lAM) union. He then visited sites the 
workers had identified as problems and, if he agreed with their complaints, 
64 
ordered corrective action and informed the lAM what he had done. Where he 
found that their compla!nts had not been substantiated, he wrote to the lAM's 
president and explained his findings. It was his demonstration that government 
employees could count on the government and on him as its CEO to provide 
them with fair employment.5 
B. Anthracite Coal Strike 
Only after describing what his government had done directly for workers 
does Roosevelt's Autobiography move to a detailed description of his 
government's interactions with organized labor. His Exhibit A was the 
government's intervention to settle the 1902 anthracite coal strike, which 
Roosevelt characterized as "[v]ery much the most important action I took as 
regards labor . ..e If so, then why did Roosevelt place the coal strike intervention 
after his enumeration of his non-union actions respecting "Social and Industrial 
Justice"? One interpretation is that it was a belated expansion of Roosevelt's 
definition of "labor" to include labor organizations. An alternative reading , 
consistent with his ambivalent style whenever he discussed labor unions, 
suggests that he saw the strike in terms of the government's extrication of 
workers and the public from a socially dangerous situation. 
5 TR letter to James O'Connell, president of the lAM, November 27, 1906, in Morison, Letters 
of TR, 5:504-508. See also TR letter to Ralph Easley of the National Civic Federation, 
November 27, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:508. 
6 Roosevelt. Autobiography, 478. 
Historians treat the coal strike as Roosevelt's most important labor 
action, at least based on the space they give it? It remains a riveting tale, 
national drama juxtaposed against deliciously low comedy, illustrating 
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Roosevelt's talents for negotiation and adaptability to complex circumstances. 
Questions remain, however, about what Roosevelt's ad hoc strike intervention 
contributed to the development of the government's labor union attitudes and 
policies and, indeed, whether Roosevelt even had a long-term view of how the 
government should react to the growth of union power and ambitions. 8 
When the coal strike began in May 1902, Roosevelt had been the 
president of the United States for eight months. United Mine Workers (UMW) 
delegates had voted to strike the Pennsylvania anthracite coal mines after 
their union failed to reach agreement with mine owners on a labor agreement, 
and nearly one hundred fifty thousand miners stopped working.9 The UMW 
had in the years preceding this strike demonstrated willingness and ability to 
lead massive miner strikes. In 1897, bituminous coal strikes had resulted in 
labor agreements and an astonishing increase in union membership from ten 
thousand to one hundred fifteen thousand miners. In 1900, UMW-Ied 
7 See Morris, T Rex, 131-137, 146, 150-169; Brands, TR Romantic, 450-462; Miller, TR Life; 
370-378. 
8 One historian neatly captures the essence of the questions in the subtitle to his article about 
the strike. Robert H. Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of 1902: A Record of Confusion," The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (September 1961 ): 229-251 . 
9 Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 175-176. 
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anthracite coal miners engaged in a successful six-week strike in 
Pennsylvania shortly before the presidential election.10 
Although President McKinley did not intervene in the 1900 strike, 
presidential politics led to its settlement. J. P. Morgan, the dominant financier 
of the era, and Senator Marcus A. Hanna, Ohio colleague and 1900 
presidential reelection campaign chairman for McKinley, feared that 
continuation of the strike would favor the election of Democrat William 
Jennings Bryan. Accordingly, Hanna convinced the mine operators to agree to 
a pay increase and a grievance procedure to settle the strike. By that time, 
Morgan interests had largely consolidated the coal-carrying railroads through 
ownership and interlocking directorates, and these railroads had acquired 
many of the coal mines. The men who ran the mines believed, however, that 
they had been maneuvered into a political settlement that primarily benefited 
the UMW, and they took a tough stance against the union's bargaining 
demands in 1902.11 
10 Jonathan Grossman, "The Coal Strike of 1902- Turning Point in U.S. Policy," Monthly 
Labor Review 98 (October 1975): 21. The union estimated that within ten days, 136,000 of the 
region's 142,500 miners joined the 1900 strike, a number that "exceeded the fondest hopes of 
the union leaders." Robert J. Cornell, The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902 (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University Press, 1957), 46-47. 
11 Grossman, "The Coal Strike," 22; Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, 9-12, 34-36, 54-56, 60. 
After the Civil War, the Pennsylvania coal mining area was the scene of multiple strikes and 
the consequent collapse of various unions and miner self-help movements, including the Molly 
Maguires. Union membership grew after successful strikes and evaporated after unsuccessful 
strikes. John Mitchell, Organized Labor (Philadelphia: American Book & Bible House, 1903; 
Clifton, N.J. : Kelley, 1973), 363-364, 367; Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, 26-27. The use here 
of the term "demand" to describe union bargaining proposals does not reflect any ec;litorial 
comment about union tactics. The UMW president, John Mitchell, used the same term in 
describing the negotiations. Mitchell, Organized Labor, 365, 371 . 
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Roosevelt initially believed he had no power to intervene in the 1902 
strike. There was no legally enforceable procedure for validati111g union claims 
for recognition as the representative of employees, recognition that the UMW 
demanded and the mine owners declined to give. There was no mechanism 
for preventing either employer or union bad faith in bargaining, which arguably 
surfaced in the owners' persistent refusals to make any bargaining 
concessions and in the union's alleged responsibility for intimidating non-
strikers. There was no established government process or bureaucracy 
dedicated to mediation of non-railroad labor disputes. All of these government 
powers became law in the 1930s and 1940s, but they were not available to 
Roosevelt in 1902. 
Roosevelt also had little inclination to involve the presidency in what 
initially appeared to be a dispute involving only miners and mine owners. "As 
long as I could avoid interfering I did so," he later acknowledged. He 
understood and for a time accepted government inaction as working to the 
mine owners' advantage. The mine owners believed that the economic 
suffering of the miners and their families would eventually end the strike. They 
"were confident that if order were kept, and nothing further done by the 
Government, they would win." Roosevelt interpreted the owners' position as 
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"merely taking the extreme individualistic view of the rights of property and the 
freedom of individual action upheld in the laissez faire political economies."12 
What eventually led Roosevelt away from that viewpoint was his belief 
that the economic struggle in the Pennsylvania mines was going to harm the 
public. Normally conservative state and municipal officials reported to him that, 
as autumn approached, their communities were facing a heating crisis that 
Roosevelt referred to variously as "a National menace," a "calamity," even "the 
direst disaster." Roosevelt recalled, "It is not too much to say that the situation 
which confronted Pennsylvania, New York, and New England, and to a less 
degree the States of the Middle West, in October, 1902, was quite as serious 
as if they had been threatened by the invasion of a hostile army of 
overwhelming force."13 Unfortunately for a Jaissez-faire strategy, the mine 
owners were unable to extract much anthracite coal without the striking 
employees, in part because of violence against strikebreakers· and their 
families, despite the presence of private police forces hired by the mine 
operators.14 
12 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 480-481; Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, 97. 
13 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 480; TR letter to Massachusetts Governor Murray Crane, 
October 22, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 359-360. Northeastern states consumed 80 
percent of the Pennsylvania anthracite coal production. Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, 1. 
Wiebe argues that fears of a coal famine were misplaced, because bituminous coal was 
plentiful and had proved to be a usable substitute during the 1900 strike. "The Anthracite 
Strike of 1902," 243-244. . • 
14 UMW president Mitchell dismissed the idea "that the majority of the men were prevented 
from working in the mines by the force and intimidation of a minority." He also accused the 
mine owners of hiring "thugs" who committed acts of violence and murder. Mitchell, Organized 
Labor, 381, 385; Roosevelt, Autobiography, 480-481. 
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Practical politics also pushed Roosevelt to intervene. During a one-
week period in late September, Roosevelt's closest friend and political adviser, 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, wrote him three nearly 
hysterical letters translating the hike in coal prices and the growing lack of coal 
at any price into a "political disaster" for their Republican Party. Lodge offered 
no recommendations, plaintively asking, "Can nothing be done?" to press the 
mine operators. Roosevelt acknowledged "the immediate political effect" of the 
"unreasoning feeling" that made people blame the government for any large 
calamity.15 
During pre-strike mediation sponsored by the recently formed National 
Civic Federation (NCF), an organization of union, management, and political 
leaders seeking ways to achieve industrial peace, the gap between 
management and union positions was enormous. The operators refused to 
budge on any union demand. The union had not overcome this resistance by 
halving its wage demands from 20 percent to 1 0 percent and, instead of its 
original demand for reducing the ten-hour workday to eight hours, proposing a 
nine-hour workday.16 Union leader John Mitchell had further offered to submit 
all unresolved bargaining issues (which included UMW demands for formal 
15 Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918 (New York: Scribner, 1925), 1:528-531 ; TR letter to Lodge, 
September 27, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:332. Even earlier, in an August 26, 1902, 
letter to powerful Republican Senator Nelson Aldrich, Roosevelt had written that the strike was 
"bad - politically as well as otherwise." Morison, Letters of TR, 3:323. 
18 Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, 64, 86. 
management recognition of the union's right to represent miners) to an 
arbitration panel appointed by the NCF.17 
·, 
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The mine owners rejected the union's arbitration offer on the basis that 
"business management" was the exclusive responsibility of a corporation's 
president and directors.18 The leading spokesman for the coal-carrying 
railroads repeatedly voiced objections to union involvement in discussing mine 
practices, on the grounds that the union lacked technical knowledge of mine 
conditions, undermined mine efficiency by encouraging employees to disobey 
management's reasonable orders, and practiced "terrorism, tyranny and 
lawlessness. "19 
Blocked in bargaining, the UMW sought public support. Mitchell 
thwarted a proposed sympathy strike by bituminous coal miners, despite their 
argument that a sympathy strike's denial of this railroad fuel would increase 
the pressure on the mine-owning railroads. Mitchell's successful rebuttal was 
that a sympathy strike would constitute a violation of the bituminous coal mine 
contracts that the UMW had previously negotiated and would undermine the 
UMW's position that management and the public could rely on the union's 
fidelity to signed contracts. His position was sustained at a union convention 
on July 17, which led to favorable press portrayals of the union's 
17 Greenberg, TR and Labor, 104-106; Mitchell, Organized Labor, 371-372. The NCF is 
described more fully below in the section on Mandatory Union Membership. 
18 Mark Sullivan, Our Times (New York: Scribner, 1927), 2:424. 
19 Correspondence and public remarks of coal-carrying railroad president George F. Baer, 
quoted in Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, 75-76. 
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reasonableness.20 Mitchell also downplayed the UMW's self-interested goal of 
obtaining formal owner recognition as the miners' representative, by depicting 
the strike as "for living wages for American conditions of employment."21 
In contrast to Mitchell's demonstrations of UMW willingness to 
compromise and adhere to labor contracts, the mine owners' public relations 
were disastrous. In late August, after owner rejection of NCF arbitration, the 
press publicized a private letter written by the chief owner representative, 
George F. Baer, president of the mine-owning Philadelphia & Reading 
Railroad. The letter was Baer's ill-considered response to someone he did not 
know who had written in a way that Baer characterized as "biased in favor" of 
working men. Explaining the owners' position, Baer replied: 
The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared 
for- not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God 
in His infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of 
the count~, and upon the successful Management of which so much 
depends. 
20 Senator Hanna personally argued to Mitchell that a sympathy strike would weaken defense 
of the union as a contract-respecting organization, undermine public sentiment in favor of the 
union, and "discourage me in my effort" to help the UMW. The NCF likewise articulated the 
importance of the union's standing by the bituminous agreements as a "fundamental 
proposition." Mitchell also had a practical reason for opposing a bituminous coal miners' 
sympathy strike. At the union convention in July, the miners voted not only to keep the 
bituminous mines in operation but also for an assessment of a dollar a week or 10 percent of 
their earnings to assist the striking anthracite miners. Greenberg, TR and Labor, 109-111 , 
117; Mitchell, Organized Labor, 377-380; Gompers, Seventy Years, 2:118; Cornell , Anthracite 
Coal Strike, 100, 102-103, 118-1 19, 122. 
21 Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of 1902," 240-241 . 
22 The letter is reproduced in Sullivan, Our Times, 2:425. 
Press and pulpit reaction ridiculed Baer's invocation of a management-only 
deity. Roosevelt later referred to it as the "Viceregent of God" position.23 
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The combination of fear of winter coal shortages, Mitchell's appearance 
of reasonableness, and Baer's selfish religiosity led even the conservative 
Senator Lodge to tell Roosevelt that the mine owners were guilty of 
"insensate folly."24 Roosevelt later remembered, "As September passed 
without any sign of weakening either among the employers or the striking 
workmen, the situation became so grave that I felt I would have to try to do 
something." As to the substance of the strike issues, he was largely silent.25 
Roosevelt considered and rejected a variety of suggestions to end the 
strike. These included suing the mine owners or seizing their property on the 
theories that they constituted an unlawful trust under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act or were endangering public health; suing the UMW under the same law for 
monopolizing coal-supplying labor; and replaying President Cleveland's Debs 
case precedent, by seeking a court injunction against the strike and then, if 
necessary, using the army to enforce it.26 
23 lbid., 426-427; Morris, T Rex, 133, 136-137; TR letter to Michael A Schaap, January 24, 
1913, in Morison. Letters of TR, 698. 
24 Lodge, Selections. 530. 
25 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 481 ; Wiebe, MThe Anthracite Strike of 1902," 245. 
26 TR letters to Henry Cabot Lodge, September 27 and October 7, 1902, in Lodge, Selections, 
533, 537; TR letter to Attorney General Knox, August 21 , 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 
3:323; letters to Knox from David Willcox, vice president and general manager of Delaware & 
Hudson Company, June 7 and October 6, 1902; and from Walter W. Ross, general attorney of 
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., October 6, 1902, in Philander C. Knox 
Papers, Library of Congress, Box 25; Roosevelt, Autobiography, 481. 
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Roosevelt believed that there was "literally nothing" that "the National 
Government has any power to do in the matter." He followed the advice he 
received from Attorney General Knox, whose papers contain an unsigned, 
undated legal memorandum analyzing one of the letters from a mine owner 
representative, plus a communication from Knox to Roosevelt in early October 
begging the president's indulgence for him to present his analysis of the same 
letter "in a more finished and fuller way." The thrust of the memorandum was 
that the strike was not subject to federal government action because the 
United States Supreme Court had declared the Sherman Antitrust Act 
inapplicable to production of goods, as distinct from their interstate 
transportation; and that the Debs case involved, unlike the coal strike, 
interference with the transportation of federal mail. 27 
As the strike dragged on, Roosevelt underwent a transformation in his 
understanding of presidential power in labor disputes. He explained later that 
the strike was a "great national crisis" that allowed him as president to move 
beyond what the Constitution required or what Congress authorized him to do. 
27 Knox Papers, library of Congress, Box 25 (the legal memorandum) and Box 31 (Knox letter 
to TR, October 7, 1902), both referring to the Walter W. Ross letter dated October 6, 1902, 
supra. The Supreme Court case referred to was United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 
(1895), in which the Court held that monopolizing the in-state manufacture of refined sugar 
(even if intended for interstate shipment) was not a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
because that law regulated only the actual transportation of goods in interstate commerce. 
Manufacturing was constitutionally subject to regulation exclusively by the state where it 
occurred. Knox had orally given the same advice to Roosevelt, who was awaiting Knox's "little 
brief on the matter." TR letter to Mayor Seth Low of New York City, October 3, 1902, in 
Morison, Letters of TR, 3:337. Roosevelt told former President Cleveland and Senator Lodge 
essentially what appears in the memorandum from the Knox papers. TR letter to Cleveland, 
October 5, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:338-339; Lodge, Selections, 533. 
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He asserted the president's "legal right to do whatever the needs of the people 
demand, unless the Constitution or the laws explicitly forbid him to do it."28 He 
equated the coal strike and the contradictory advice he was receiving with 
Lincoln's challenges during the Civil War and expressed his determination not 
to follow pre-Civil War President Buchanan's principle "of striving to find some 
constitutional reason for inaction."29 
Roosevelt's first step in the direction of expanded presidential power 
was tentative, in the sense that he first relied on his personality and the bully 
pulpit of his office. He took the unprecedented and dramatic step of inviting -
representatives of the mine owners and the union to meet with him at the 
temporary White House on October 3. 30 Roosevelt heightened the drama by 
appearing in a wheelchair. It was a legitimate posture, because Roosevelt's> 
carriage had recently been sideswiped by a trolley car in Pittsfield, 
Massachusetts, injuring the President and killing his bodyguard. Roosevelt's 
injured left leg was operated on twice in the ensuing month.31 
28 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 479. TR's daughter remembered that "there was a howl from the 
newspapers that his 'interference' was unconstitutional. That protest is amusing to recollect, 
as one observes the present day role of government, in its 'interference' with labor and 
industry." Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Hours (New York: Scribner, 1933), 54-55. 
29 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 479; TR letters to William Allen White and Robert Bacon. 
October 6 and 7, 1902, respectively, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:343-344; TR letter to 
Massachusetts Governor Murray Crane, October 22, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:360;. 
362. Roosevelt wrote the letter to Crane soon after the end of the strike as "a full account or' 
the whole affair.» Ibid., 3:359. 
30 TR letter to Lodge, September 30, 1902, in Lodge, Selections, 535. The White House was 
then undergoing a major restoration. Morris, T Rex, 149. 
31 Morris, T Rex, 141-143; Lodge, Selections, 535; Wagenknecht, Seven Worlds, 28; Gould, 
Presidency, 65, 66. 
In attendance before the wheelchair-bound President were six 
representatives of the coal mine operators, including the deity-invoking 
George Baer; four UMW officers, including John Mitchell; Attorney General 
75 
Knox; Commissioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright, who had been monitoring the 
strike for the President; and George Cortelyou, Roosevelt's private secretary 
and a future cabinet member.32 Roosevelt began the meeting by reading a 
statement in which he "disclaim[ed] any right or duty to intervene in this way 
upon legal grounds or upon any official relation that I bear to the situation." 
Nevertheless, he said he represented the affected general public and asked 
for "an immediate resumption of operations in the coal mines in some such 
way as will without a day's unnecessary delay meet the crying needs of the 
people." 
At this stage, Roosevelt was leaving it to the management and union 
parties to determine how to resolve their conflict, although they had been 
unable to do so since early spring. Mitchell immediately offered face-to-face 
negotiations with the mine operators or, if that failed, third-party resolution, 
suggesting that the president name a tribunal whose award the parties would 
agree in advance to accept. The mine owners took a different approach. Baer 
32 Except as noted, the following account of the meeting is from the government-printed 
Report of the Conference between the President and Representatives of the Anthracite Coal 
Companies and Representatives of the United Mine Workers of America, October 3, 1902, in 
Knox Papers, Library of Congress, Box 25; with further color provided by Morris, T Rex, 155-
161, and Sullivan, Our Times, 2:431-433. That Roosevelt saw the meeting as an important 
influence on public opinion is suggested by the fact that the government printed and 
distributed the Report immediately after the meeting. Morris, T Rex, 161. 
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expressed their annoyance by first detailing the violent misdeeds of the union 
and its supporters ("the fomentors of this anarchy"), but he then offered to 
submit the miners' "alleged grievances" to the local courts. The offer was 
significant because it meant that the mine operators were agreeing to third-
party resolution, albeit in a venue different from that proposed by Mitchell. 
Despite this significant concession and its acknowledgment in the 
government's Report of the meeting, management's offer to let the courts 
decide was ignored. Roosevelt did not mention it in his Autobiography. On the 
contrary, his statement there was that the owners "refused to talk of arbitration 
or other accommodation of any kind."33 
What Roosevelt focused on later in discussing the owners' conduct at 
the meeting was their "most insolent frame of mind" and their "language that 
was insulting to the miners and offensive to me." He contrasted the operators' 
conduct with that of Mitchell, ''who kept his temper admirably and showed to 
much advantage." Mitchell later described the operators' performance at the 
meeting as "a series of tirades and invectives against the union and its 
officers, which left no ground for discussion or conciliation." He too omitted any 
reference to the operators' offer to submit disputed issues to the local courts.34 
33 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 481 . One historian contends that the union opposed resolution 
by local judges because they were "not particularly known for pro-labor sympathies," which 
may also explain why the mine owners proposed that form of adjudication. Greenberg, TR and 
Labor, 152-153. 
34 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 481 ; Mitchell, Organized Labor, 387 -388; TR letter to Hanna, 
October 3, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:337. 
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It is difficult to believe that Roosevelt did not notice the operators' offer 
of judicial resolution. Not only was it mentioned in the government Report, but 
the chief of the federal government's Division of Mineral Resources also told 
Roosevelt on October 8 that George Baer had amended the mine owners' 
court-resolution proposal to allow referral of outstanding strike issues to any 
higher court designated by the president. Roosevelt refused to convey this 
amendment to the union unless other mine operators agreed to it and, further, 
unless they apologized to him for their conduct at the meeting on October 3.35 
A more likely explanation for Roosevelt's course is that he concluded 
that the October 3 meeting's publicity had weakened the operators' public 
standing while strengthening that of the union. In the days after the meeting, 
the press generally condemned the operators' attitude and reported that the 
union had gained popular support. Lodge told Roosevelt that the striking 
miners gained sympathy because of what was perceived as Mitchell's "fair 
proposition." Even "so naturally conservative a man" as former President 
Cleveland, who had forcibly suppressed the1894 railway strike, wrote that he 
supported Roosevelt's actions. 36 
35 Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, 200. My belief that this was a deliberate repudiation of the 
employer proposal is not shared by Morris, who explains it away as a failure by both the 
president and the UMW to catch the "significance" of the owners' suggestion for third party 
resolution. T Rex, 159-160. Roosevelt may also have been aware of the union's continued 
resistance to judicial resolution, as Mitchell allegedly told Oscar Straus of the NCF that the 
owners' idea of mine-by-mine resolutions was too burdensome. Cornell, Anthracite Coal 
Strike, 191. 
36 Ibid., 189-190; Lodge letter to TR, October 5, 1902, in Lodge, Selections, 536-537; 
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 488; TR letter to Hanna, October 5, 1902, in Morison, Letters of 
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Having tried inaction and then mediation, Roosevelt devised a 
supposedly secret plan to send the army to the coal fields. Upon a request 
from the governor of Pennsylvania for federal troops to maintain order, he 
would send the army to seize the mines and run them until an Investigating 
Commission could "decide on the rights of the case· and report findings to him 
for further action. He had already arranged for Cleveland to serve on the 
commission, which Roosevelt said would investigate the conditions and 
causes of the strike, including at this late date "whether there has been 
violence and if so to what extent. "37 He did not tell Cleveland about the 
military aspect of his plan. 
Roosevelt was at pains in his Autobiography to dispel any inference 
that army seizure of the mines smacked of dictatorship. Describing in an 
avuncular way his selection of the retired Major General John M. Schofield as 
commander of the troops, he later wrote, "He was a fine fellow- a most 
respectable-looking old boy, with side whiskers and a black skull-cap, without 
any of the outward aspect of the conventional military dictator." Although 
neither Roosevelt in his Autobiography nor his biographers have shed much 
TR, 3:342-343. The Cleveland letter of October 4, 1902, whi<:h suggested a cooling-off period, 
and Roosevelt's extensive reply on the following day are both set forth in Joseph Bucklin 
Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time Shown in His Own Letters (New York: Scribner, 
1920), 1:204-207. Sullivan, Our Times, 2:433-435, credits Cleveland's letter to Roosevelt as 
emotional inspiration and politi<:al cover for what Roosevelt did next, but he offers no 
substantiating evidence for this interpretation. Roosevelt expressly rejected Cleveland's Idea 
of a cooling-off period as unworkable. Bishop, TR and His Time, 1:207. 
37 TR letter to Cleveland, October 10, 1902, in Morison, Letters ofTR. 3:346-347: TR letter to 
Cleveland, October 13, 1902, In Bishop, TR and His Time, 1:209. 
. . 
light on why Roosevelt selected a supposedly unthreatening retiree to 
command the troops, Schofield had a strike suppression background. Ten 
years earlier, in 1892, Schofield commanded fifteen hundred federal soldiers 
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sent to the Coeur d'Alene mining district, where they assisted in protecting 
strikebreakers and arresting strike leaders and sympathizers.38 This suggests 
that Roosevelt picked Schofield to keep both owners and strikers in doubt 
about his ultimate intentions. 
Roosevelt claimed in his Autobiography that only General Schofield 
knew about the mine-seizure component;39 however, a few days after hatching 
the mine seizure plan, Roosevelt wrote Governor Crane of Massachusetts that 
he had "outlined" it to Secretary of War Elihu Root and Attorney General Knox 
and told them to write letters of protest if they wanted to avoid responsibility, a 
suggestion that implies their knowledge of a potentially controversial military 
action. Supporting that implication, he also said that Root had informed him 
that ten thousand army regulars were available immediately.40 
Writing to his biographer in 1930, Root expressed uncertainty about 
whether Roosevelt would have actually sent federal troops to take possession 
of the mines. "Theodore," Root wrote, ''was a bit of a bluffer occasionally, and 
at the same time he had nerve to go on -to take a chance his statements 
38 The violent Coeur d'Alene strike in 1892 also reverbE!rated in Roosevelt's later career, since 
it led to the formation of the Western Federation of Miners that Roosevelt despised and about 
which we will have more to say. Foner, History of Labor Movement, 2:232-234. 
39 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 489-490. 
40 TR letter to Crane, October 22, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:362-363. 
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would have the deciding effect and, if not, to go on and trust the country would 
back him up." Attorney General Knox had firmer doubts about Roosevelt's 
intention to seize the mines. Much later, Knox said that Roosevelt had asked 
him for a legal opinion about seizure of the mines. When Knox responded that 
Roosevelt lacked the power to do it, Roosevelt said he would abide by Knox's 
opinion. Consistent with Knox's recollection, during the intermission of his 
October 3 meeting with the mine and union representatives, Roosevelt wrote 
the mayor of New York City that the idea of seizing the mines and having the 
government act as a "receiver" was "absurd.'141 
Root was concerned enough that he felt "as if Roosevelt needed a little 
help ... Roosevelt, after all, was a young fellow [TR was forty-three years old; 
Root was fifty-seven] without very much experience in the ordinary affairs of 
life." The "little help" that Root devised was "a way for the people to get out of 
the impasse without humiliation," and, by implication, without use offorce. His 
concept was simultaneously to address the "double line of complaints" - the 
miners' objection to existing work conditions and the owners' objection to any 
41 Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938), 1 :275-276; DavidS. Barry, 
Forty Years in Washington (Boston: Little, Brown, 1924), 251; TR letter to Mayor Seth Low, 
October 3, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:337. In 1915, commenting to the English foreign 
secretary about English strikes during World War I, Roosevelt recalled that he had been 
prepared to send in the army during the anthracite coal strike, "dispossess for the time being 
the capitalists," and forbid "the smallest outrage or interference on the part of the striking 
workingmen." That he did not have to do so resulted when "the capitalists and workingmen 
both became impressed with the fact that drastic action impended." TR letter to Edward Grey, 
November 24, 1915, ih Morison, Letters of TR, 8:987. There has never been an explanation of 
the practicality, as distinct from the symbolism, of expecting ten thousand soldiers with no 
mine training to replace one hundred fifty thousand experienced miners, while simultaneously 
maintaining order in the mining district. 
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kind of recognition of the union's right to speak for the miners. What Root 
wanted was a statement from the owners that while they remained unwilling to 
make an agreement with or recognize the UMW as the representative of the 
workers, they were willing to submit the existing situation to impartial 
adjudication. ' [l]t was a damned lie," Root said, "but it looked fair on paper.'o42 
Although Root's solution seemed to be a rehash of a union proposal that the 
mine owners had already rejected, he framed it so that neither the union nor 
the president would actually propose it. 
On October 9, Root wrote to J. P. Morgan, outlining his proposed 
solution. At Morgan's invitation, Root spent the day of October 11 on Morgan's 
yacht, Corsair. He persuaded Morgan that his idea to resolve the strike would 
be the best course for the mine owners. Root later denied that he had 
threatened government action, which would preclude his having raised 
Roosevelt's military option.43 Morgan was probably amenable without 
government threats, because he had led Senator Hanna to believe in late 
September that the financier would agree to a third-party "decision, • a position 
that the operators, through Baer, "absolutely refused to entertain" at that early 
date.44 Since Baer had expanded the owners' definition of acceptable third-
42 Jessup, Elihu Root, 1:275-276 . 
.., Roosevelt knew that Root met with Morgan. Jessup, Elihu Root, 1 :275-276; Cornell, 
Anthracite Coe/ Stn'ke, 218; TR letter to Crane, October 22, 1902, In Morison, Letters of TR, 
3:363. One Roosevelt biographer suggests that the military plan 'must have been outlined' by 
Root to Morgan, but this is speculation. Pringle, TR Biography, 193. 
44 Hanna letter to TR, September 28, 1901, in Bishop, TR and His Time, 1:201. 
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party resolution three days before Root met with MorgaD, logic also suggests 
that Root may not have needed to unsheathe Roosevelt's sword to convince 
Morgan. Moreover, the failure of the Pennsylvania National Guard's recent 
arrival in the coal fields to encourage a back-to-work movement would have 
demonstrated to the mine owners that their wait-and-see strategy for breaking 
the strike was moribund.45 
Having reached agreement, Morgan and Root then drafted "a little 
memorandum" on the yacht's stationery in which the owners. rather than the 
union or the president, proposed a presidential commission to arbitrate the 
labor dispute. When that was done, they took a cab to a private club, where 
Morgan proposed the memorandum to various mine owners. The owners 
approved the Root-Morgan memorandum, but added the condition that the 
arbitration commission had to be composed of five members -- an expert 
mining engineer, a man with experience in mining and selling coal, a military 
officer from the engineering corps, a federal judge from the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and a person "eminent as a sociologist." Morgan and Root then 
transmitted the amended mine owner proposal to Roosevelt. By October 13, it 
was announced that the mine owners were proposing arbitration.46 
" On the effect of the Pennsylvania National Guard's presence. see Com ell, Anthracite Coal 
Strike, 219-222. 
•• Jessup, Elihu Root, 1:275-276. Roosevelt reproduced the 'little memorandum,' as amended 
by the operators, in his letter to Governor Crane, October 22, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 
3:363-365; Sullivan, Our Times, 2:440; Roosevelt, Autobiography, 482; Greenberg, TR and 
Labor, 155-157. 
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It was Mitchell's turn to object. He questioned the fairness of an arbitral 
body packed by the operators, but he was willing to agree if the commission 
were enlarged by the addition of a representative of organized labor and a 
Catholic ecclesiastic, because the miners were predominantly Catholic. The 
mine owners demurred, emphatically on the first point, and Morgan sent two of 
his associates, Robert Bacon and George W. Perkins, to discuss the 
commission further with Roosevelt on October 15. Roosevelt knew and liked 
both men. Bacon had been his Harvard classmate and later became his 
secretary of state. Perkins would serve as Roosevelt's chief money-raiser and 
head of the Progressive Party when Roosevelt tried to reclaim the presidency 
in 1912. He regarded them as "entirely reasonable," but they were under strict 
orders from the operators not to allow the appointment of a labor 
representative.47 Their meeting with Roosevelt became the occasion for the 
strike's comic relief, and Roosevelt would later tell and retell the story with 
glee. 
"[A]fter about two hours' argument" over adding members to the 
commission, Roosevelt wrote, "it dawned on me that they were not objecting 
to the thing, but to the name. I found that they did not mind my appointing any 
47 TR letter to Morgan, October 15, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:351-353; Roosevelt, 
Autobiography, 482-483; Lewis L. Gould, Four Hats in the Ring: The 1912 Election and the 
Birlh of Modern American Politics (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 130. In 
a pre-strike letter to his brother-in-law, Douglas Robinson, on October 4, 1901 , TR described 
Bacon and Perkins as "men of the highest character, who are genuine forces for good." 
Morison, Letters of TR, 3:159. 
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man, whether he was a labor man or not, as long as he was not appointed as 
a labor man, or as a representative of labor." Roosevelt wrote to Lodge (and 
later used some of the same imagery in his Autobiography) that he finally 
realized that "the mighty brains of these captains of industry had formulated 
the theory that they would rather have anarchy than tweedledum, but that if I 
would use the word tweedledee they would hail it as meaning peace." 
With that illumination, Roosevelt announced that he would appoint as 
the "eminent sociologist" the chief executive of one of the railroad unions, even 
though he doubted the labor official "had ever previously heard" of such a title. 
He then appointed a Catholic bishop to be the seventh man on the 
commission. Bacon and Perkins, speaking for the operators, "saw nothing 
offensive in my language and nothing ridiculous in the proposition, and 
Pierpont Morgan and Baer, when called up by telephone, eagerly ratified the 
absurdity.1148 Roosevelt's tweedledee appointment of an eminent sociologist to 
the commission suggests the same labor relations insight as Root's earlier. 
idea that an already rejected presidential commission could be resurrected by 
shifting its sponsorship to the owners. Both TR and Root understood that the 
appearance of things, no matter how bizarre, is what may count most in labor 
disputes. 
48 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 482-484; Lodge, Selections, 539-540. In a letter to the humorist, 
Finley Peter Dunne, creator of "Mr. Dooley," Roosevelt described the commission's 
appointment process as "screaming comedy." Morison, Letters of TR, 3:357. In contrast to 
Roosevelt's rollicking recitation of these events, Root's dry recounting of the same facts nine 
months later provides its own humor. Bishop, TR and His Time, 1:212-213, 216. 
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Within a week, the representatives of the striking miners voted to end 
the strike, and "all questions in dispute were submitted to the arbitration of the 
commission appointed by the President of the United States.'149 After a three-
month period during which it heard 240 union witnesses, 154 operator 
witnesses, and 153 strikebreaker witnesses, and gathered over ten thousand 
pages of testimony and exhibits, the arbitration commission ordered significant 
percentage wage increases along the lines demanded by the union and 
workday hours reductions to eight hours without loss of pay for some 
classifications and nine hours for others. 5° Although it did not order the 
operators to recognize the union's representative status, it ordered de facto 
recognition by establishing a conciliation board to interpret and administer its 
other orders. The conciliation board was to be composed of an equal number 
of operator and union representatives. 51 
Mitchell regarded the outcome as "a clear victory for the men [that] 
justified the declaration of the strike" and "a landmark in the history of labor. "52 
AFL president Samuel Gompers later said that the strike was "the most 
important single incident in the labor movement in the United States" and that 
49 Mitchell, Organized Labor, 390. 
50 Most of the miners' were paid based on time worked rather than the "tonnage" of coal 
mined. Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, 111. 
51 Mitchell, Organized Labor, 393-396; Grossman, "The Coal Strike of 1902," 26. Voting 
deadlocks were to be resolved by decision of a federal appellate judge. James Ford Rhodes, 
The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909 (New York: Macmillan, 1923), 247. 
52 Mitchell, Organized Labor, 391 . 
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it "abolished" the whole system of company dominance in the coal mines. 53 
Roosevelt believed that "the great monied interests" and the newspapers they 
controlled never forgave his coal strike actions. 54 
Some historians agree that Roosevelt's handling of the strike was a 
watershed in American labor relations, because it achieved a "new standing" 
for organized labor, according to one, 55 and defended "the legitimate rights of 
labor," according to another. 56 Less effusively, Hofstadter credits Roosevelt for 
deviating from prior presidents' strike interventions as "partisan.s of the 
captains of industry" (i.e., Hayes in 1877 and Cleveland in 1894) by seeming 
"in the public eye to stand not only apart from but above the opposing sides."57 
Nevertheless, Roosevelt's twists and turns during the strike and his 
virtual silence about its underlying issues suggest that he did not have a 
principle at stake or a policy in mind. One historian of the coal conflict calls the 
strike an example of the "passive nature" of Roosevelt's labor policy in his first 
presidential term. 58 Roosevelt's intervention resolved only one labor dispute, 
without establishing principles for government to follow in future strikes. That 
the anthracite coal strike became part of American labor's folklore does not 
alter the fact that it provided no long-term palliatives to labor strife when 
53 Gompers, Seventy Years, 2:126-127. 
54 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 492-493. 
55 Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, 259. 
56 Pringle, TR Biography, 195. 
57 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Knopf, 1955; Vintage, 1960), 235-236. 
58 Greenberg, TR and Labor, 221. 
collective bargaining fails. 59 Although Roosevelt proved that government 
intervention could resolve a major strike without·invoking the authority of the 
courts or the military, the settlement of the coal strike did not include a 
comprehensive labor relations program, rule, or precedent. 
No one understood this better than Roosevelt. As he explained, the 
strike was "absolutely peculiar, because we dealt with a necessity of life," so 
that "everything [including resolution of bargaining issues, stopping strike 
violence, and the rights of non-strikers to work] had to give way to the prime 
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necessity of saving people as a whole from a fearful calamity - or rather, had 
to be postponed to thus saving them." Yet, he still believed that "under 
ordinary conditions a strike is not a subject for interference by the President."60 
In 1920, Joseph Bucklin Bishop wrote in his authorized biography of 
Roosevelt that the coal strike commission secured labor peace in the 
anthracite mines "permanently, for since 1902 there has been no strike there 
and no serious labor trouble."61 Nevertheless, as a Roosevelt contemporary 
observed, "In the quarter century that passed between the coal strike of 1902 
59 Whether intended or not, the strike resolution provided political cover for Roosevelt in his 
1904 presidential campaign, because it signified that he and his party were not the captives of 
the trusts, including the railroads that owned the mines. Lewis L. Gould, Reform and 
Regulation, 3rd ed. (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland, 1996}, 35, 54. Roosevelt certainly did not 
disavow the political benefit of labor support, as symbolized by the inclusion in his inaugural 
parade of "the anthracite coal miners in their miners' caps, who, since the settlement of the 
coal strike, had a special feeling" for him. Longworth, Crowded Hours, 66. 
60 TR letter to his sister Anna, October 16, 1902, in Cowles, Letters from TR, 253-254 
(emphasis added}. Beyond the labor implications, historians argue that the enduring 
significance of Roosevelt's strike intervention was its contribution to "enhancing the power of 
the presidency." Gould, Presidency, 69; Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of 1902," 251 . 
61 Before his death, Roosevelt reviewed and approved the part of the Bishop biography that 
covers the coal strike and its immediate aftermath. Bishop, TR and His Time, 1:vii, 219. 
and the year 1927, it cannot be said that any measurable progress had been 
made, either in England or in America, toward formulating means for settling 
strikes through official governmental action."62 As this implies, the anthracite 
coal strike exposed, without resolving, underlying weaknesses in collective 
bargaining that seemed to call for further government attention. 
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We should not presume to judge what Roosevelt accomplished in 1902 
from the perspectives of today, or of the labor management environments in 
the 1930s and 1940s when Congress did try to formulate a labor policy.63 But 
we should not forget that the problems were visible in 1902 and that Roosevelt 
·did not attempt to craft structural solutions. 
62 Sullivan, Our Times, 2:444n. 
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C. Military Intervention in Labor Disputes 
Roosevelt's threat to send the army to Pennsylvania during the 
anthracite coal strike distracts us from the fact that for months he did not 
seriously consider using federal troops to bring order to the coal fields. That 
fact is significant because Roosevelt usually insisted on suppression of strike 
violence before addressing the underlying labor problems. 
Roosevelt had information about violence during the anthracite coal 
strike, and he believed that strike violence was inevitable in such a massive 
strike. At the October 3 wheelchair meeting, Mitchell's counter to the 
operators' accusation that twenty people had been murdered was to admit to 
only seven deaths. In his later recounting of strike events, Mitchell conceded 
that some strikers and their sympathizers acted violently, sometimes fatally, 
but he argued that it was "utterly impossible to control every act and deed" 
among one hundred fifty thousand strikers. A case in point was when a mob of 
five thousand strikers and strike sympathizers in late July 1902 beat two men 
(one of them a shopkeeper) to death for trying to protect non-strikers. The 
incident received national publicity. 54 
Roosevelt acknowledged to a biographer that disorder in the anthracite 
coal strike "has been very great in the present instance and of a very evil 
kind," but he also observed that he had received reports to "the exact 
64 TR letter to Governor Crane, October 22, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 361; Cornell, 
Anthracite Coal Strike, 151-152, 186-187; Mitchell, Organized Labor, 381, 385; Morris, T Rex, 
134. 
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contrary." In either event, he was of the opinion that the existence of violence 
"in no way justifies a refusal to have some dispassionate body settle the 
respective rights and wrongs of the two parties." Dealing with violence had to 
wait, "vital though I deemed it that violence should be stamped out," because 
the shortage of coal threatened innocent people with a calamity. "When the 
calamity has been averted then the other question can be taken up." He 
rejected a suggestion that he condemn the violence on the basis that "not a 
particle of good would come from my denouncing the outrages in question.'.e5 
In short, when faced with a strike of some undefined enormity, he was willing 
to bypass his normal sequence of order before equity. 
Moreover, the threat to dispatch troops under General Schofield did not 
prefigure a policy for utilizing the military option in the future. Root's biographer 
asserts that Roosevelt as president "was inclined to resort rather readily to the 
use of federal troops" to control an impending riot of striking miners.66 
Roosevelt was certainly not shy about threatening military action. 
Representative of such rhetoric were the two opportunities he took in Chicago 
in May 1905 to publicize his willingness to use the army there in response to 
an ongoing strike. He told labor leaders that he would not hesitate to use the 
65 TR letters to Joseph Bucklin Bishop, October 13, 1902, and Ethelbert Talbot, October 29,-
1902 in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:349, 371; TR letter to his sister Anna, October 16, 1902, in 
Cowles, Letters from TR, 253-254. 
66 Jessup, Elihu Root, 270. This contention leads directly to the Root biography's discussion 
summarized above implying that Root was the peacemaker and Roosevelt the militarist during 
the 1902 anthracite coal strike. 
93 
army to suppress rioting. Then he publicly announced "in the plainest possible 
language" that his government would act against disorder "whenever the 
necessity arose." He assessed his remarks proudly, ·so if the rioting in 
Chicago gets beyond the control of the State and City, they now know well that 
the regulars will come . ..e7 
Similarly, during a post-presidential1910 speaking tour, he declared 
that, notwithstanding his support of workers' rights, in labor disputes the first 
duty of an "honest and upright civil official is to restore order" because "while 
the mob rules there is no time to find out the right and the wrong of the 
question at issue between that mob and any person or any corporation . .sa 
In practice, however, President Roosevelt was hardly doctrinaire. He 
approached each case as it arose. Subsequent to the anthracite coal strike, 
Roosevelt faced four major occasions when state governors called on him for 
military assistance in connection with labor conflicts: Arizona in 1903, 
Colorado in 1903-1904, Idaho in 1906, and Nevada in 1907-1908. He reacted 
differently to each request. 
When mine workers in Morenci, Arizona, struck in June 1903 to protest 
the territorial legislature's enactment of a limitation on daily hours of work 
without maintaining their daily pay levels, the acting governor requested 
federal troops to prevent an impending riot. The federal government promptly 
51 TR letters to Henry Cabot lodge, May 15 and 24, 1905, in Morison, Letters of TR, 4:1179-
1180, 1193; TR letter to son Kermi~ May 14, 1905,1n Irwin, Letters to Kermit, 101. 
68 Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 172. 
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sent troops, who were ordered to take action only if local authorities could not 
restore order. Secretary of War Root's biographer argues that this 
demonstrates Roosevelt's inclination·to send troops to quell labor disturbances 
unless restrained by Root, who happened to be away from Washington. 
Roosevelt's role in the episode, however, is historically unclear. He was also 
out of town, and the order to send troops was issued by the acting secretary of 
war and the acting adjutant general. Roosevelt nevertheless took credit for the 
order. In any event, the troops were quickly withdrawn when they found no 
disorder, a recall that was not present in some of the other instances 
discussed below.69 
During a strike in Colorado by the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) 
beginning in 1903, the Roosevelt administration initially refused to send 
troops, on the dual grounds that the governor failed to demonstrate the state's 
inability to cope with violence and inappropriately sought to put federal troops 
under state direction and control.70 Root, a skilled lawyer trying to rationalize 
federal intervention in labor conflicts, had shown Roosevelt that the United 
States Constitution limited domestic use of the army to requests from affected 
states for aid to suppress "insurrections," but that subsequent congressional 
69 For Roosevelt's involvement, see Jessup, Elihu Root, 270; Greenberg, TR and Labor, 225-
226; Jacob Riis, Theodore Roosevelt the Citizen (New York: Outlook, 1904), 380; TR letter to 
Lyman Abbott, September 5, 1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:593. For his non-involvement, 
see Bennett Milton Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorder (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1941), 122n. The Arizona action led to labor criticism of Roosevelt as "unfriendly." 
Riis, TR the Citizen, 371. 
70 TR letter to Philip Bathell Stewart, November 23, 1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:656. 
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enabling legislation gave the president power to decide if an insurrection 
actually exists and what force is "necessary and sufficient to suppress such 
insurrection."71 Whether or not Roosevelt intervened militarily, as we will see, 
seems to have depended on how his decision would affect one particular 
union, the WFM. 
During the following summer, the Colorado labor dispute escalated in 
the Cripple Creek mine area. There was evidence of violence perpetrated by 
both the WFM and organizations supporting the mine owners. A local Citizens' 
Alliance, frustrated by the economic effects of the strike, allied itself with the 
Mine Owners Association to enforce the governor's order that the militia 
transport union mine workers from the area.72 As the Cripple Creek violence 
increased, the union asked for federal troops to protect their members from 
what it characterized as state-supported violence. Roosevelt procrastinated, 
waiting for several investigative reports on the situation. By September 1904, 
state militia had neutralized the WFM by closing union-represented mines and 
deporting union miners. 73 
Roosevelt offered various rationales for his Colorado inaction. He told a 
journalist that he could not accede to the union miners' request for protection 
because it would "require" unlimited federal interference in local disputes, 
71 TR letter to Governor Edwin Warfield of Maryland, February .12, 1904, in Morison, Letters of 
TR, 4:727-728. 
72 TR letter to Carroll D. Wright, June 6, 1904, in Morison, Letters of TR, 4:838, 838n. 
73 TR letters to Wright, August 4, 5, 13, 22, and 25, 1904, in Morison, Letters of TR, 4:880, 
882-883, 891-892, 900-901 , 900-901 n, 905. 
including "in every State where a negro is lynched." To his political confidant, 
Philander C. Knox, however, Roosevelt sympathized with the Colorado 
governor for "manfully [doing] his duty in stopping disorder and in battling 
against a corrupt and murderous conspiracy among the Federation of 
Miners."74 The suspicion from this episode is that Roosevelt's decision not to 
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send troops was motivated in large part by the fact that the WFM, a union that 
he intensely disliked, had made the request. Anti-WFM motivation becomes 
even more apparent as we examine the Idaho and Nevada situations. 75 
The Idaho request for federal troops in early 1906 did not involve a 
strike in progress, but it did involve the WFM. Three of the union's leaders, its 
secretary-treasurer William D. Haywood, its president Charles H. Moyer, and 
their supporter and confidant George A. Pettibone, were arrested in Colorado 
and extradited to Idaho, where they were indicted for the 1905 murder, by 
dynamite, of former Idaho Governor Frank Steunenberg. The case against the 
union leaders rested largely upon the testimony of the actual murderer, who 
said they had hired him to kill Steunenberg. Their motivation was allegedly to 
retaliate against Steunenberg for requesting, as Idaho governor in 1899, 
74 TR letters to Ray Stannard Baker, August 27, 1904; and Knox, November 10, 1904, in 
Letters of TR, 4:909, 1024 
75 The most prominent leader of the WFM, William D. Haywood, personified the antithesis of 
Roosevelt's labor views. Haywood enthusiastically supported the Haymarket defendants and 
the Pullman strikers; led the WFM to become the "dominant factor" in the 1905 formation of 
the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), an organization "founded on the class struggle"; 
and reviled "class collaboration" and the AFL as inconsistent with the principles of unionism. 
W illiam D. Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book (New York: International, 1929), 73, 77, 100, 109, 
174-177, 181-182, 185. . 
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federal troops to put down what he termed an insurrection by striking miners in 
the Coeur d'Alene region after they blew up a mine concentrator and drove all 
non-striking company personnel away.76 
With the WFM leaders imprisoned in Idaho, organized labor undertook 
a national publicity campaign to free them as, according to Roosevelt, "martyrs 
to the cause of labor." The Idaho governor became concerned that there might 
be riots on the defendants' behalf, and he requested Roosevelt to send federal 
troops. Although no riot had occurred (and none subsequently occurred), 
Roosevelt quickly sent troops to Boise, with instructions to remain there 
indefinitely. In justification of this action, Roosevelt did not hide his hostility to 
the WFM and the defendants for their many years of practicing "every form of 
violence" and for past "incitement to assassination." He also inveighed against 
their union supporters, including Eugene Debs, for threatening violent 
revolution if the defendants were convicted, which he interpreted as "a certain 
duress on the courts or on the Government authorities."77 
Beginning in July 1907, all the Idaho defendants were acquitted or the 
charges against them were dropped. But Roosevelt's condemnation of the 
WFM leaders never abated. He regarded the acquittal of Haywood as a "gross 
miscarriage of justice" that he supposed was the result of a "terrorized" jury. 
76 Greenberg, TR and Labor, 317-322. For a compact and clear summary of the case, see 
Walter Lord, The Good Years (New York: Harper & Row, 1960; Bantam, 1962), 140-167. 
77 TR letters to Attorney General William Moody, March 26, 1906; Secretary of War Taft, April 
18, 1906; and magazine editor Lyman Abbott, April 23, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5: 196-
200, 214, 219. 
When the "infamous creatures at the head of the Western Federation of 
Miners" late·r opposed the Idaho governor's re-election, Roosevelt actively 
supported the governor. 78 
In December 1907, the governor of Nevada requested Roosevelt to 
send federal troops to reestablish order in his state because of reciprocal 
violence between what Roosevelt later called "greedy" mine owners and the 
"lawless" and "constantly armed" WFM. In his Autobiography, Roosevelt 
justified his deployment of troops as temporary "until time had been given for 
the State authorities to organize their force so that violence could at once be 
checked."79 This obscures the full picture. 
The WFM had gone on strike in late November in opposition to 
Goldfield, Nevada, mine owners' payment of wages in scrip that merchants 
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then discounted. Roosevelt sent troops within three days after receiving the.,. 
governor's request, even though there was little or no evidence of violence. "It 
is far better to avoid conflict," he told the acting secretary of war, "by sending 
too many troops than by sending too few to run the risk of inviting bloodshed." 
After the arrival of the troops, the mine owners opportunistically announced 
wage reductions and their intention not to hire men affiliated with the WFM. 
78 Morison, Letters of TR, 5: 189n; TR letter to Whitelaw Reid, July 19, 1907, in Morison, 
Letters of TR, 5:733; Greenberg, TR and Labor, 322-328. 
79 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 390-392. 
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Yet, there was still no violence.80 
During more than two months beginning on December 17, 1907, 
Roosevelt wrote the governor of Nevada five times questioning the justification 
for federal troops in the absence of insurrection and insisting that the governor 
should call the Nevada legislature into session to provide for a state police 
force. Roosevelt recognized that the governor was stalling, but he repeatedly 
postponed removal of the troops from Nevada until March 7, 1908. One effect 
of their presence was to help break the WFM strike.81 
Roosevelt's various demonstrations of animosity toward the WFM in the 
Colorado, Idaho, and Nevada incidents suggest that on labor matters his was 
a government of men, not of laws or principle. As the eminent Roosevelt 
scholar, Elting Morison, observes, justice for Roosevelt was a matter of 
"personal intuition," lacking any "organized statement of self-evident truths 
about man and his requirements to provide a direction or a basis for judgment 
in political action."82 
Roosevelt's hostility to the Western Federation of Miners and its leaders 
did not mean, however, general hostility to unions or strikes. It reflected his 
distinction between good and bad labor leaders. As he told a supporter of the 
80 TR letter to Robert Shaw Oliver, December 6, 1907, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:863; Rich, 
Presidents and Civil Disorder, 125-128. 
81 TR letters to Governor John Sparks, December 1.7, 20, and 28, 1907, January 4, 1908, and 
February 4 and 7, 1908, in Morison, Letters of TR, 6:866, 868, 877, 895-896, 923, 927; Rich , 
Presidents end Civil Disorder, 129, 131, 133, 134-135. 
sa Morison, Letters of TR, 5:xvii. 
WFM leaders, he drew the "sharpest possible line" between them and "law-
abiding and upright representatives of labor."83 Just as he railed against 
Haywo.od and Moyer of the WFM as bad labor leaders, he rewarded John 
Mitchell of the United Mine Workers as a good labor leader during _the 
anthracite coal strike.84 
When the WFM was not involved, Roosevelt showed restraint in his 
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exercise of government power in strike situations, as he demonstrated early in 
1908 in response to a threatened railroad strike. The presidential precedent for 
dealing with railroad strikes was Cleveland's 1894 decision to seek an 
injunction and then prosecute strike leaders for contempt when the strike did 
not end. Roosevelt's response was very different. He notified the Interstate . 
Commerce Commission of his desire for an investigation and publicity about 
the railroads' strike-provoking decision to reduce wages, and he offered 
government conciliation of the dispute under a post-Cleveland law, the 
Erdman Act. Roosevelt's pro-labor and mediating response led to rescission of 
the wage reductions and settlement of the dispute, for which Gompers and 
other labor leaders gave him the credit.85 
83 TR letter to Honore Jaxon, April 22, 1907, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:653-654. Roosevelt's 
hostility to "bad" unions like the WFM extended to his vow ("to the death") not to hire any of 
their members. TR letter to John Campbell Greenway, October 5, 1903, in Morison, Letters of 
TR, 3:616-617. 
84 The distinction helped Roosevelt avoid universal union opposition, because some AFL 
leaders shared his dislike of violence and radicalism in the union movement. John Morton 
Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954; New York: 
Atheneum, 1963), 59. 
85 TR letter to ICC, February, 18, 1908, in Morison, Letters of TR, 6:947, 948n. 
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Roosevelt was equally vindictive toward some business leaders as he 
was toward some union leaders. One footnote to the Haywood/Moyer affair 
was Roosevelt's public condemnation of the railroad magnate, E. H. Harriman, 
who had allegedly refused to donate to the Republican Party because he said 
it was easy for him to buy Democrats, Congress, and the judiciary. Roosevelt 
denounced Harriman for "cynicism and deep-seated corruption" and declared 
him "at least as undesirable a citizen as Debs, or Moyer, or Haywood." This 
reflected Roosevelt's viewpoint that it was "essential that we make it clear that 
we war on the evil of human nature, whether shown in the labor man or the 
capitalist. "86 
To Roosevelt, the evils perpetrated by bad labor and corporate leaders 
undermined the nation's democratic fabric. In the midst of the Haywood/Moyer 
affair, Roosevelt wrote a revealing letter to the steel magnate and 
philanthropist, Andrew Carnegie, in which he analogized the conflict aboi.Jt 
"economic equity between labor and capital" to the French Revolution. On one 
side were violent extremists who favored change, and they were "to be 
dreaded almost or quite as much as the Bourbon reactionaries who are 
against it." Violent labor leaders paralleled French revolutionaries like Marat, 
Hebert, Robespierre, and Danton, who did no good because they "nullified the 
good that others did" and produced "a reaction that re-enthroned despotism." 
86 TR letters to James S. Sherman, October 8, 1906; Honore Jaxon, April 22, 1907; and 
magazine editor Lyman Abbott, June 18, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:452, 653-654, 307. 
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Such men "did not improve on the morality of the worst nobles of the Old 
regime; they merely damaged freedom as their predecessors had damaged 
order."87 
Roosevelt's comparison between the French Revolution and 
contemporary economic and social conditions was not casually made. He was 
a student of the French Revolution, having written a sympathetic biography of 
Gouverneur Morris, the American minister to France during the Jacobin terror. 
"There was never another great struggle, in the end productive of good to 
mankind," he wrote, "where the tools and methods by which that end was won 
were so wholly vile as in the French Revolution." Beyond his distaste for 
Jacobin means, Roosevelt saw something even more sinister. In challenging 
Bourbon absolutist misrule, the revolutionaries also "destroyed the principle of 
authority" in a government that "represented the whole," by establishing "the 
rule of an anarchic despotism which, by what seems to a free American a 
gross misnomer, they called a democracy." 
87 TR letters to Carnegie, August 6, 1906; and Ray Stannard Baker, June 3, 1908, in Morison, 
Letters of TR, 5:345, 6:1049. Similarly, while stumping for McKinley in the 1896 presidential 
campaign, he said that the labor leader, Eugene Debs, and the Democratic candidate, William 
Jennings Bryan, were "strikingly like the leaders of the Terror in France in mental and moral 
attitude." Hagedorn, Works of TR, 14:258. He even used the comparison against President 
Woodrow Wilson in connection with a labor matter. Angered by Wilson's yielding to a union 
demand for legislation to limit the workday in order to avoid a railroad strike, Roosevelt wrote, 
"I think it is as foolish and as wicked to back any labor union which is wrong as to back any 
great corporation which is wrong. It makes no difference to the State whether we suffer from a 
White Terror or a Red Terror; whether the tyranny is that of the ministers of Louis XV, or that 
of Robespierre, Danton and Marat." Instead, he believed that Wilson should have acted 
primarily as the representative of "the people of this nation as a whole," rather than of 
property owners or laborers. TR letter to Lyman Abbott, September 2, 1916, in Morison, 
Letters of TR, 8:1112-1113. 
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When Roosevelt the champion of an ordered democracy equated 
militant labor leaders with fanatical Jacobins, he did so because he regarded 
both as threats to fundamental societal values. For him the worst aspects of 
the French Revolution provided lessons that were not limited to eighteenth-
century France. He wrote: 
Jacobinism, socialism, communism, nihilism, and anarchism, -
these are the real foes of a democratic republic, for each one, if 
it obtains control, obtains it only as the sure forerunner of a 
despotic tyranny and of some form of the one-man power.88 
Roosevelt's opposition to such isms went beyond fears of bloody 
revolution and despotism. It also reflected his commitment to achieving social 
change by peaceful means. Tlhus, just as he distinguished between good and 
bad unions, he distinguished between good and bad socialist principles and 
methods, depending on whether or not they were "in the interest of the 
people." Although there were aspects of socialism that he supported, this did 
not mean that he was "therefore committed to all of Karl Marx's theories." He 
disagreed "most emphatically" with Marxian Socialism because it was 
"unalterably opposed to our whole industrial system," sought to destroy 
capitalism through continual class struggle, and rejected the possibility of 
reconciliation between the employer and worker classes.89 
88 Theodore Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1899), 150, 225, 234-
235, 259. 
•• The principles of socialism that Roosevelt identified as worthy of his support were tree 
public schools and compulsory education, neither of which seems purely socialist in 
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During his 1910 post-presidential tour of Europe, he made a point of 
observing European socialism. His comments were not positive. In Italy, he 
sympathized with "some of the Socialistic aims," but had "a very profound 
distrust of most of the Socialistic methods" and noted that the ''well-meaning" 
Socialists he met had ''wild eyes." In France, the Republicans who treated him 
as a soul mate were "very uneasy over the Socialistic propaganda" that 
seemed headed toward "mob work and general sinister destruction." In 
Sweden, he "could not understand the extreme bitterness of the Socialist 
attitude" that welcomed class destruction by appealing for an end to having 
children. In Germany, he studied the "advanced" social security system, 
intended by the emperor "to draw the teeth of the Socialists by remedying all 
the real abuses." But he found that this did not stem social discontent that 
"was primarily political rather than economic." In Denmark, he was baffled that 
Denmark's social security system for manual laborers was "a higher and more 
intelligent social and governmental action than we have begun to have in 
America; yet I encountered much bitterness towards the national government 
among the large and growing Socialist party."90 
The negative tendencies he found among Marxists and socialists 
conflicted with his belief that "employer and employees have overwhelming 
inspiration. Roosevelt, Autobiography, 156, 497-498, 515; TR letter to Emerson Hough, MaJt 
4 1908, in Morison, Letters of TR, 6:1022. 90 TR letter to Trevelyan, October 1, 191 1, in Morison, Letters of TR, 7:359, 380,385, 390, 
398. 
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interests in common, both as partners in industry and as citizens of the 
Republic." Even when their interests diverged, he was confident that 
adjustments could be made by changes in law and its interpretation. 
Roosevelt's optimistic political philosophy led him to a middle-of-the-road 
position between the revolutionary Marxian socialists and the "reactionaries" 
whose "standing pat" on matters of industrial justice provoked revolution. He 
was comfortable there, because it allowed him to place a foot on either side of 
the road so that he could practice "sane radicalism."91 
Roosevelt's linkage of dangerous isms with "bad" unions did not mean 
that there were no limits on how he sought to control the Western Federation 
of Miners. He drew the line against trying to manipulate the law to convict 
WFM leaders. In a letter to his attorney general condemning Haywood, Moyer, 
and the WFM for their historic espousal of violence, Roosevelt also insisted on 
a fair trial and an investigation of contentions that the union leaders had been 
improperly extradited from Colorado to stand trial in Idaho for the murder of 
former Governor Steunenberg. The ensuing Department of Justice report that 
the extradition had been lawful furnished him with a foundation for combining 
adherence to "fair trial" protections with condemnation of the WFM defendants 
and their sympathizers.92 Our modern sensibility may nevertheless cringe at 
91 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 498-499; TR letter to Raymond Robins. August 12, 1914, in 
Morison, Letters of TR, 7:798. 
92 TR letters to Attorney General William Moody, March 26, 1906; and Boise newspaper editor 
Calvin Cobb, June 16, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:197, 302-303 
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Roosevelt's seeming to base military intervention on how it would affect the 
WFM. 
Shortly before his presidency ended, Roosevelt was candid that as 
president he "used every ounce of power there was in the office." One of his 
examples for establishing "a precedent for strength in the executive" was 
"keeping order in Nevada this year [1908] when the [Western] Federation of 
Miners threatened anarchy." But he tried to balance his assertion of power by 
insisting upon his sense of responsibility. Explaining his refusal to run for 
almost certain re-election in 1908, he said, "I believe in a strong executive; I 
believe in power; but I believe that responsibility should go with power, and 
that it is not well that the strong executive should be a perpetual executive."93 
This is an appealing bid to justify his treatment of the WFM as subject 
to review by another president. Four years later, however, that sense of 
responsibility did not prevent Roosevelt from running again for the presidency, 
and he never ceased hoping that he would eventually be re-elected.94 
D. Mandatory Union Membership 
Within a year after the 1902 anthracite coal strike, Roosevelt upheld the 
right of a government employee not to be a union member and yet keep his 
job. Because the incident did not involve Roosevelt's usual gallery of infamy -
namely, violence and the Western Federation of Miners-- it provides an 
93 TR letter to Trevelyan, June 19, 1908, in Morison, Letters of TR, 6: 1087. 
94 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Notes and Anecdotes of Many Years (New York: Scribner, 1925), 
149. 
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intriguing case study for assessing Roosevelt's attitude toward what organized 
·labor perceived as an essential union interest. 
The situation arose when an assistant foreman in the Government 
Printing Office (GPO), William A. Miller, was expelled from the Binders' Union 
in May 1903 after introducing cost-saving machinery, establishing production 
levels higher than those in union rules, making negative comments to a 
newspaper about his union, and complaining to a congressman about GPO 
inefficiency. The expulsion made him the only one of five hundred GPO 
employees who was not a union member, a status that defied the GPO's de 
facto "union shop" since its inception in 1860. The chief executive of the GPO 
then discharged Miller, arguably to head off an expected union strike if Miller 
remained in employment. 95 
Miller appealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission, which 
ordered his reinstatement on the basis that the discharge was not justified 
under civil service rules. The GPO nevertheless refused to reinstate Miller and 
appealed the order to Roosevelt and Secretary of Commerce and Labor 
George L. Cortelyou, arguing that all employees of the GPO belonged to one 
95 A clear and scholarly statement of the Miller affair appears in a chapter of Willard B. 
Gatewood, Jr., Theodore Roosevelt and the Art of Controversy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1970), 139-165, which also describes Roosevelt's use of the affair as a 
jumping off place for reorganizing the notoriously inefficient GPO. Except as otherwise noted, 
the following account of the affair reflects Gatewood's narrative. See also Greenberg, TR and 
Labor, 185-187. 
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or the other of eleven unions and that Congress had never disputed the 
practice of employing only union members. 
In letters to Secretary Cortelyou, Roosevelt supported Miller and 
ordered his reinstatement. First, Roosevelt said that union decisions could not 
override federal civil service law. Second, and most importantly for this study, 
he invoked the finding of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission that "no 
person shall be refused employment or in any way discriminated against on 
account of membership or non-membership in any labor organization, and that 
there shall be no discrimination against or interference with any employee who 
is not a member of any labor organization by members of such labor 
organization." Roosevelt then extended the Miller precedent to all executive 
departments by means of an order declaring that they were to follow open 
shop principles, namely, that federal employment was not contingent on union 
membership.96 
Labor leaders emphatically disagreed. AFL president Gompers 
regarded the open shop as a weapon to weaken and destroy labor unions. 
UMW president Mitchell, who tried hard to be supportive of Roosevelt after the 
anthracite coal strike, must have chewed his tongue over the Miller affair. In a 
contemporaneous book about the union movement, he set forth the reasons 
why organized labor believed mandatory union membership was a necessary 
96 TR letters to Cortelyou,. July 13 and 14, 1903, in Letters of TR, 3:514-516; Greenberg, TR 
and Labor, 188-190, 192-193, 196-197. 
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condition of employment. These included a worker's morat duty to his class, 
avoidance of personal animosities in the workplace, and the view that the 
majority of non-unionists are "at the worst, stupid and apathetic."97 Some 
unions not only opposed Roosevelt's decision, but they also called for his 
defeat in the 1904 presidential election. In a demonstration of how ugly the 
dispute became, Miller's former union and Gompers unsuccessfully continued 
to seek Miller's discharge on the newly advanced grounds of alleged bigamy, 
wife-beating, desertion of family, fraud, and theft. 
Having tacked to starboard on the substance of the Miller case, 
"Roosevelt then responded to union dismay by tacking to port. He agreed to 
discuss the Miller case with the AFL executive council, including Gompers and 
Mitchell, on September 29, 1903. Based upon a draft he had prepared in 
advance, Roosevelt issued a statement at the meeting that was a masterpiece 
of giving something to both sides in the open shop dispute. He held the tiller 
steady on his Miller decision, emphasizing that "I can no more recognize the 
fact that a man does or does not belong to a union as being for or against him 
than I can recognize the fact that he is a Protestant or a Catholic, a Jew or a 
Gentile, as being for or against him." But he deliberately limited his position to 
government employment in order to appease the union officials. Thus, not only 
did he omit repetition of his reliance on the authority of the Anthracite Coal 
Strike Commission's open shop pronouncement (which related to non-
97 Mitchell, Organized Labor, 272-285; Greenberg, TR and Labor, 194. 
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government employment), but he also provided a formula to limit the Miller 
decision to government employment by telling the AFL executive council that "I 
am dealing purely with the relation of the Government to its employees."98 
That was enough to satisfy the AFL.99 At its convention in November 
1903, the AFL declined to pass anti-TR resolutions, while reasserting its 
position for "union shop everywhere, as well in federal, state and municipal 
employment as in private enterprises." In what a cynic may regard as 
Roosevelt's symbolic expression of gratitude, a week after the AFL convention 
he invited six labor leaders from Butte, Montana, to visit him at the White 
House.100 
Roosevelt's accommodation with the AFL executive council was 
disingenuous, given that he had originally cited the Anthracite Coal Strike 
Commission's "clearly and fearlessly enunciated" private-employment decision 
as the authority for also covering government employment as a matter of 
"elementary decency."101 Moreover, the belated distinction between 
government and non-government employment does not reflect his bedrock 
98 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 496-497; Morris, T Rex, 271. Roosevelt's statement is 
reproduced in his letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, September 30, 1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 
3:607. . 
99 Greenberg, TR and Labor, 210-213. Roosevelt's explanation of his reference to government 
employment was that it was "the point at issue," and "I had nothing to say about" private 
concerns. TR letter to Lemuel Clarke Davis, October 5, 1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:617. 
100 Roosevelt noted that the visit was "denounced in certain capitalistic papers." Roosevelt, 
Autobiography, 507-508. On the other hand, according to a friend, Roosevelt qualified even 
his union-welcoming gesture when he said, "The White House door, while I am here, shall 
swing open as easily for the labor man as the capitalist, and no easier." Riis, TR the Citizen, 
371 (emphasis in original). · 
101 TR letter to Cortelyou, July 14, 1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:516. 
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labor views. Long after the Miller affair, he reiterated his all-inclusive belief "in 
the right of the nonunion man to refuse to join a union and to work side by side 
with the union men."102 
Roosevelt's actions in the Miller case, from beginning to end, had a 
political basis. He believed that Wall Street capitalists were "especially bitter 
against me because of my having settled the Anthracite Coal strike" and that 
this had contributed to Republican defeats in local elections during November 
1903. In a letter to Senator Hanna at an early stage of the Miller controversy, 
Roosevelt noted that his opponents and other "curious men" regarded him "as 
improperly friendly to organized labor and to the workingmen generally." 
Almost simultaneously, Senator Lodge wrote Roosevelt that a group of 
railroad managers, fearing an imminent strike, had said that Roosevelt was 
"entirely given over to the labor side" and would "not treat the labor men in the 
same way that you would treat capital if they violate the law."103 Initially, 
therefore, the Miller case enabled TR to show business interests and other 
conservatives that he was not invariably friendly to organized labor. Roosevelt 
calculated the political risks in reinstating Miller: 
The labor unions were very arrogant and domineering because 
they did not believe I would face the music, and it was necessary 
to give them a good jolt to make them understand at the outset 
102 TR letter to Edward P. Costigan, union lawyer and Progressive Party candidate for 
~overnor of Colorado, August 15, 1914, in Morison, Letters of TR, 7:807. 
3 TR letter to Richard Watson Gilder, November 4, 1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:645-
646; TR letter to Hanna, May 29, 1903, quoted in Bishop, TR and His Time, 1:246; Lodge 
letter to TR, June 3, 1903, quoted in Greenberg, TR and Labor, 184-185. 
that I would not tolerate anything in the nature of tyranny on their 
part. I was very sorry to have to go into the matter, because I 
entirely appreciate the political disadvantages of what I did and I 
should be a fool if I did not regret having to do anything that I 
thought would be politically disadvantageous to me; but this was 
the case where I did not feel that I should be justified in any 
hesitancy.104 
Against the political disadvantages of upsetting union leaders, 
Roosevelt sought to gain political advantage from the Miller incident "as an 
illustration of the fairness with which the administration has tackled the two 
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sides of the labor-capital question." As he later told his son Kermit, the Miller 
case "gave to trades-unions a lesson that had been taught corporations -that 
I favored them while they did right and was not in the least afraid of them when 
they did wrong."105 
Labor history has viewed "open shop" rhetoric at the time of the Miller 
case as code for more comprehensive anti-unionism. At the turn of the 
century, after it had become apparent that union membership was growing in a 
geometric progression, employer associations began forming nationally for the 
purpose of achieving a non-union business environment. The best known of 
these organizations was the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), 
whose membership consisted mostly of smaller businesses. It had originally 
been formed to promote trade and commerce. In early 1903, however, it 
104 TR to Albert Shaw, August 1, 1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:537. 
105 TR letters to Jacob Gould Schurman, August 31 , 1903; and Lyman Abbott, September 5, 
1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:581 , 591-593; TR letter to Kermit, October 26, 1904, in 
Irwin, Letters to Kermit, 79. 
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embraced a Declaration of Principles that claimed not to oppose labor 
organizations "as such" but condemned strikes, boycotts, closed shops, and 
other interference with employer control over the conditions of work. One 
manifestation of these principles was requiring employees to sign an 
agreement, sometimes known as a yellow-dog contract, not to join unions or 
induce others to join.106 
Roosevelt's position in the Miller case should not be confused with the 
NAM's adoption of the open shop as part of an anti-union agenda. In his 
Autobiography, Roosevelt castigated the NAM for its "selfishness and short-
sighted ness." By opposing "every rational and moderate measure for 
benefiting workingmen, such as measures abolishing child labor, or securing 
workmen's compensation," the NAM's course and language were "ominous of 
evil" and "of such reactionary type as directly to incite revolution."107 His 
opposition to mandatory union membership never descended to the yellow-
dog level of compulsory non-unionism. On the contrary, his words clearly 
expressed the right (as distinct from the obligation) of employees to join 
unions. In that respect, he shared the philosophy of the National Civic 
106 Foner, History of Labor Movement, 3:27, 34-42; James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in 
the Liberal State: 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon, 1968), 4-5, 15. The terms "closed shop" and 
"union shop" were sometimes used interchangeably. Gompers argued, however, that the 
"union shop" sought by the AFL was not "closed" to any wage earner who was willing to join 
the union; whereas the "open shop" as practiced by "the opponents of labor" effectively 
prevented a union member from working in the shop. Samuel Gompers, Labor and the 
Employer, ed. Hayes Robbins (New York: Dutton, 1920), 112. 
107 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 505-506. 
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Federation, which had been formed in late 1900 to improve relations between 
capital and labor. 
The NCF was organized on a tripartite model, with representatives of 
capital, predominantly from large corporations; labor, predominantly from the 
AFL; and the general public. This third group included men who were or 
became close to Roosevelt, like his future cabinet appointees Oscar Straus 
and Charles Bonaparte. The NCF's goal, at least until1905, was for 
employers and unions to work cooperatively on the basis of "reason and 
understanding," byproducts of which would be favorable employer treatment of 
the unionization of skilled workers in return for union abstention from more 
militant activity like the organization of unskilled workers. Implicit in that 
philosophy was ·willingness to accept union shops under unspecified 
circumstances, a willingness that the NAM used to attack the NCF.108 
Marxist labor historian PhilipS. Foner dismisses the contention that the 
NCF and NAM had different union values by pointing out that many employer 
representatives in the NCF came from demonstrably anti-union, open shop 
corporations and that their corporations were the dominant funding source for 
the NCF. However, union representatives in the NCF included Gompers, 
Mitchell, and .Henry White of the United Garment Workers whom Roosevelt 
had once sought to appoint as chief factory inspector in New York State. They 
108 Foner, HistoryofLaborMovement, 2:384-386; 3:61-65, 68-71 ; Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, 
7, 18. 
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thought enough of the NCF to reshape their early-AFL class-struggle rhetoric. 
In its place, they embraced the NCF view that there was "no necessary 
hostility between capital and labor" and endorsed the idea of working with 
employers.109 This view paralleled Roosevelt's hopes. 
E. Criteria for Supreme Court Nominees 
Roosevelt made three appointments to the United States Supreme 
Court. They were Massachusetts Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ( 1902), 
federal appellate Judge William Rufus Day (1903), and Attorney General 
William Henry Moody (1906). There is no warrant for inferring that labor 
considerations were decisive in his selections, but labor-relatedness may 
nevertheless shed some light on his thinking. 
The Holmes nomination provides the strongest evidence of a labor 
connection. Roosevelt wrote to Senator Lodge on July 10, 1902, that his 
reasons for nominating Holmes included the following : 
The labor decisions which have been criticized by some of the 
big railroad men and other members of large corporations 
constitute to my mind a strong point in Judge Holmes' favor. 
The ablest lawyers and greatest judges are men whose past 
has naturally brought them into close relationship with the 
wealthiest and most powerful clients, and I am glad when I can 
find a judge who has been able to preserve his aloofness of 
mind so as to keep his broad humanity of feeling and his 
sympathy for the class from which he has not drawn his clients. 
I think it eminently desirable that our Supreme Court should 
show in unmistakable fashion their entire sympathy with all 
109 Foner, History of Labor Movement, 2:386-387; 3:64-68, 71 -72. 
proper effort to secure the most favorable possible 
consideration for the men who most need that consideration.110 
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A detailed study of the Holmes nomination, however, concludes that his 
labor decisions were not the predominant reason for his selection. More 
important was Roosevelt's attitude toward territorial issues growing out of 
American expansionism under President McKinley.111 
Moreover, since Roosevelt did not identify particular labor decisions, we 
do not know which cases he had in mind. While on the Massachusetts 
Supreme JudiCial Court, Holmes dealt with both the rights of labor 
organizations and, separately, the rights of working people without reference 
to organized labor.112 Roosevelt could have been invoking either. 
When we consider Holmes's two famous repudiations of injunctions 
against union activity, it is also unclear what Roosevelt may have specifically 
liked about them. In Vegelahn v. Gunter, Holmes dissented from issuance of a 
broad injunction against picketing, because he regarded the injunction as 
having unreasonably forbidden peaceful picketing. But he also acknowledged 
110 H. W. Brands, ed. , The Selected Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Cooper 
Square, 2001 ), 279-281 . The letter reviews over a dozen reasons for and against appointing 
Holmes, including the quoted labor portion and concerns about judicial handling of islands 
taken from Spain in the recent war. It is difficult, if not impossible, to apportion weight to any of 
the reasons. 
111 John A Garraty, "Holmes's Appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court," The New England 
Quarterly 22, no. 3 (1949): 291-303. Some historians interpret the mention of Holmes's Iaber 
views in the tetter to Lodge as indicating that they contributed to the final decision to nominate 
Holmes. George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement (New York: 
Hill & Wang, 1946), 19; Greenberg, TR and Labor, 396-397. 
112 E.g., on the latter subject, Holmes argued in dissent for the constitutionality of a statute 
restricting the docking of wages for imperfect work. Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117 
(1891). 
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that an injunction would have been proper if there had been proof (rather than 
an unsupported inference) of force or threatened physical harm to prevent 
someone from crossing a picket line. 
In Plant v. Woods, Holmes dissented from enjoining a threatened stril<e 
for a closed shop (where one unlon's.members refused to work with members 
of another union) on the basis that •unity of organization" was a justifiable 
purpose, a principle that we know Roosevelt rejected when he later decided 
the Miller mandatory union membership case. To complicate interpretation 
further, Holmes criticized the union action, despite his view of its legality, for 
benefiting one group of workers "at the expense of their fellows. "113 Despite 
the complexity of Holmes's analyses, Roosevelt was almost certainly aware 
that the judge's labor injunction views disagreed with the more anti-union 
attitudes of a majority of his fellow Massachusetts judges. 
A somewhat clearer insight into what labor views Roosevelt wanted in a 
Supreme Court Justice came four years after his nomination of Holmes, when 
the president briefly considered nominating federal Judge Horace Lurton to 
another seat on the Court. Roosevelt regarded Lurton as "sound" and "right" 
about labor, making clear that what he meant by judicial soundness was 
willingness to insist upon union obligations, rather than union rights. Lurton, he 
113 Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92 (1896); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (1900). These 
dissents are reproduced and commented on in Max Lerner, ed. , The Mind and Faith of Justice 
Holmes (New York: Modern Library ed., 1943), 109-122. 
wrote, "takes just the attitude we take as regards . .. the checking of labor 
people when they go wrong.''114 
As for the nomination of Judge Day, his biographer characterizes the 
reasons as "somewhat obscure" and suggests that "geographical influence" 
may have been determinative because both Day and Taft, Roosevelt's first 
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choice, were from Ohio. Day, a former lawyer for small corporations, was well 
regarded for his work in the State Department, where he eventually served as 
secretary of state, and as a federal judge.115 The only evidence of a labor 
connection is that Roosevelt intended to appoint Day to a commission of 
investigation just before the settlement of the anthracite coal strike, describing 
him variously as "a good man" and an "eminent outside gentleman." Since 
Roosevelt was at that time expressing exasperation with the mine owners for 
their "gross blindness," insensitivity to the public interest, and responsibility for 
the failure of his White House settlement conference,116 it is tempting to 
114 TR letters to Taft, July 27 and August 2, 1906; and Root, August 18, 1906, in Morison, 
Letters of TR, 5:338, 343, 368. Lurton and Secretary of War Taft had been colleagues and 
friends when they served together on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Taft apparently 
lobbied Roosevelt on Lurton's behalf, despite the fact that Lurton was a Democrat. Instead of 
Lurton, Roosevelt appointed Attorney General Moody. In 1909, Taft appointed Lurton to the 
Supreme Court. Morrison, Letters of TR, 5:338n. 
115 Joseph E. Mclean, William Rufus Day, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical 
and Political Science, series 64, no. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1946), 534-535, 548-
549, 564-565, 569-570. As a judge, Taft had issued labor injunctions. He opposed union 
boycotts, injury to employer property, and unlawful interference with business operations, but 
he also believed that workers were entitled to organize in unions and to strike. Henry F. 
Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1964), 1:367. 
116 TR letters to Hanna and Cleveland, October 10, 1902; Bishop, October 13, 1902; and 
Governor Crane of Massachusetts, October 22, 1902, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:348, 346, 
349, 362. 
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speculate that Roosevelt regarded Day as sufficiently independent to make a 
fair assessment of the dispute between mine owners and their employees. 
The Day nomination exemplifies the presidential difficulty of knowing 
what a nominee will actually do on the Court. Justice Day took positions in two 
cases that are diametrically opposed from a labor standpoint and can only be 
reconciled based on his views of the constitutional division of authority 
between the national and state governments. In 1905, he joined the majority of 
the Court to declare unconstitutional, as a violation of the prevailing doctrine of 
liberty of contract, a federal statute that prohibited railroads from requiring 
employees to sign so-called yellow-dog contracts that they would not join a 
union.117 Seven years later, he voted to uphold a similar state yellow-dog 
prohibition, because he thought that state police power (as distinct from 
federal commerce power) included the right to restrict such employment 
contracts.118 Issues of federalism; in other words, trumped labor issues. 
Of his three nominees, Roosevelt probably knew the most about 
Moody, whom he had previously appointed to the offices of secretary of the 
navy and attorney general. We know that Roosevelt respected Moody and that 
Justice Day recommended him.119 Moody had a reputation from his years in 
the House of Representatives ( 1895-1902) for sympathy to pro-worker 
legislation as an antidote to socialism, whose proponents had achieved 
117 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). Holmes, contrary to Day, dissented. 
118 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). See Mclean, Day, 633-635. 
119 TR letter to Moody, December 16, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:527. 
political success in his congressional distric~. He had also expressed a 
willingness to exempt labor unions from antitrust liability. Like Roosevelt, he 
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believed that "the corporation has come to stay as has the trade union." .Yet, 
Moody campaigned actively in 1906 to thwart the AFL's electoral efforts to 
defeat congressional candidates who supported labor injunctions.120 In all 
these respects except his early idea of antitrust exemption for unions, Moody 
was similar to Roosevelt. 
What Roosevelt's three nominees had in common regarding labor 
matters was that they were empathetic to wageworkers and neither hostile to 
unions nor predisposed to give unquestioning acceptance to union actions. 
Insofar as a capsule description may aid our understanding of a person, this 
one is also applicable to Roosevelt. 
F. Labor Injunctions 
Organized labor's leaders regarded the injunction issued against Debs 
and the 1894 railroad boycott as a threat to organized labor's effectiveness. 
Debs stated that the injunction broke the Pullman strike and restrained union 
leaders "from discharging our duties as officers and representatives of the 
employees." Perlman, the labor historian, contends that "sporadic" use of labor 
injunctions thereafter became "a veritable crop. "121 
120 Judith Rene McDonough, "William Henry Moody" (Ph.D. diss., Auburn University, 1983), 
20-22, 127, 148. 
121 Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 155-156, 159; Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor 
Injunction, 17-19. A more recent analysis argues that an accurate tally of the number of labor 
121 
By 1906, a congressional election year, organized labor was 
determined to challenge the legal foundation for court injunctions against 
unions and their leaders. One form this took was opposing election of 
politicians who did not agree to support laws banning labor injunctions.122 The 
union campaign, which intensified in the 1908 presidential election, aroused 
Roosevelt's energetic defense on behalf of two of his most cherished notions: 
the continued political dominance of the Republican Party, where organized 
labor found most of its foes, and the necessity to maintain a bulwark against 
union actions that he regarded as lawless. Despite his willingness to 
accommodate organized labor in part, he would not yield to complete 
eradication of labor injunctions. 
AFL officers met with Roosevelt early in 1906 to express their desires 
for an anti-injunction law and for heightened enforcement of existing laws 
limiting workdays to eight hours. Emblematic of Roosevelt's sentiments 
regarding those issues, his immediate response focused only on obtaining 
evidence to enforce the eight-hour requirements.123 Behind the scenes, he 
simultaneously began to consider a compromise on the use of labor 
injunctions is "impossible," because many were temporary or preliminary decrees, not 
published in law reporters, or part of court records that no longer exist. It estimates, however, 
that the number of labor injunctions quadrupled in the 1890s compared to the prior decade 
and then doubled in the 1900s. In each of those decades, the proportion of strik.es judicially 
enjoined did not exceed 3 percent. William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American 
Labor Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 193-198. 
122 Julie Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political 
Activism, 1881-1917 (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 82, 103-104. 
123 Gompers, Seventy Years, 2:243; TR letter to AFL secretary Frank Morrison, March 22, 
1906, in Morison, LettersofTR, 5:190-191. 
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injunctions. In a letter to his attorney general, Roosevelt sought a fairer use of 
the injunction power in connection with a broad, anti-union injunction recently 
issued by a Philadelphia court. "My own theory," he wrote, "has always been 
that while any attempt at violence, or coercion by threat of violence, must be 
put down in the strongest manner; yet on the other hand, it is only right that 
the labor union people in the event of a strike should be given full liberty to try 
to convince by legitimate and peaceable arguments the men who are taking 
their places [i.e. , strikebreakers] that they ought not thus to act."124 
In framing a response to organized labor's efforts to defeat Republican 
candidates who did not support a ban on labor injunctions, Roosevelt 
recognized that it was "a bad business to solidify labor against us." He wrote 
that "great care should be taken when assuming a position antagonistic to 
labor on one point to make it clear as a bell that we are not as a whole 
antagonistic, but friendly, to labor." He sought to show the administration's 
friendliness to labor by counseling against attacks on Gompers and other labor 
leaders, because "a large number of slovenly thinkers" would otherwise 
mistakenly confuse such attacks as on all labor men. He believed that a 
compromise on the injunction issue might prevent a rift with organized labor. 
He speculated that if the government acted "on behalf of one or two labor 
124 TR letter Attorney General Moody, March 22, 1906, in Morison, Letters ofTR, 5:1 91-19a 
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organizations where we regarded the injunction as wrong, it would strengthen 
us when we regarded the injunction as right."125 
But Roosevelt the applied ethicist pulled in a different direction from 
Roosevelt the politician. Although the president conceded that Congress had 
not done "all they might have for these labor people," the union position was 
"so extreme that they have left us no alternative but to come out squarely 
against some of their demands." This meant support of Republican candidates 
who shared Roosevelt's opposition to union anti-injunction efforts, even when 
that entailed distasteful alliances. One such alliance was with Republican 
Representative Charles Littlefield of Maine, whose anti-labor record led the 
AFL to make him a primary target for defeat in 1906. Roosevelt delegated 
Secretary of War Taft, Senators Lodge and Beveridge, and others to 
campaign for Littlefield, despite the congressman's "fool attitude" as a cheap, 
dishonorable poseur.126 
125 TR letters to journalists George Lorimer, May 12, 1906, and Lyman Abbott, July 1, 1906; 
cabinet member James Wilson, September 1, 1906; Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon, 
September 17, 1906; and Charles Bonaparte, Moody's successor as attorney general, 
December 23, 1907, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:268-269, 328, 404, 413-414; 6:873. 
Roosevelt did not hide his belief that some labor injunctions were indefensible. He criticized 
"the judge who by misuse of the process of injunction makes it plain that in him the wage-
worker has a determined and unscrupulous enemy." Roosevelt, Autobiography, 473. 
126 TR letters to Root, August 18, 1906; Lodge, August 9 and September 12, 1906; and 
Speaker of the House Cannon, August 15, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5: 350, 360-361, 
367-368, 408. Littlefield was re-elected and then publicly demonstrated his ingratitude to 
Roosevelt and Taft by demanding that they provide specific citations to prove that the courts 
had ever abused their power to grant labor injunctions. Roosevelt's reaction was to relegate 
Littlefield to a deeper level of disdain by adding udishonest" to his earlier list of the 
congressman's shortcomings. TR letters to Littlefield, May 2, 1908; and Taft, August 18, 1908, 
in Morison, Letters of TR, 6:1 021, 1179. 
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Organized labor's failure to defeat the Littlefield persuasion in the 1906 
elections did not cause it to retreat from seeking a ban on all labor injunctions. 
Roosevelt offered a compromise on the injunction issue in a special message 
he sent to Congress in January 1908, the beginning of a presidential election 
year. Still of the opinion that it was "most unwise to abolish the use of the 
process of injunction," because that would undermine the judiciary's ability "in 
effective manner [to] check disorder and violence," Roosevelt suggested a 
middle way to accommodate organized labor's concerns. The labor injunction, 
he told Congress, should not "prevent the entirely proper and legitimate 
actions of labor organizations in their struggle for industrial betterment." 
Therefore, surround the injunction procedure with "safeguards," such as 
reasonable notice to the party against whom the injunction was sought.127 
. Several days after the special message, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Loewe v. Lawlor (colloquially known as the Danbury Hatters case), 
holding that unions were combinations subject to liability under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.128 The decision intensified organized labor's efforts to escape 
from the antitrust law. It also set the stage for an alliance of government, 
business, and labor to amend that law to provide for what Roosevelt 
127 Morison, Letters of TR, 6:157 4. 
128 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). Even before this decision, there had been a lower 
court holding that unions were combinations subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act. When 
Gompers and John Mitchell were subsequently charged with violating a labor injunction under 
that Jaw, Roosevelt became concerned that a jail sentence for contempt of court in advance of 
the 1908 election would doom the Taft campaign. TR letter to Taft, August 24, 1908, in 
Morison, Letters of TR, 6:1195-1196. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 
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conceived as the joint benefit of all three. The complexity of Roosevelt's 
conception underscores how difficult it is for historians to pigeonhole his 
attitude toward organized labor. 
The Loewe decision coincidentally followed a period when Roosevelt 
and large business organizations, as represented in part by the NCF, were 
already working on some kind of government regulation of business that would 
be coupled with changing the Sherman Antitrust Act to allow "reasonable" 
restraints of trade. As the fruit of a carefully prepared conference in October 
1907, the NCF prepared a legislative campaign to amend the Sherman Act to 
permit reasonable restraints of trade in conjunction with unspecified 
government regulation of business. Since labor unions were represented at 
the conference and active in the NCF, the amendment was also intended to 
protect national and local organizations of labor.129 
Roosevelt was less than enthusiastic about the NCF proposals, 
because they would defer implementation of his business regulation goals to 
further study before realization of congressionally mandated rules. Instead, he 
wanted an amendment that would immediately allow reasonable restraints of 
trade, conditioned on a government body's first approving the reasonableness 
of the restraints. In other words, he was agreeable to the NCF's ultimate goal 
contingent on granting the executive branch of government greatly expanded 
129 Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 203-213. 
126 
control of business. What was appealing to Roosevelt was that the NCF had 
crafted an alliance with organized labor and farm groups. In response to 
Roosevelt's interest, the NCF created a three-person directorate composed of 
the NCF president, a farm leader, and Gompers to work closely with Roosevelt 
and his staff to draft legislation.130 
The AFL's participation in the Roosevelt-led effort was galvanized by 
the Loewe decision, which it interpreted as threatening the very existence of 
labor organizations. When its leaders explained their fears to Speaker of the 
House Joseph Cannon in March, he categorically rejected both the union 
interpretation and any need for a remedy. Moreover, as discussed above, 
unionization efforts were under attack by small employers belonging to the 
National Association of Manufacturers, as well as big corporations belonging 
to the NCF. Roosevelt's regulatory scheme seemed to offer organized labor a 
safer harbor.131 
The Roosevelt-NCF-AFL alliance did not proceed smoothly. It went 
through at least thirteen drafts of a bill before the principals could agree on 
what to present to Congress. In its final form, known as the Hepburn bill after 
the congressman who agreed to introduce it, Roosevelt obtained strong 
government regulation of business through a registration procedure, and 
business obtained the right to engage in reasonable restraints of ~rade. 
130 Ibid., 213-223. 
131 Ibid., 223-230. 
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Although organized labor gained a much less demanding registration 
procedure than that for corporations, it was not exempted from the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. Tension between Roosevelt's and the AFL's primary goals 
quickly became apparent.132 
In a special message to Congress on March 25, 1908, regarding the 
need to amend antitrust law (without specifically endorsing the Hepburn bill 
that he had shaped), Roosevelt both caressed and slapped organized labor. 
He said it was unfair and potentially destructive to unions not to clarify the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, since labor combinations were "absolutely necessary" 
in the modern industrial world; strikes were a legitimate tool for dealing with 
"very wealthy individual employer, and still more wealthy corporation"; and the 
Sherman Act's treble damages should not be assessed against labor 
organizations. But all this was premised on unions' acting "peaceably" (a word 
he used several times), and "Nothing should be done to legalize either a 
blacklist or a boycott that would be illegal at common law."133 
While supporting the business provisions of the bill, organized labor 
continued to seek an outright exemption from the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
Moreover, many businesses, not limited to members of the National 
Association of Manufacturers, opposed the bill as undermining the labor 
leverage that Loewe had given them. In addition, a diverse group of employers 
132 Ibid. , 235-238. 
133 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of 
National Literature, 1911-1922), 15:7343-7346. 
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and business associations argued that the bill had gone too far in its statist 
implications. In the face of so many objections, the Hepburn bill never got out 
of committee.134 
After the mildly cooperative Hepburn bill interlude, the AFL's continued 
opposition to all labor injunctions became its litmus test in the 1908 
presidential election. Roosevelt was unable to persuade the Republican Party 
to embrace even a modest compromise with organized labor. He and Taft 
desired a plank in the party's platform that would "moderate" the use of labor 
injunctions. Without "the slightest expectation of placating or gaining the 
ultraviolent labor men," Roosevelt believed this would "enable the labor merr 
who would naturally be with us to feel that they had a justification for staying 
with us." The Republican Party, however, would go no further than a plank 
upholding the authority of the courts to issue injunctions, while urging 
legislation that would "more accurately" define court rules in such cases anct 
forbid injunctive orders without notice, "except where irreparable injury would 
result from delay." It did not identify the labor injunction as a situation needing 
special attention. Lodge called it "a colorless plank."135 
134 Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 254-266, 267-273, 282-283; Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, 
79-81 . 
135 TR telegrams to Lodge, June 15 and 16, 1908; and letter to Lyman Abbott, June 17, 1908, 
in Morison, Letters of TR, 6:1077, 1078, 1081; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. , and Fred L. Israel, 
eds. , History of American Presidential Elections, 1798-1968 (New York: Chelsea House, 
1971), 3:2106. Even so, the 1908 Republican platform was more accommodating to organized 
labor than its 1904 platform, when TR was the party's candidate. The earlier platform 
approved combinations of labor and capital, "when lawfully formed for lawful purposes," 
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This was not nearly enough for the AFL.136 After a Republican 
resolutions committee blocked Gompers' efforts to gain strong anti-labor 
injunction language; Gompers declared that labor had been "thrown down, 
repudiated and relegated to the discard by the Republican Party." He took his 
case to the Democratic convention, where he obtained platform language 
under the special interest heading of "Labor and Injunctions" that limited labor 
injunctions in broad terms and required trial by jury (not judges) to determine 
whether or not compliance with the injunction had occurred. Gompers 
expressed his appreciation by endorsing the Democratic presidential 
candidate, William Jennings Bryan.137 
Roosevelt, previously willing to seek an accommodation with organized 
labor on injunction limitations, used the injunction issue to attack Gompers' 
presidential endorsement. In a precisely and sharply phrased letter to Senator 
Knox, Roosevelt challenged Bryan to separate himself from what he depicted 
as the dangerous implications of the Democrats' labor plank. 
Because Gompers claimed that the Democratic plank embodied anti-
injunction legislation that organized labor had already proposed, Roosevelt's 
letter targeted the legislation proposal. He attacked it and supporting 
provided that "both are subject to the laws and neither can be permitted to break them." Ibid., 
3:2005. 
136 But it was too much for the anti-union National Association of Manufacturers, which feared 
that saying anything about labor injunctions might generate distrust of the courts. Pringle, Life 
and Times of Taft, 350-352. 
137 Schlesinger et al., History of Elections, 3:2073-2074, 2078, 2096-2097; Gompers, Seventy 
Years, 2:262-263. 
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comments from organized labor as an attempt simultaneously to treat 
business operations as having no legally protected property rights while 
protecting all labor actions from being treated as unlawful conspiracies.138 This 
would mean, he argued, that unions could not be enjoined from engaging in 
violence, conducting secondary boycotts against innocent third parties away 
from the premises of a labor dispute, or establishing blacklists against anyone 
who opposed union activity. Roosevelt argued that such union power would 
constitute a reversal of the position taken by the Anthracite Coal Strike 
Commission that he had created to help organized labor accomplish its strike 
aims in 1902. 
Lest anyone mistake his letter as a pamphlet for big business, 
Roosevelt ended it with a tribute to American workingmen. "I believe both in 
the patriotism and the intelligence of the workingmen, the laboring men, of 
America," he wrote. Absent, however, was a conciliatory tone toward 
Gompers. "I do not believe that they [workingmen] will permit Mr. Gompers to 
138 So-called business "property rights" (e.g., in the form of goodwill or the right to carry on the 
business) were important to ~ business seeking a labor injunction, because they provided a ... 
basis on which to claim irreparable injury that could not be translated into a specific monetary 
loss. Absent an adequate monetary remedy, the judicial remedy for such irreparable injury 
was a cease-and-desist order, that is, an injunction against the union action. Mason, 
Organized Labor and the Law, 103-1 05. By seeking to eliminate "property rights" in business, 
therefore, organized labor's goal was to eliminate a crucial pillar on which labor injunctions 
were con$tructed. 
deliver them like chattels to Mr. Bryan in exchange for a sham." He then 
immediately released the letter to the public.139 
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On the day before his letter to Knox, Roosevelt wrote a more personal 
letter touching on the same subject to his son Kermit, then a Harvard 
freshman who would soon accompany TR on an extensive, post-presidential 
hunting trip to Africa. In it, Roosevelt said that "labor people" (the context 
suggesting that he was speaking about laborers, not labor unions) had "just 
cause of complaint with the Republican party taken as a whole, because 
Congress under the lead of [Speaker of the House] Cannon treated them 
badly; and the courts representing both the old school Republicans and the 
old school Democrats, have been curiously disregardful of their interests." 
On the other hand, Roosevelt observed to Kermit that Gompers "and the 
Democratic and labor demagogs" were "demanding outrageous and 
impossible action both by the legislature and Executive." His letter significantly 
contrasts laborers with labor union leaders, the former group's just cause of 
complaint with the latter's demagoguery, and the legislature (note the first 
letter is lower case) that had treated laborers badly with the Executive (note 
the first letter is upper case), Roosevelt himself, whom workers knew "so well 
139 TR letter to Knox, October 21, 1908, in Morison, Letters of TR, 6:1305-1313. Gompers 
regarded TR's attack on him as ending "the old friendly relations between us." Gompers, 
Seventy Years, 1:533. As strongly phrased as the letter was in its defense of the labor 
injunction, it was mild in comparison to Roosevelt's rhetoric during the 1896 presidential 
campaign when he said, "The men who object to what they style 'government by injunction' 
are, as regards the essential principles of government, in hearty sympathy with their remote 
skin-clad ancestors who lived in caves, fought one another with stone-headed axes, and ate 
the mammoth and woolly rhinoceros." Roosevelt, American Ideals, 196-197. 
that I think they would support me without regard to their grievances real or 
imaginary against the courts and the Congress."140 
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In his final annual message to Congress, issued after Taft's defeat of 
Bryan for the presidency, Roosevelt repeated his and the Republican Party's 
pre-election proposals for further definition of the labor injunction procedure 
and for due notice before issuance of an injunction, "except where irreparable 
injury would otherwise result. " He repeated the critique of proposed union 
legislation set forth in his October letter to Knox. The unions, he said, had 
refused all compromise, instead making demands that "would mean the 
enthronement of class privilege in its crudest and most brutal form, and the 
destruction of one of the most essential functions of the judiciary in all civilized 
lands." Union class-selfishness would divide society and "would inevitably in 
the end cause a violent reaction." What was most important for industrial 
reform and betterment, he told Congress, was government action that directly 
benefited working people --like child-labor prevention, shortening of hours of 
work, a comprehensive employers' liability law, old-age pensions, and 
unemployment compensation. Soon to step down from the presidency, 
. 
Roosevelt seemed to turn away from political accommodation with organized 
140 TR letter to son Kermit, October 20, 1908, in Morison, Letters of TR, 6: 1304. From Kermit's 
early days in prep school, Roosevelt wrote him candidly about political and policy matters, 
while expecting Kermit to keep such correspondence confidential. Irwin, Letters to Kermit, 69, 
190. The special quality of their relationship was further underscored by the fact that Kermit 
was the only relative who accompanied Roosevelt on the African safari in 1909 and the South 
American adventure in 1913. 
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labor and focus instead on the government's primacy for obtaining social 
justice.141 
G. Foundation for the Promotion of Industrial Peace 
In 1906, Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for mediating an end to 
the Russo-Japanese War. It came with a monetary award of what was then 
the substantial sum of nearly $40,000. He did not feel that he could morally 
accept that part of the prize because being paid "for making peace would in 
any event be a little too much like being given money for rescuing a man from 
drowning, or for performing a daring feat in war." He and his wife together 
decided that he must apply the money for a public purpose.142 
At his request, Congress established a Foundation for the Promotion of 
Industrial Peace to which he donated the Nobel money.143 "In the present state 
of the world's development," Roosevelt later said, before the onset of the 
Great War in Europe, "industrial peace is even more essential than 
international peace; and it is fitting and appropriate to devote the peace prize 
to such a purpose. "144 Writing to the Norwegian chairman of the Nobel 
Committee, he described the object of the "permanent" foundation as "better 
141 Hagedorn, Works of TR, 15:499-511 . 
142 TR letter to son Kermit, December 5, 1906, in Irwin, Letters to Kermit, 174-175. 
143 Except as otherwise noted, my summary of the Foundation's history is based on Congress, 
Senate, Senator Lodge speaking for the Foundation's dissolution, S. 7 410, 63rd Cong., 3ro 
sess., Congressional Record 52 (26 January 1915): 2303-2304; Theodore Roosevelt, The 
Great Adventure (New York: Scribner, 1918), 173-178; and TR letters to philanthropic 
businessman Alexander Smith Cochran, February 4, 1915; and Congressman James A. 
Gallivan, July 2 and August 22, 1918, in Morison, Letters of TR, 8:887, 1344-1345, 1363-
1366. 
144 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 558. 
and more equitable relations among my countrymen who are engaged, 
whether as capitalists or wageworkers, in industrial and agricultural 
pursuits."145 Consistent with that vision, the Foundation's trustees included 
representatives of labor and capital , the judiciary, politics, and the general 
public.146 
During the next eight years, however, the Foundation apparently did 
. 
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nothing. In late 1914, after the Great War had begun, a special committee of 
the Foundation's trustees recommended that Congress return the 
Foundation's assets to Roosevelt for his personal disposition, because the 
Foundation had received no additional gifts and "the fund itself is too small to 
be successfully administered" by the trustees. Roosevelt agreed, noting in his 
characteristically vivid language that his plan, "through no fault of the trustees, 
has resulted in the talent being hidden in a napkin for eight years."147 
The evidence suggests that Roosevelt had another reason for 
terminating the Foundation. In early 1915, he expressed a desire for funds to 
meet the "innumerable" demands that he received for pro bono contributions. 
He complained that Congress "won't even give me back the Nobel Peace 
Prize to make use of." Despite proposed legislation to dissolve the Foundation 
145 TR letter to J. Lovland, December 10, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:524. 
146 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 558. 
147 Roosevelt's humorous metaphor may have masked genuine disappointment about the 
inaction of his trustees. Compare it with his telling a Harvard audience that the worth of 
Andrew Carnegie's 191 0 donation toward accomplishing international peace would ultimately 
"depend upon the common sense and good judgment and efficiency with which the trustees or 
those working under them try to embody the purpose of the donation in actual acts. • Theodore 
Roosevelt, Applied Ethics {Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1911), 31-32. 
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in January of 1915, Congress did not take that action until 1918, when 
Roosevelt renewed his request for return of the funds. His request was then 
quickly approved by Congressional resolution, and the Foundation's existing 
assets worth $45,482.83 were transferred to Roosevelt. 
Whatever the reason for the demise of the industrial peace foundation, 
Roosevelt donated the funds to individuals and organizations like the Red 
Cross and the YMCA "to care," in his words, "for our soldiers, and for the 
widows and children and mothers of our soldiers, in this great war." 
Roosevelt's dispositions included Amerjcan and Allied beneficiaries. In fulfilling 
his moral intentions, he apparently also paid a political price, since $2,000 of 
the proceeds, or approximately 5 percent, were donated to the Speaker of the 
House and the wives of the three members of Congress who sponsored the 
resolution releasing the funds, to be used "for war activities or charities" of 
their choosing. 
Roosevelt's shift in the use of the Nobel Peace Prize funds from 
industrial peace to war-related purposes undoubtedly expressed his sense of 
the Great War's overwhelming importance.148 His way of prioritizing issues, as 
he explained in another context, was "a question of the major interest driving 
148 Theodore Roosevelt, The Foes of Our Own Household (New York: Doran, 1917), 17-18, 22 
("The deeds of peace are for the future. The instant need is for the deeds of war."). During the 
final sixteen months of his life, from September 1917 to January 1919, Roosevelt wrote over 
one hundred articles - nearly two a week - for the Kansas City Star, almost all of which dealt 
with military and war policy and the direction of peace negotiations. Theodore Roosevelt, 
Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star, ed. Ralph Stout (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921). 
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out the minor interest."149 Shortly after the war began in Europe, he made 
clear that American military preparedness was his major interest and that 
industrial justice was a distinctly minor interest. "[l]t is of no use talking about 
reform and social justice and equality of industrial opportunity inside of a 
nation," he wrote, "unless that nation can protect itself from outside attack."150 
Not only did war aims supersede Roosevelt's vision of achieving industrial 
peace, but it also led him to call on the labor movement to subjugate its 
interests to those of the war effort. In a 1915 speech on "Americanism," he 
disparaged strikes while the nation was preparing to defend itself as "a 
scandal to the country as a whole and discreditable alike to employer and 
employee." Just as employers should recognize human rights and work 
cooperatively with employees, he argued, their employees should shun the 
militancy of labor organizations like the IWW or else brand themselves as "not 
merely an open enemy of business but of this entire country."151 
149 Robinson, My Brother TR, 274. 
150 Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part (New York: Doran, 1916), 79.· 
151 Ibid., 366-367, 375. The IWW (Industrial Workers of the World) was a militant labor 
organization founded in 1905 by, among others. the Western Federation of Miners, 
Roosevelt's chief example of the "bad" union. Roosevelt considered the IWW as part of "the 
squalid crew who preach the gospel of envy and hatred, who preach a class war which, when 
preaching is trmslated into action, expresses itself through the bomb and the torch." 
Rooseve-lt Great Adventure, 121 . 
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VI. "What Books a Statesman Should Read": Octave Thanet's Fiction 
If we could code by color the positions that Roosevelt took in the labor 
actions described above, like countries differentiated on a map, their diversity 
would require multiple colors to represent the underlying rationales. Indeed, for 
some of the actions (like those regarding the coal strike, union membership, 
labor injunctions, and the industrial peace foundation} , there would have to be 
different shades of color to signify Rooseveltian changes of position. Did 
Roosevelt have core beliefs, like roads and bridges on a map, which help to 
connect those positions? My contention is that at least part of the answer can 
be found in Roosevelt's taste for a certain kind of labor literature. 
Roosevelt read widely, and we know a great deal about what he read.1 
In November 1903, Roosevelt responded to a letter from Nicholas Murray 
Butler, influential Republican and president of Columbia University, asking 
what books Roosevelt had read during the first two years of his presidency. 
The "catalogue" Roosevelt furnished would be extraordinary even for a person 
with more leisure time than a president of the United States. His list identifies 
over a hundred works (some multi-volumed), either by title or author, including 
classics of literature, history, philosophy, poetry, drama, comedy, children's 
books that he "read aloud to [his] children, and often finished afterwards to 
myself," travel , and hunting, not to mention "ephemeral novels" whose names 
1 Wagenknecht, Seven Worlds, 44-76. 
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he had forgotten.2 
Deep in Roosevelt's "catalogue" is the pregnant statement that he had 
read stories by Octave Thanet, "which I always like when they deal with labor 
problems."3 Not only does that comment contain one of the few expressions in 
the list of what he liked, but the item is also the only one singled out for 
addressing labor matters. It provides a key to understanding Roosevelt's 
attitude toward unions because Octave Thanet wrote labor stories that seem 
to foreshadow or parallel Roosevelt's own experiences as president. 
The French-looking name Octave Thanet was the pseudonym of an 
American writer whose family name was "French." Alice French (1850-1934) 
was the daughter of wealthy New England parents. She moved as a child with 
her family to Davenport, Iowa. There, her father was a successful 
manufacturer, banker: and railroad executive.4 She did most of her writing in 
Iowa and on a large plantation she later bought in Arkansas. Virtually forgotten 
today, she was a popular and prolific writer of regional fiction during 
Roosevelt's adult years. Her biographer lists over one hundred fifty short 
stories and articles published in magazines between 1871 and 1903, the year 
2 TR letter to Nicholas Murray Butler, November 4, 1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:641-644. 
3 Ibid., 3:643. 
4 George McMichael, Journey to Obscurity: The Life of Octave Thanet (Lincoln, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 18, 54-56. 
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of Roosevelt's reading "catalogue." These were so popular that, by the latter 
year, book publishers had issued eight separate compilations of her stories.5 
In addition to her reputation based on local color and patois, her work 
displays a profound distaste for labor unions. We do not know which of 
Thanet's labor stories Roosevelt read, but all the logical suspects (namely, 
those published in book form before Roosevelt's revealing letter to Butler) 
reflect condemnation of unionism or admiration for salt-of-the-earth business 
managers.6 Curiously, Roosevelt's interest in Thanet's labor stories has 
received little attention from historians.7 
5 McMichael, Journey to Obscurity, 222-231. Magazines by the 1880s were paying for her 
stories at twice the standard rate. Ibid., 115. William Allen White, the midwestern newspaper 
editor and Roosevelt friend, rated her •one of the best short-story writers of the nineties." 
White, Autobiography, 311 . 
. s The Thanet stories discussed below are those that deal with labor problems in the eight book 
compilations. Although her biographer reports that TR told Thanet in 1910 that he had taken 
one of these books on African safari in 1909 as part of his specially bound "pigskin library." 
Roosevelt's detailed account of what he actually took does not mention any of Thanet's works. 
He did, however, comment on books he had taken on earlier journeys, including "the novels 
and stories of Octave Thanet, • a reference immediately followed by his statement, "I have 
certainly profited as much by reading really good and interesting novels and stories as by 
reading anything else, and from the contemporary ones I have often reached , as in no other 
way I could have reached, an understanding of how real people feel in certain country 
districts. • Compare McMichael, Journey to Obscurity, 191, with Roosevelt, African Game 
Trails, 513-516. None ofThanet's eight books or her labor stories appears in inventories of 
Roosevelt's Sagamore Hill library, but they may have been given away or otherwise disposed 
of. Author's telephone conversation with Amy Verone, Chief of Cultural Resources, and e-mail 
correspondence with Mark Koziol, Museum Technician, both of the National Park Service, 
Sagamore Hill National History Site, in July-September, 2009. 
7 The fullest account of his presidential labor attitudes and actions does not mention Thanet or 
her stories. Greenberg, TR and Labor. The same is true of almost all of the TR biographies 
mentioned in this study. Edmund Morris' more recent study of Roosevelt's presidential years 
mentions Thanet only by name in connection with the "catalogue" of Roosevelt's reading, 
without referring to either Roosevelt's liking for her stories or their labor subject matter. Morris, 
TRex, 288. 
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One of her earliest stories, "Communists and Capitalists: A Sketch frcnm 
Life" (1878), demonstrates Thanet's thinking about labor organizations.8 The 
"story" is actually a series of dialogues in which a woman who works her wcry 
from clerk to part owner of a plow factory debates a self-described communist 
blacksmith whom she refuses to hire unless he promises to abandon his union 
affiliation and strike advocacy. He rejects her offer as "tempting me to turn 
traitor" and the capitalist system generally because it "grinds a poor man to 
powder, so as to make a rich man richer." She argues that he has ignored 
human nature's subjection to a Spencerian "survival of the fittest" and that in 
communism "the weak would have less protection than even now, for all those 
restraints of morality, which are bound up inseparably with rights of property, 
would have been thrown aside."9 
Neither the capitalist nor the communist convinces the other, and 
Thanet suggests they never will, but the story's moral resides in the character 
of the debaters. The capitalist woman is altruistic, tangibly aiding the 
blacksmith's wife and children, and kind to animals. Contrary to the accusation 
that she wants to exploit workingmen, her goal is for workers to become 
company stockholders so that they can share in her factory's profits. 
8 Reprinted as ·A Communist's Wife" in Knitters in the Sun {New York: Houghton Mifflin, 
1887). The further reprint of that volume referred to here is Alice French, Knitters in the Sur» 
{New York: Garrett, 1969), 173-200. French was responsible for the story's title change, 
believing this would help to liberate it from its tendency toward essay. McMichael, Journey to 
Obscurity, 105. 
9 French, Knitters, 189, 190-191. Roosevelt was not a fan of Herbert Spencer, whom he 
regarded as a teacher of "social nihilism" who stood "as far to one side of the line of sane 
action as [Karl] Marx stands on the other." Roosevelt, Foes, 127, 163. 
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Roosevelt would have been attracted to that labor approach, for, as early as 
1886, he had boasted that almost every one of the many wageworkers on his 
ranch "has some interest in the profits."10 In contrast, Thanet's labor advocate 
is so dedicated to communist principles that his family lives in poverty and 
poor health. When he later becomes a leader of Chicago rioters supporting the 
1877 railroad strike, he physically rebuffs his terrified wife while he gives 
orders to the rioters. He refuses to take any responsibility for her death during 
the ensuing rioters' battle with police and troops, blaming it instead on the 
capitalist woman's declining to hire him years earlier.11 
Thanet did not remain a dry theoretician. Her story "Otto the Knight" 
(1888) is a melodrama that criticizes violent union rhetoric.12 There, Arkansas 
mill workers who are members of the Knights of Labor quit work in protest 
against the story's hero, their head carpenter, because he had formerly 
worked as a strikebreaker. Influenced by union rhetoric and threats against the 
hero, a youth named Otto attempts to blow up the hero with dynamite when 
the latter is working alone in the mill, but a child wanders into the area after the 
fuse has been lit. In the prelude to a happy ending fit for silent movies, the 
non-union hero and Otto the union sympathizer together save the child. Guilt-
ridden, Otto confesses to the mill owner, who humanely protects the boy from 
10 Morris, Rise of TR, 345. 
11 French, Knitters, 175, 183-184, 187, 192-193, 195-198, 200. 
12 Octave Thanet, Otto the Knight and Other Trans-Mississippi Stories (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1891 ), 1-58. 
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going to jail. The story ends with the community blaming the union for the 
dynamiting and the pretty ingenue choosing the non-union hero over a union 
suitor. 
In one of her most modern stories, Thanet uses domestic conflict to 
parody the process of labor-management dispute resolution. In "The Strike at 
Glasscock's" (1893), Mrs. Glasscock is the only worker at her husband's mill. 
In order to protest Mr. Glasscock's refusal to paint their house, she goes on · 
strike in imitation of what she has read in newspapers about union disputes. 
Based on the same newspaper reports, he adopts the management tactic of 
locking her out of the house. Instead of talking through their dispute, he 
foresees using the method for strike and lockout resolution learned from the 
newspapers. Why, nobuddy gives in," he explains to a stranger. "They finds 
somebody they can have confidence in, an' they leaves it to him, an' both on 
'em will abide by his decidin'." The joke is that the husband believes he knows 
"aforehand what a decent arbitrationer" would decide, and he does it himself. 
As he paints the house, the wife returns to home and work. Good sense has 
resolved their labor dispute without waiting for the formality of a third party's 
decision.13 The story is a tongue-in-cheek forerunner of the convoluted path to 
third-party resolution taken by the mine owners and the UMW in the 1902 
anthracite coal strike. 
13 Octave Thanet, A Book of True Lovers (Chicago: Way & Williams, 1897). It was reprinted in 
Alice French, A Book of True Lovers (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, 1969), 1-20. 
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The most extensive collection of Thanet labor stories was published in 
1898 in a book entitled The Heart of Toil. Instead of depicting universal union 
villainy or absurdity, Thanet refines her labor critique by contrasting a 
thoughtful and decent union leader, Harry Leroy, who appears in several of the 
stories, with hotheaded or venal characters who misuse union power for 
selfish ends. The reasonable union leader represented by Leroy would 
become familiar to Roosevelt during his anthracite coal strike dealings with the 
UMW's John Mitchell, who struggled against violence during the strike, argued 
against a contract-violating sympathy walkout by bituminous coal miners, and 
maintained his composure in front of the president despite vituperation from 
mine owners. For Roosevelt, the law-and-order predisposition of union leaders 
like Mitchell and the fictitious Leroy was a model for responsible union 
leadership.14 
Fictional union leader Leroy actually opposes striking a plow factory in 
"The Non-Combatant" (1897). He privately tells a shop owner whose trade has 
declined during the strike that when responsible union leaders support strikes, 
"[l]t's either because they see no other way to prevent the men's being ground 
to powder, or because there's a crazy pressure on them from the hot-heads 
that they can't resist." Leroy works hard to maintain peaceful discipline among 
14 Octave Thanet, The Heart of Toil (New York: Scribner, 1898). The reprint cited here is Alice 
French, The Heart of Toil (Freeport, N.Y. : Books for Libraries, 1969). For Thanet's invocation 
of Leroy's adherence to law and order, see pages 89, 121. 
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the strikers. He then risks his life to save the factory owner from a beating by 
hotheaded, inebriated strikers.15 
The moral of the story is that the strike damages the entire community. 
It impoverishes strikers' families; jeopardizes the economic well-being of other 
local businesses and their employees, whether or not they sympathize w ith the 
strikers; undermines personal relationships; and encourages anonymous fire-
setters to bum down a shopkeeper's home and store after he helps leroy 
protect the mill owner. Thane! seems to ask the reader to consider the empty 
purpose of all this suffering, when we learn that the mill owner and the union 
leader find that their joint defense against union violence engenders mutual 
trust that enables them to resolve the labor conflict in a single conversation.16 
Similarly, in "The Way of an Election" (1897), Harry leroy's logical 
advocacy before union members of a conservative political choice prevails 
over an ambitious labor editor's emotional arguments against an amorphous 
"money power," but only after national politicians have bribed the editor to 
change his position.17 Thanet's opinion of venal union leaders foreshadows 
Roosevelt's. In a letter to his secretary of state, John Hay, during a western 
trip in 1903, the president wrote that "in Butte, every prominent man is a 
millionaire, a gambler, or a labor leader, and generally he had been all three . . 
'
5 1bid., 3, 13, 23, 25, 30-34. 
16 Ibid .. 36. 
17 Ibid .. 45, 59, 61-63, 68, 74-76. 
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. The millionaires had been laboring men once, the labor leaders intended to 
be millionaires in their turn, or else to pull down all who were. "18 
Thanet's decent labor leader prevails over another ambitious and 
unsympathetic union adversary in "The Moment of Clear Vision" (1898). 
Leroy's goal is to obtain a strike settlement that benefits the employees, rather 
than yielding to his adversary's desire to prolong the strike in order to achieve 
wider union recognition (one of the key stumbling points, it will be 
remembered, in Roosevelt's efforts to settle the 1902 anthracite coal strike). 
The theory of Leroy's adversary is that "[i]ndividual hardships must be borne 
for the sake of the cause." Thanet's dramatic device in this story is Leroy's 
kidnapping of the adversary, but only to renew the man's contact with family 
and human values from which he has strayed because of union careerism. 
Leroy justifies the kidnapping as "better one man should suffer than four or five 
hundred, and maybe a great many more."19 
The most violent and action-oriented story in The Heart of Toil is 
Thanet's defense of a strikebreaker in "The 'Scab"' (1895). Hired as a railroad 
fireman to replace a striking worker during the 1894 railroad strike, the "scab" 
feels guilty that he has profited from another man's suffering, but justifies his 
action by the need to support his wife and six children. (By the time the story 
18 Robinson, My Brother TR, 152-153. 
19 French, Heart of Toil, 83, 88, 90, 92-94. 
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was published in book form, Roosevelt was also the father of six children. 20) 
The train's engineer, conductor, and brakeman, who are members of non-
striking railroad unions. are not entirely sympathetic to the strikebreaker, but 
they abhor the striker violence directed at trains still in operation. The "scab" 
exposes himself to harm in order to help the train travel safely past dangerous, 
striker-placed obstacles and to protect a woman passenger from a pro-strike 
mob. He finds later that his guilt for replacing the striking fireman was 
misplaced, because it was this same striker who attacked the woman 
passenger and who had a reputation among his fellow trainmen for pre-strike 
arrogance and laziness. 
The story also offers an intellectual defense of the "scab" by arguing 
that replacing a striker is morally the same as a union member's replacing a 
non-union worker fired for refusing to join the union.21 Whether or not the two 
kinds of replacement are equivalent, Roosevelt may have appreciated the 
linkage between the equal rights to employment of both strikebreakers and 
non-union employees when he reinstated non-union federal employee Miller to 
his job at the Government Printing Office. 
In The Heart of Toil's final story, "The Conscience of a Business Man" 
(1898), Thane! shifts her focus to assess the character of a steel mill 
president. Faced by declining business and the unwillingness of banks to 
20 Harbaugh, Life and Times, 7 4. 
21 French, Heart of Toil, 159, 165-166, 168, 173-174, 186, 190. 
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finance his company during a downturn, the president must decide whether or 
not to lay off workers. There is no union involvement, but Thanet shows how 
labor agitators try to stir up employees by spreading rumors of an impending 
layoff and accusing the company president of greed. The president, however, 
is a self-made man with genuine concern for his employees, and he defers a 
personal home-buying dream by loaning his available cash to the company in 
order to avoid a layoff. 22 
In 1905, Thanet sent Roosevelt her labor novel, The Man of the Hour, 
telling him that the model for the hero was her deceased brother. The hero is a 
do-gooder, who abandons a thriving, family-run, machine-manufacturing 
business and spends a large inheritance to support workers in a strike whose 
purposes he nevertheless distrusts. At this point in the story, he personifies 
the principle of backing the union-right-or-wrong, because that is how he 
believes he can do the most good for working people. 
The novel recounts in detail union strike tactics, both legal (e.g., 
winning public support by offering to arbitrate all disputes with the struck 
employer and recruiting non-employee picketers) and potentially illegal (e.g., 
threats and violence against persons and property and secondary boycotts 
22 1bid., 191 , 197-199, 210-211 , 215. This story develops the Thanet theme in praise of fair 
business managers. As a sympathetic, but unlettered, character says of "plutograts" in "The 
Moment of Clear Vision," supra, "Some of them are good men, and I've known of their doing 
kind things right here in Chicago." Ibid., 118. 
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directed at non-struck employers).23 Disillusioned by strike-related deaths for 
which he feels partially responsible, the hero finds absolution by successfully 
leading strikebreakers at his family's factory against a walkout fomented by a 
corrupt and violent union official. The hero's rewards are an unqualified return 
to his family, an executive position in the family company, and marriage to his 
childhood sweetheart. The novel's message is that the alternative to strikes is 
helping people through "the only true, sensible, American way, by giving them 
a show to help themselves," provided that "the great business man of the 
future" understands that he must "have a heart or he can't understand and 
manage his men." It is the same golden rule that Roosevelt preached. 24 
Thanking Thanet for the novel, Mrs. Roosevelt wrote that it showed that 
the author's hero/brother was a good man. According to Thanet's biographer, 
the president told an Iowa newspaper that he was interested .in the novel, 
praising Thanet for her knowledge of factories and the machine business. 
Roosevelt later proclaimed the accuracy of her stories about "American labor 
people."25 
23 Where Roosevelt analogized labor violence to the excesses of the French Revolution , 
Thanet saw parallels between labor violence and the actions of Russian nihilists at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Thus, a nihilist emigre's attempt to burn down the hero's family factory 
at the beginning of the novel is echoed by a striking union's attempt to do the same at the 
novel's climax. Octave Thanet, The Man of the Hour (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1905), 98-
99, 461-462. 
24 Thanet, Man of the Hour, 4 75. 
25 McMichael, Journey to Obscurity, 164, 191-192; TR letter to Trevelyan, November 23, 
1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:499-500. 
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Thanet's unsubtle labor lessons can be simply summarized. Business 
owners do not invariably exploit their workers. In contrast, unions undermine 
morality and property rights by becoming vehicles for hotheads and self-
aggrandizing leaders. Even the most responsible union leader struggles 
against such socially destructive elements. Strikes lead to violence, 
impoverishment of families, and harm to the wider community. Strikes and 
third-party intervention are not necessary to reach agreement on common-
sense labor resolutions. 
For Roosevelt the former cowboy and Rough Rider, Thanet's good guy 
vs. bad guy mythology was attractive, because it portrayed the kind of life 
lessons that were important to him.26 In his Autobiography, Roosevelt 
addressed the question of ''what books a statesman should read." His answer 
was "poetry and novels - including short stories under the head of novels." He 
acknowledged the importance of reading history and government, science and 
philosophy. "But, in the final event," Roosevelt explained, "the statesman, and 
the publicist, and the reformer, and the agitator for new things, and the 
upholder of what is good in old things, all need more than anything else to 
know human nature, to know the needs of the human soul; and they will find 
26 Roosevelt's sister said of his Dakota experience as cowboy and ranchman that he became 
"not only one of them from a physical standpoint, but also one of them from the standpoint of 
understanding their mental outlook.• Robinson, My Brother TR, 123. For a concise summary 
of Roosevelt's cattle ranching years and the three books TR wrote about them, see Harbaugh, 
Life and Times, 54-58, 66. Roosevelt also described his ranching years in an autobiographical 
chapter entitled "In Cowboy Land." Roosevelt, Autobiography, 94-131 . 
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this nature and these needs set forth as nowhere else by the great imaginative 
writers, whether of prose or of poetry."27 
Roosevelt made clear to Alice French that he regarded her Octave 
Thanet stories as illuminations of human nature and the needs of the human 
soul. Shortly after the anthracite coal strike, he told her, "I doubt whether I 
have ever seen a story of yours which I have not picked up and read, always 
with pleasure, and, especially where you deal with labor problems, real profit." 
He praised her stories "on acute phases of the labor problem" as "missionary 
work" and invited her to the White House.28 She dined there twice, in 1906 and 
1908. Praising her as "a trump in every way" a short time after the first dinner, 
Roosevelt wrote to another writer friend, William Allen White, that Octave 
Thanet "has always seemed to preach just the social and economic gospel 
that we as a people need." That gospel, as Roosevelt could not have failed to 
see in her stories, did not depict unions as part of salvation.29 
Roosevelt's comments about Thanet's labor stories and gospel coincide 
with his presidential years, and there are no comparable Thanet references in 
27 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 346-347. 
28 TR to Alice French, February 7, 1903, in Letters of TR, 3:421-422; McMichael, Journey to 
Obscurity, 160. 
29 McMichael, Journey to Obscurity, 172, 180. Roosevelt's reference to Thanet's "social and 
economic gospel" evokes the name of the Social Gospel, a contemporaneous liberal theology. 
It is unlikely that Roosevelt was suggesting concordance between the two gospels. On labor 
matters, Social Gospel thought was quite different from Thanet's. The Social Gospelers' 
perception of the industrial injustice.s of capitalism led them to support union organization on 
moral grounds. Many of them, however, were unsympathetic to strikes and groped for an 
alternative to what they viewed as potential union abuse of power. A few, like Washington 
Gladden, accepted strikes as part of labor's "belligerent right." Charles Howard Hopkins, The 
Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 1865-1915 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1940), 81-82, 92-97, 225, 246-247, 324. 
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his published writings thereafter. There is some post-presidential evidence, 
however, in his appraisal of another labor-fiction writer, John Hay, that he 
retained his underlying distrust of organized labor's tendencies. As discussed 
earlier, Hay had anonymously written an anti-strike novel, The Breadwinners, 
nearly two decades before Roosevelt's ascension to the presidency.30 It is 
uncertain when Roosevelt read it, but he was certainly familiar with the novel 
by 1915, ten years after Hay's death. In a review that year of a biography of 
Hay, Roosevelt called the novel "a really powerful presentation of one side of 
our complex social and industrial problems; a side which needs to be stated, 
but which there is a certain irony in having stated by Lincoln's biographer." 
Roosevelt found irony in comparing Hay's radicalism when he worked 
for Lincoln with the novel's conservative "instincts and ways of thought." He 
attributed Hay's change of heart to "horror of lawlessness and disorder and the 
brutal violence unleashed by demagogues who were powerless to control it" 
during the 1877 railroad labor riots. Recourse to irony, however, does not 
demonstrate disagreement with Hay's "really powerful presentation." What it 
does suggest is Rooseveltian evasiveness, for we know that he shared Hay's 
horror of labor lawlessness and disorder. Significantly, he did not characterize 
as wrong either Hay's radicalism or later conservatism. Indeed, Roosevelt 
30 The emphases in the labor fiction of Hay and Thanet are different. His focus is on the 
undesirable consequences of strikes; hers reflects a broader critique of labor union 
tendencies. Both, however, are critical of the potential of labor unions to undermine morality 
and social stability. 
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minimized the meaning of the words "radical" and "conservative" because of 
their "inexactitude in terminology, for the same action may be radical from one 
standpoint and conservative from another."31 
In his Autobiography, written earlier than the book review but also after 
Hay's death, Roosevelt found another indirect way to comment on Hay's labor 
views. Noting Hay's "jesting with me about my supposedly dangerous 
tendencies in favor of labor against capital," Roosevelt recounted Hay's 1905 
inaugural gift to him of a ring containing a cutting of Lincoln's hair. "I often 
thereafter told John Hay," Roosevelt wrote, "that when I wore such a ring on 
such an occasion I bound myself more than ever to treat the Constitution, after 
the manner of Abraham Lincoln, as a document which put human rights above 
property rights when the two conflicted."32 
Until I read Roosevelt's review of the Hay biography, I found it difficult 
to understand where he was heading with the Hay comment in his 
Autobiography. Was he returning Hay's labor jest, disagreeing with Hay, or 
hiding their agreement? When read together, however, the two references 
underscore Roosevelt's deliberate avoidance oJ either rejection or adoption of 
Hay's labor views. They nevertheless seem to serve a dual purpose, because 
they allowed Roosevelt to offer, indirectly through Hay, disapproval of labor 
unions without directly playing the role of critic. Given Roosevelt's skill as a . 
31 Hagedorn, Works of TR, 11 :244-245. 
32 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 399-400. 
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writer and his earlier admiration for Thanet's labor views, this seems at least to 
suggest that Roosevelt did not abandon his Thanetological perspective in his 
post-presidential years. 33 
33 Roosevelt's comments about Thanet's labor views were almost all private; whereas the two 
comments about Hay's views were very public. Roosevelt was, unsurprisingly, more candid in 
private than he was in public. One can argue that his circumspection about Hay's labor views 
showed respect for a deceased friend. Perhaps, but he was hardly circumspect in his brutal, 
albeit private, posthumous criticism of Hay's performance regarding foreign affairs and 
administration of the State Department. TR letter to Lodge, January 28, 1909, in Morison, 
Letters of TR, 6:1489-1498. 
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Alice French, at the height of her career 
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VII. "Labor is the Superior of Capital": Post-Presidency 
Roosevelt historiography sometimes treats his post-presidential years 
as the flowering of a more liberal social agenda, including in his attitude 
toward organized labor. Regarding a man whose career demonstrates 
frequent modifications of outlook, this is an appealing concept. It is possible to 
find isolated instances that support the interpretation, but easier to show that 
Roosevelt's labor views underwent little change during this period.1 
After leaving the presidency, Roosevelt spent a little more than a year 
collecting animal trophies in Africa, counseling with royalty and intellectual 
leaders in Europe, and considering complaints that President Taft had not 
furthered Rooseveltian ideals. In late summer of 1910, he embarked on a 
national speaking tour in which he articulated his political philosophy, the New 
Nationalism. At the beginning of his itinerary, in Osawatomie, Kansas, 
Roosevelt delivered a speech memorable for his most famous labor 
statement. 
Quoting Lincoln, his political hero, Roosevelt said, "Labor is prior to, 
and independent of capital. ... Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves 
much the higher consideration." He proclaimed that "I stand for the square 
1 Compare Kathleen Dalton, Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life (New York: Knopf, 2002; 
Vintage, 2004}, 417-418 (arguing for his leftward movement}, with Patricia O'Toole, When 
Trumpets Call: Theodore Roosevelt after the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2005}, 351 (arguing for lack of evidence of change}. Dalton bases her conclusion largely on 
TR's expressed sympathy for striking garment workers in 1913, but as president he had also 
sympathized with strikers and supported their right to unionize. O'Toole notes that in 1918 
TR's new world of economic justice "was virtually a twin of his old one." 
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deal," and by that he meant not just fair play under the current rules, but 
"having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of 
opportunity and of reward for equally good service." He wanted "to regulate 
the terms and conditions of labor," including wages "more than sufficient to 
cover the base cost of living"; shorter hours of work; comprehensive workers' 
compensation; regulation of children's and women's labor; practical training in 
common schools; and better sanitary conditions and safer equipment. 
The Osawatomie speech did not address the role labor unions should 
play in realizing Roosevelt's vision for a worker square deal. But when he 
invoked the "need to set our faces like flint against mob violence just as 
against corporate greed; against violence and injustice and lawlessness by . 
wage workers,~ it was clear that he continued to have concerns about union 
irresponsibility. 2 He elaborated on this when he told members of the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen in early September 1910 how to resolve 
potential conflicts between labor rights and labor obligations. "Insist upon your 
own rights and remember your own duties," he said. "Of the two, lay a little 
more stress on the duties than on the rights. "3 
As the New Nationalism tour progressed, Roosevelt followed two lines 
of thought about organized labor - one friendly and one skeptical -- without 
resolving the problem of where they might intersect. The friendly line tracked 
2 Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 8, 11-12, 24-25. 
3 Hagedom, Works of TR, 16:163. 
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the emergence of the nation's "extraordinarily complex industrial 
development," which required new protection for employees and recognition of 
"the desirability of the right of collective bargaining (through trade unions] on 
the part of employees face to face with the great corporation, as was not 
necessary when the employer was one man or a partnership of two or three 
men employing half a dozen or half a score of men." It was "outrageous" for 
employers to discriminate against employees who want union representation 
"or to refuse to deal with a union when organized." Roosevelt announced, in 
words that unions still quote in organizing drives, "If I were a wage worker, I 
should certainly join a union."" 
Roosevelt's skeptical line of thought grew from the premise that "labor 
organizations have the weaknesses and defects common to all forms of 
human organization." When they acted "very well," he was for them. When 
they acted "very badly," he was against them. Acting badly encompassed 
strikes with "violence, lawlessness, and mob rule." Such instances had to be 
dealt with promptly and sternly, "no matter what the cause may be that excites 
them," and "all questions of reform had to be postponed until the orderly 
process of the law was resumed." Speaking in Columbus, Ohio, during a street 
railway strike that had turned violent, Roosevelt even condemned attorneys 
who defended the "miscreants" accused of such behavior. He told the wage 
4 Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 37-38 (speech to Colorado legislature), 127-129 (speech in 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota), 224 (speech in Columbus, Ohio). The reference to union use of 
TR's advocacy for joining a union is from the author's personal experience. 
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workers to "get rid of the attorneys ... [because] such action inevitably tends 
to cast a doubt upon the sincerity of the expressions of the men who disclaim 
sympathy with those outrages."5 
Roosevelt's inventory of the "weaknesses and defects" of labor unions 
was not limited to violence. It was also "outrageous" for unions and employees 
to "force a man to join" the union (echoing his presidential action in the 1903 
Miller case) or to encourage "secondary boycotts" where unions sought to 
pressure the involved primary employer by harming its vendors and 
customers. What troubled Roosevelt about such tactics was the union's 
extending the labor dispute to harm the public, "the people as a whole."6 
Roosevelt's simultaneous endorsement and criticism of organized labor 
reads today like the tension embedded in the labor legislation that Congress 
passed in the 1930s and 1940s, but he did not propose such legislation? 
5 Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 118 (speech in Sioux Falls), 129-130, 133 (Labor Day speech 
in Fargo, North Dakota), 172 (speech in Omaha), 207 (speech in Chicago), 219, 221 (speech 
in Columbus). In his 1913 Autobiography, at page 493, Roosevelt called "unworthy" any public 
servant who "invariably throws the weight of his influence on the side of the trade union, 
whether it is right or wrong." 
6 Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 132 (Labor Day speech in Fargo), 222, 224 (speech in 
Columbus). To the list of union behaviors that should be "repressed," Roosevelt later added 
restriction of output and jurisdictional disputes between unions. At the same time, he 
continued to identify employer wrongs. Roosevelt, Autobiography, 494-495. Studies show a 
contemporary parallel to Roosevelt's ambivalence about labor unions among the progressive 
movement's middle-class leaders, who felt they were "hemmed in" politically and/or 
economically by monopolistic capitalism and the combination of organized labor and 
socialism. George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1951; Chicago: Quadrangle, 1963), 91-95; Hofstadter, AgeofReform, 170, 241 . To the 
same effect, an appraisal of national political leaders in the progressive movement concludes 
that abuses of union power complicated their desire to balance property and union rights. Fred 
Greenbaum, "Ambivalent Friends: Progressive Era Politicians and Organized Labor- 1902-
1940," Labor's Heritage 6, no. 1 (1994): 62-76. 
7 These enactments are discussed below in the Conclusion. 
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Instead, the New Nationalism as expressed in 1910 relied on the internal 
workings of each union's membership to cure organizational defects. His 
prescription was to "let the men within the organization realize the necessity of 
keeping the organization straight.'18 
Running for President ·in 1912 as the leader of the Progressive Party, 
Roosevelt effectively abandoned the Republican Party's "colorless" 1908 plank 
regarding labor injunctions. In essence, his 1912 platform adopted the 
Democrats' 1908 platform, by incorporating broad language restricting labor 
injunctions and granting trial by jury to those accused of contempt in labor 
disputes. Further, his 1912 platform explicitly favored "the organization of the 
workers, men and women, as a means of protecting their interests and of 
promoting their progress." 
Yet, the gap remained between Roosevelt's Progressive Party outreach 
to organized labor and his emphasis on the primacy of government action to 
protect workers. The Progressive platform clause favoring worker organization 
was placed last of fifteen paragraphs defining the components of "Social and 
Industrial Justice," with the earlier paragraphs setting forth government 
responsibility for worker health, safety, and job security; minimum wages; 
limitations on hours of work; social insurance; and education. As an 
exclamation point to government as the source of worker benefits, the 
Progressive platform also called for establishment of a cabinet-level 
8 Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 131 (Labor Day speech in Fargo). 
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department of labor "with wide [though unspecified] jurisdiction over matters 
affecting the conditions of labor and living."9 
Roosevelt's 1911 and 1912 writings and speeches likewise emphasized 
the government's role in achieving social and industrial justice. He called for 
realization of the Progressive Party's labor goals through "legislation."10 .In his 
"Confession of Faith" delivered to the Progressive Party convention that 
nominated him for the presidency in 1912, Roosevelt supported the party's 
. "social and industrial justice" platform with unequivocal rhetoric calling for the 
establishment of "minimum occupational standards." Any industrial condition 
below such standards "should come within the scope of Governmental action 
and control," and he pledged that his federal government would have 
investigative, standard-setting, and enforcement power over virtually all 
aspects of work. 11 In a campaign speech less than two months before the 
1912 election, Roosevelt reached a crescendo in asserting the supremacy of 
government to remedy social and industrial wrongs. "The only way in which 
our people ... can protect the working man in his conditions of work and life," 
he told a San Francisco audience, "the only way in which the people can 
prevent children working in industry or secure women an eight-hour day in 
9 Schlesinger, History of Elections, 3:2188-2189. 
10 Roosevelt was critical of the judicial branch of government for having thwarted, through 
"foolish and iniquitous decisions," the efforts of legislatures "to remove burdens from wage-
workers." Theodore Roosevelt, Progressive Principles, ed. Elmer H. Youngman (New York: 
Progressive National Service, 1913), 5, 76-77, 93-96, 241 . 
11 Roosevelt, Progressive Principles, 131-135. 
industry, or secure compensation for men killed or crippled in industry, is by 
extending, instead of limiting, the powers of government."12 
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As for labor unions, Roosevelt refined but did not revise his blueprint for 
resolving the tension between labor rights and labor duties. He was for 
collective bargaining and for seeing labor organizations become powerful, but 
he saw peril ahead when that happened. "The minute any organization 
becomes powerful," he wrote, "it becomes powerful for evil as well as for good; 
and when organized labor becomes sufficiently powerful the State will have to 
regulate the collective use of labor just as it must regulate the collective use of 
capital. "13 
Organized labor did, however, receive prominence in one of 
Roosevelt's most famous 1912 campaign addresses, delivered just after a 
would-be assassin had shot him and before he was taken to the hospital. At 
that dramatic moment, less than a month before the election, Roosevelt 
seemed determined to express his fundamental beliefs. His impromptu 
remarks (stenographically captured and "differing considerably from the 
prepared manuscript") encompassed both an embrace of unionization and a 
desire to circumscribe how unions act. In "one-half of the appeal that I make," 
he asked "the outsider and the capitalist" to recognize "that the laboring man 
must organize for his own protection." The other half of his appeal was "to the 
12 Hagedorn, Works of TR, 17:309-310. 
13 TR article in Outlook Magazine, February 4, 1911, reprinted in Hagedorn, Works of TR, 
17:72. 
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labor man himself." Roosevelt asked everyone associated with organized 
labor to denounce "crime ... violence ... disorder . . . and the inciting of 
riot," the black clouds hanging over the labor movement; and "to feel in their 
turn that exactly as justice must be done them so they must do justice." But he 
did not indicate what he would do as president if either half of his appeal was 
ignored or rejected.14 
Roosevelt's statements in the 1910-1912 post-presidential years raise 
the question of Herbert Croly's influence. Croly's book, The Promise of 
American Life, appeared in 1909.15 Roosevelt read it before returning to 
America from his African and European trip. He regarded it as a "profound and 
illuminating study of our national conditions," a watershed book for its 
emphasis on "collective responsibility," and a corrective to the prevailing notion . 
of "individual responsibility" by which business preeminence had dominated 
American life.16 Some historians treat the book as either a stimulant to or 
extension of Roosevelt's progressive thinking, and at least one prominent 
Roosevelt biographer gives Croly credit for conceiving the New Nationalism 
14 Roosevelt, Progressive Principles, 108-1 09; Hagedorn, Works of TR, 17:320n, 325. 
15 Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York: Macmillan, 1909; Archon Books, 
1963). Croly was a forceful writer who, after dropping out of Harvard three times, rose to the 
intellectual heights with this book. Harvard soon awarded him an honorary degree, and he 
later became a founding editor of The New Republic. 
16 TR letter to Lodge, April27, 1910, in Morison, Letters ofTR, 7:76; Hagedorn, Works of TR, 
17:53; Roosevelt, Autobiography, 27, 79. 
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(there is no disagreement that the name was borrowed from Croly) on which 
Roosevelt based his 1912 campaign.17 
Croly's book is a dense critique of what he regarded as an essentially 
anti-democratic individualism in American political and economic history. His 
democratic ideal, which paralleled Roosevelt's, emphasized a wider 
distribution of wealth through the actions of a strong national government. 
Little attention has been paid, however, to Croly's labor views, how they did or 
did not influence Roosevelt, or whether Roosevelt's praise of Croly's notion of 
"collective responsibility" encompassed labor organizations. 
On labor union matters, The Promise of American Life contains savage 
anti-union criticism oddly combined with a call for transforming the union 
movement by ceding to it enormously expanded power. Initially, the book 
describes labor organization as natural and beneficial to worker standards of 
living, but it also condemns some unions' "arrogant and lawless" use of mob 
violence for creating an atmosphere in which "the average union laborer" 
accepts assaults on strikebreakers as "morally justifiable." Croly's appraisal 
was that worker preoccupation with union and class had turned workers away 
from American ideals, the national interest, and a democratic future.18 
17 Pringle, TR, 379-380 (including the New Nationalism attribution); Harbaugh, Life and Times, 
321 (crediting Croly with formalizing Roosevelt's piecemeal regulatory program); Goldman, 
Rendezvous with Destiny, 146-147, 161 , 163. The editors of Roosevelt's letters conclude that 
Roosevelt Mdid not derive his progressivism from Croly. The two simply agreed." Morison, 
Letters of TR, 6:922n, 7:76-77n. 
18 Croly, Promise, 126-130. 
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This sounds very Rooseveltian, as does the initial statement of Croly's 
solution. He advocated "a more effective body of national opinion, and a mere 
powerful organization of the national interest," plus state constabularies to 
"prevent the lawlessness which frequently accompanies strikes."19 As Croly 
came to the end of his book, however, he took a U-turn. He outlined a "radical 
and revolutionary" program that he acknowledged the average American 
would rightly regard as "subversive of the established political and economic 
system of the country."2° Croly's labor program advocated "substantial 
discrimination" by the state in favor of unions, through an explicit preference 
for union labor over non-union workers. He regarded the latter as "a species of 
industrial derelict," because their competition with union laborers tended to 
degrade everyone's standard of living. If "worthy [non-union] individuals" were 
thus sacrificed, he regarded it as excusable because change "involves 
individual cases of injustice." 
In return for such pro-union discrimination, Croly suggested imposing 
conditions on unions. These would include the right of employers to discharge 
any worker "not worthy of the money," to bypass the union in order to arrange 
with individual workers for higher rates of pay and hours, and to participate in 
setting membership terms for admission to the union. Croly was vague about 
how to establish these conditions or what would happen if unions resisted 
19 1bid., 131 , 344. 
20 Ibid. , 398. 
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them as unacceptable limitations on their organizational rights and authority. 
He did say that when unions were "bad," because their "rules and methods are 
inimical to the public interest," the state would "relentlessly and aggressively 
fight" them and would organize "counter-unions" whose members would have 
exclusive rights to the work in question. He did not seem worried about his 
theory's potential for civic tumult or government dictatorship of labor relations. 
As for strikes, the union manifestation that Croly had criticized earlier in his 
book, they would not be forbidden; indeed, they would not go away "unless the 
spirit and methods of collective bargaining were very much improved." 
Croly recognized that the state's role "can only be indefinitely 
answered" and that discriminating between "good" and "bad" unions was 
"beyond the courage of existing governments." Not surprisingly, he admitted 
that it was "improbable" his program would "prove to be any ultimate solution 
of the labor problem."21 
Would a re-elected President Roosevelt have tried after 1912 to 
implement Croly's "improbable" solution to the labor problem? Roosevelt's 
New Nationalism does not address it, and Roosevelt's defeat in the 
presidential election of 1912 obviated his having to flesh out his approach to 
unions. We know, however, that Roosevelt disagreed categorically with Croly's 
21 Ibid., 386-396. 
conception of favoring unionized workers and abrogating the rights of non-
union workers'. 22 
In 1917, Roosevelt articulated a package of novel, but non-Crolyan, 
concepts for dealing with strikes. 23 First, after the army had acted to restore 
order during a violent strike, his usual first response, he added that the 
government "clearly" had the further duty "to step in and deal with the 
conditions which called forth the violence." This included elimination of 
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employer security forces, forbidding the importation of strikebreakers, and "a 
thoroughgoing and impartial governmental inquiry into the causes of the 
strike."24 
Second, the notion of a government inquiry should also apply to 
"exceptional labor disturbances" where the national interest was affected, 
apparently even if violence had not occurred. In those situations, the 
government should substantively decide "all of the questions at issue" in the 
strike and issue a decree that "will be binding upon the capitalists, the 
property-owners." If the capitalist employers did not comply, the government 
would run the business until they did. In dramatic contrast, the workers could 
ignore the decree and continue the strike, the sole qualification being that "the 
22 In addition to the earlier discussion of this point, see Roosevelt's post-Promise statement in 
1913 that "[t]he non-unionist, like the unionist, must be protected in all his legal rights by the 
full weight and power of the law." Roosevelt, Autobiography, 496. 
23 Roosevelt, Foes, 11 0-112, 116-118. 
24 Roosevelt had long believed in governmental inquiry into what caused a strike. See his 
1911 articles in the The Outlook magazine, quoted in Hagedorn, Works of TR, 17:75. The new 
component was his specification of actions that the government should take thereafter. 
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government would guarantee, by the exertion of the entire police power of the 
nation, that there should be no violence against them [the employers], no 
lawless interference with their running the business according to the terms laid 
down." In other words, Roosevelt was proposing arbitration of certain labor 
disputes that would be binding only on the employers. 
Moreover, as Roosevelt framed the concept, government intervention in 
"exceptional labor disturbances" would arso apply to any strike that involved 
violence. If so, it would mean that even in non-exceptional labor disturbances 
unions could unilaterally precipitate the one-sided arbitration scheme by acts 
of violence. 
Aspects of these radical ideas are so remote from the corpus of 
Roosevelt's writings and actions about labor problems that they defy 
integration with the rest of his canon. The one-sided resolution of labor 
problems (mandatory for employers and voluntary for unions) and what 
appears to be a built-in incentive for labor violence were not only departures 
from Roosevelt's past approaches, but they were also inconsistent with his 
virtually simultaneous expressions about union issues.25 Indeed, that same 
year he told a colleague that improved worker benefits should be "arranged by 
common consent of both sides of the community," but if "they cannot be thus 
25 1n the same book that set forth the new concepts, Roosevelt also emphasized that the rights 
of men should prevail over "any powerful labor union which shows brutality or insolent 
disregard for equity in dealing with the rights of any of our citizens" and that compulsory 
arbitration would not eliminate "the chance of trouble in a great strike." Roosevelt, Foes, 97-
98, 108. • 
168 
arranged, the State will have to do it."26 And a year earlier, as vice president of 
the Authors' League of America, he had opposed the organization's affiliation 
with the AFL as too divisive for the membership, belligerently asserting that "I 
don't care a rap whether the Federation of Labor does or does not understand 
my position. "27 
Roosevelt's conservative reaction to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia 
at about the same time further illustrates the anomaly of his radical1917 labor 
concepts. Before the Bolsheviks gained power, he cautioned a Russian 
correspondent against "any of those sinister and dreadful deeds which a 
century and a quarter ago in France produced the Red Terror, and then by 
reaction the White Terror."28 When the Bolsheviks seized control of the 
government, he condemned them. He saw Bolshevik rule as meaning not only 
that Russia would no longer be a war ally against Germany, but also a threat 
to liberty and democracy. Although he called himself "a very radical democrat," 
he professed to be "equally radical in the insistence on orderly liberty." He told 
a friend that he was "inclined to think Bolshevism a more serious menace to 
world democracy than any species of capitalism." To another friend, he said 
that the Bolsheviks were operating under "the pretense of lifting the lowly 
26 John J. Leary, Jr., Talks with T.R. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 153 (emphasis added). 
27 Bishop, TR and His Time. 2:401-403. 
28 TR letter to llya Lovovich Tolstoi (son of Leo), May 1, 1917, in Morison, Letters of TR. 
8:1186. 
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[which] merely smashes the man on top and brings down everybody under the 
ruins."29 
Roosevelt's imagery in describing the Bolshevik revolution is 
reminiscent of his earlier association of militant labor unions with the worst 
aspects of the French Revolution. Equally interesting is that the Bolsh~vik 
threat to liberty and democracy led him to defend capitalism and capitalists. 
None of this is consistent with the tactical advantages that his 1917 labor 
concepts showered on labor unions over "the capitalists, the property owners." 
Perhaps the novelty of his 1917 labor ideas was a bid for labor support 
in anticipation of a future run for the presidency. Perhaps it was a message to 
posterity about how radical he was willing to be. Perhaps his preoccupation 
with the war in Europe or aging and health issues had affected his intellectual 
focus. 30 We may never know, but we do know that he did not repeat the 
concepts. 
Roosevelt died in January 1919, when he was barely sixty years old. 
Nearly six years later, the New York Herald Tribune published five articles that 
had been found among Roosevelt's papers. According to the newspaper, 
29 TR letters to James Bryce, November 26, 1917; Felix Frankfurter, December 19, 1917; and 
W.A. White, May 2, 1918, in Morison, Letters ofTR, 8:1253-1254, 1264, 1315 (emphasis 
added); O'Toole, Trumpets, 383. He even used some of the money released from his 
industrial peace foundation to support the anti-German, anti-Bolshevik military plans of a 
Russian battalion commander named Madame Maria Bochkareva. TR letter to Congressman 
James A Gallivan, August 22, 1918, in Morison, Letters of TR, 8:1364-1365. 
30 During this period., he was often uwracked with pain from the malignant malarial fever he 
had suffered in Brazil [in 1913-1914] and from abscesses of his thigh and ear." Harbaugh, Life 
and Times, 435-436, 475. 
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Roosevelt had written them a few months before he died, in reaction to labor 
troubles at a Colorado mining company, but had then put them aside.31 One 
has to be cautious in drawing conclusions from those articles about 
Roosevelt's beliefs, because he never approved them for publication. Their 
style, including redundancies, suggests neither a finished product nor 
Roosevelt's usual grace of expression and organization. 
The content of the articles nevertheless elaborates on themes that 
Roosevelt had developed throughout his career- the right of working people 
to organize in unions; the obligation of workers to act "wisely" when they 
organize; the right of "a non-union man to work side by side with a union man"; 
union recognition of "the need that prosperity shall come to the managers and 
investors, no less than to the manual workers, in any business"; the public's 
interest and right to intervene in labor disputes that are grave enough to affect 
the people's welfare; suppression of strike actions (by the army, if necessary) 
that menace life and property, before trying to deal with the causes of the labor 
conflict; and the establishment of bodies whose "prime function shall be the 
exposure of the facts and perhaps the power of mediation."32 
These themes are dramatically different from the radical labor concepts 
he expressed in 1917. What is perhaps most interesting in the articles is their 
emphasis on the benefits of profit-sharing and employees' becoming "actual. 
31 Greenberg, TR and Labor, 432. 
32 New York Herald Tribune, September 7, 14, and 21, 1924, and October 5, 1924. 
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partners· in the business as a result of the distribution to them of company 
stock reflecting a percentage of company profits. Roosevelt had alluded to 
those notions previously, but the articles seem to offer them as solutions for a 
failed labor-relations model.33 One article says that owners' "benevolent 
despotism is not permanently possible under American conditions." Another 
says that raising wages from time to time will not "settle the strike question and 
whether or not there shall be strikes." The implication is that benefit and pay 
increases will never be sufficient to guarantee labor peace. In contrast, when 
profit-sharing has been tried, it "has worked admirably, greatly minimizing the 
friction that has heretofore existed between capital and labor, minimizing the 
strike menace to almost nothing."34 The articles seem to suggest that if 
workers become owners, then strikes and labor militancy, and perhaps even 
unions, will wither away. 
33 TR letters to Leon 0 . Sutton, May 25, 1911; and S. Stanwood Menken, January 10, 1917, in 
Morison, Letters of TR, 7:270-271. 8:1143. 
34 New York Herald Tribune, September 7 and 28, 1924. 
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VIII. "A Sleek Article": Samuel Gompers 
Roosevelt's relationship with Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL 
and the foremost union leader of their era, provides a coda to the evolution of 
TR's attitude toward organized labor. Not only did their careers coincide, but 
the two men also frequently interacted during nearly four decades. During that 
period, Roosevelt migrated from an early appreciation of Gompers's social 
insights and advice, to active courtship of Gompers's support, to increasingly 
hostile political opposition, and finally to disdain and a near-physical 
altercation in connection with Gompers's defense of labor actions that 
Roosevelt considered evil. Examination of that sequence reveals much about 
the role Roosevelt expected unions and their leaders to play in his America. 
We have already reviewed Gompers's influence on the young 
Roosevelt's legislative career in connection with their joint support of the 
tenement-house bill. A mutually supportive relationship continued during 
Roosevelt's terms as New York City police commissioner and New York State 
governor, when Roosevelt accorded Gompers access and consideration on 
labor issues, leading Gompers "to believe he had respect for me."1 
By the time Roosevelt became president of the United States, Gompers 
had been president of the AFL for more than a decade. According to 
Gompers's description of their interactions, President Roosevelt diligently 
attempted to woo the AFL president. He was frequently and courteously 
1 Gompers, Seventy Years, 1:526-527. 
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greeted at the White House; was the first labor leader invited to a social 
function there; was introduced to Mrs. Roosevelt and other members of the 
president's family; and received private briefings from Roosevelt about the 
government's foreign policy intentions. Not only was Roosevelt the first 
president to use the term "organized labor'' in an official message to Congress, 
but also "at times [he] accepted my advice and acted upon it." Looking back, 
Gompers characterized their relationship as one of friends. 2 
One can nevertheless see, as early as the second year of Roosevelt's 
presidency, that TR had misgivings about Gompers. These appeared in the 
Miller case, where Roosevelt had taken a firm stand against organized labor's 
insistence on mandatory union membership. After Roosevelt met with labor 
leaders to discuss his position, he shared his impressions of the meeting with 
his good friend Senator Lodge. The union leaders, he wrote, were "entirely 
reasonable," especially the UMW's John Mitchell, with whom Roosevelt had 
developed an excellent relationship during the anthracite coal strike. As for 
Gompers, however, Roosevelt was not enthusiastic. Calling Gompers "a sleek 
article," he dismissed Gompers's reasonable demeanor as something the 
labor leader "thought it better to be so."3 
A political rupture between the two men became evident in 1906 when 
organized labor actively opposed Republican congressional candidates who 
2 Gompers, Seventy Years, 1 :529-531 . 
3 TR letter to Lodge, September 30, 1903, in Morison, Letters of TR, 3:607. 
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did not support its legislative goals.4 Even then, Roosevelt insisted that 
Republicans minimize personal attacks on Gompers, but his restraint did not 
inhibit telling his daughter after the el~ction was over that "[i]t is very gratifying 
to have ridden iron-shod over Gompers and the labor agitators. "5 The break 
became more serious two years later when Gompers and other labor leaders 
supported Bryan instead of Taft in the election to succeed Roosevelt as 
president. As discussed earlier, the dispute between Roosevelt and Gompers 
focused on the use of labor injunctions and Roosevelt's devastating critique of 
Gompers's position in the president's widely publicized October 1908 letter to 
Senator Knox. 
What provoked Roosevelt's ire far more than political disagreements 
were labor leaders who defended unions that, in Roosevelt's opinion, had 
engaged in lawless or unethical conduct. During a period of his exasperation 
with the Western Federation of Miners, he set forth his creed about how 
responsible union leaders should and should not act: 
Moreover, to a man who believes as sincerely as I do in 
substituting genuine rights for these equivocal rights of labor, it is 
a source of chagrin as well as of anger to see the actions of 
labor unions in subscribing money to pay for the defense of the 
4 The political faliout also affected labor support for non-congressional Republican candidates, 
as shown by Roosevelt's "alarmed" letter to New York gubernatorial candidate Charles Evans 
Hughes that it was difficult to find "trustworthy labor men" to help the Hughes campaign. TR 
letter to Hughes, October 2, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:438-439. 
5 TR letters to Speaker of the House Cannon, September 17, 1906; and Alice Roosevelt 
Longworth, November 7, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:413-414, 488. Although Roosevelt 
in his letter to daughter Alice did not directly call Gompers an agitator, he did elsewhere. TR 
letter to Lodge, October 10, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:459. 
criminals at the head of that criminal organization, the Western 
Federation of Min~rs.6 
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In the same vein, Roosevelt sensed "great danger" when labor leaders 
"express sympathy with other labor leaders accused of murder, simply 
because they are labor leaders."7 Gompers became the object of Roosevelt's 
wrath in the aftermath of the dynamite bombing of the Los Angeles Times 
building on October 1, 1910, during a city-wide union organizing strike. 
Twenty-one employees of the newspaper died in the blast. The owner of the 
Times was Harrison Gray Otis, a vocal advocate of "open shops." Gompers 
described Otis in his autobiography as a bitter enemy of unions, while also 
calling the bombing "a terrible happening." At the time of the bombing, 
Roosevelt praised Gompers for his "moderate and gentlemanly tone" in 
contrast to Otis's "scurrilous blackguardism."8 
Eventually, authorities arrested the two McNamara brothers, one of 
whom was an officer of the Bridge and Structural Iron Workers union, and a 
third man who confessed to the trio's joint responsibility for the dynamiting. 
Gompers agreed to take over the fund-raising and disbursement of funds for 
the McNamaras' Legal Defense Committee. He contended that he was not 
aware of any connection between the bombing and organized labor. He also 
said that he believed "responsibility [for the dynamiting] lay with operatives in 
6 TR letter to George Alger, March 20, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:189. 
7 TR letter to magazine editor Lyman Abbott, April23, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:219 
~emphasis in original). 
TR letter to Gompers, May 7, 1911, in Morison, Letters of TR, 7:279. 
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the service of the ~open-shop' crowd" that had been "~aking war" on the 
McNamaras' union. 
On December 1, 1911, early in their trial, the McNamara brothers 
changed their not-guilty pleas to guilty, ostensibly to avoid the death penalty. 
Gompers asserted in his autobiography that if the McNamaras had told him 
they were guilty, "I would not have engaged in the work of collecting money for 
their defense, neither would I have urged that course upon the labor 
movement. "9 
Even before the guilty pleas, Roosevelt had challenged labor leaders 
over their McNamara advocacy. Arguing that the arrests resulted .from 
evidence gathered by "impartial" sources, he announced "hearty reprobation of 
those labor leaders who, without wanting to know anything of the facts of the 
case, have at once flown to the defense of the alleged dynamiters ... and who 
talk about the arrest as being part of a conspiracy against labor unions." While 
9 Gompers, Seventy Years, 2:183-193. As to the changed plea, muckraking journalist Lincoln 
Steffens claimed that he had brokered a deal with the brothers, their attorneys, business 
leaders including the owner of the Times, the prosecutor, and the judge, for a lighter sentence, 
no further indictments, and a labor-management conference to resolve Los Angeles' labor 
problems. Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1931 ), 668-689. Another view is that the business leaders accepted this resolution 
because of their fear that one of the McNamaras' defense attorneys, a socialist, would 
otherwise be elected mayor of Los Angeles during the trial. Mowry, California Progressives, 
53-55. Whatever the reason, "public opinion, even the labor vote, was against labor and the 
settlement"; further arrests followed; and the labor-management conference never occurred\.. 
Steffens, Autobiography, 685, 688-689; Mowry, California Progressives, 53. Gompers 
continued to hover between condemning the dynamiters and justifying their motives. In a 1913 
article, he rhetorically followed condemnation with a question -- "were the methods used by 
the employers less deadly to humanity and freedom?" - that he answered by criticizing the 
presiding judge in the McNamara case for failing "to realize causal relationship." Samuel 
Gompers, Labor and the Employer, ed. Hayes Robbins (New York: Dutton, 1920), 231 . 
he concurred that it was proper to fund their legal defense, "it is grossly 
improper to try to create a public opinion in favor of the arrested men simply 
because ... [they] are members of a labor union."10 Roosevelt did not 
mention Gompers by name, but Gompers soon gave him the opportunity. 
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After the Times's Otis editorially lambasted Roosevelt for currying union 
favor by not assuming the guilt of the McNamaras, Gompers's rebuttal 
provided an opportunity for Roosevelt to lash both Otis and Gompers. 
Roosevelt courteously acknowledged Gompers's "honorable statement" of 
opposition to Otis's more extreme comments, but he also observed that some 
labor men "so framed their statements about the explosion as to convey the 
impression - and, I fear, to excite the feeling among their followers -that this 
matter was to be treated as a case of class conflict, and that the labor men 
were to rally behind the accused as a matter of class duty and loyalty." 
Accordingly, he asked "Mr. Gompers and those associated with him in 
the cause of labor" to "make it equally evident that they do not intend to stand 
by the men right or wrong." He believed that labor leaders should not wait for a 
court verdict, because escaping conviction for murder was not "warrant 
enough for upholding a labor leader when the outside circumstances are such 
as conclusively to show that . .. the labor leader is an undesirable citizen." He 
10 Theodore Roosevelt, uMurder is Murder," The Outlook 98 (May 6, 1911): 12. 
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explicitly invoked his similar, prior condemnation of the Western Federation of 
Miners.11 
Commenting in 1916 on the country's industrial preparedness for 
expansion of the war in Europe, Roosevelt archly mentioned Gompers as the 
embodiment "in some sense" of what the country wanted in a champion of 
labor. The qualifying phrase takes on a negative meaning when compared 
with Roosevelt's description the year before of a former railroad union leader 
who was "the only prominent labor leader I ever met who was as good a 
citizen, as good an adviser politically, and as broad and practical a worker for 
social justice as the best of our people generally."12 Even allowing for 
hyperbole, this statement suggests that Roosevelt did not hold Gompers and 
most union leaders in high regard. 
The low point of the Roosevelt-Gompers relationship came on July 6, 
1917, when Roosevelt was the featured speaker at a Carnegie Hall reception 
for representatives of the new Russian revolutionary government under 
Kerensky. In his speech, Roosevelt criticized recent race riots during a bitter 
strike in East St. Louis, where white strikers fatally attacked black 
strikebreakers. His ostensible point was that the United States should prevent 
such "appalling brutality" if it wanted to be treated as an international model for 
11 Theodore Roosevelt, "Mr. Gompers, General Otis, and the Dynamite Charges," The Outlook 
98 (June 17, 191 1), 330-332. 
12 TR letters to Guy Emerson, May 16, 1916; and the American writer Winston Churchill, 
August 4, 1915, in Morison, Letters of TR, 8:1042, 958-959. 
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liberty and justice. Roosevelt later insisted that he had not mentioned 
organized labor. The next speaker was Gompers, who nonetheless 
understood Roosevelt to have "scathingly denounced labor for participating in 
the riots." On that basis, Gompers explained the economic background of the 
riots, including "luring negroes from the South .. . to be used in undermining 
the conditions of the laborer in East St. Louis." Such "luring of these colored 
men" was "on a par with the behavior of the brutal, reactionary, and tyrannous 
forces that existed in old Russia." What ensued was a bitter confrontation 
between the two men.13 
Roosevelt regarded Gompers's remarks, in conjunction with a reported 
statement by another labor leader, as an unacceptable and anti-democratic 
attempt to justify murder and violence because the victims had declined "to 
unionize and strike." Accordingly, he rose to reply to Gompers before the next 
speaker began. "Never will I sit motionless," he said, "while directly or 
indirectly apology is made for murder of the helpless." In brief remarks and 
later, he expanded his condemnation of the riots to cover "all persons, whether 
representatives of organized labor or not, who attempt to palliate or excuse 
13 New York Times, July 7, 1917, pp. 1, 4. The day before the Carnegie Hall meeting, the 
AFL's secretary, Frank Morrison, issued a denial of union responsibility for the East St. Louis 
riots. New York Times, July 6, 1917. p.18. Roosevelt's side of the Carnegie Hall confrontation 
is set forth in his Foes of Our Own Household, 280-286. Gompers' side is set forth in his 
Seventy Years. 1 :534-535. See also Bishop, TR and His Time, 2:432-435. 
such crimes, or who fail to condemn them in clear-cut and unequivocal 
fashion."14 
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Gompers's account of their Carnegie Hall confrontation focused less on 
. 
what Roosevelt said than on the manner in which Roosevelt said it. "He strode 
across the stage," Gompers remembered, "until he reached my side where he 
stood towering over me and pointing his forefinger at me and shaking his fist in 
my face and at one time laying his hand on my shoulder." In contrast, 
Roosevelt's account omitted any reference to his physical conduct and instead 
was devoted exclusively to the reasonableness of what he had said. For 
Roosevelt, the issue between him and Gompers was his statement that 
"murder is not debatable." 
later the same year, Roosevelt offered through a third party to help 
Gompers prevail over unionists who opposed Americ~n participation in the 
Great War. It did not represent a full reconciliation between them. Roosevelt 
simultaneously asserted that "I do not take back any word I have ever said 
about him [Gompers], and ·I don't care whether he takes back anything he has 
said about me or not." In contrast, Roosevelt was unequivocal in his open 
praise for leaders of labor organizations like the International Typographical 
Union and the United Mine Workers, whose support of the war effort included 
14 Roosevelt's criticism of people who failed to condemn the criminal behavior of others 
belonging to the same affinity group was not limited to organized labor. He made similar 
remarks about people of color in connection with a Brownsville, Texas, riot that had been 
attributed to African-American soldiers. Gould, Presidency of TR, 238. 
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commitments to maximize production and avoid strikes.15 Gompers's 
patriotism did not elicit the same reaction from Roosevelt because Gompers at 
Carnegie Hall refused to subordinate union militancy to prosecution of the war. 
15 Leary, Talks with TR, 251-253, 255; Roosevelt. Kansas City Star. 170-172, 21 1-212. 
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Figure 6 
SAMUEL GOMPERS AT 65 
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IX. Conclusion 
The evidence is substantial that Roosevelt tried to improve the working 
conditions and benefits of laborers. Not only do his words support that 
proposition, but we can also observe him practicing what he preached in his 
efforts to obtain legislative improvements for workers, his enforcement of 
worker-friendly laws, his intervention to resolve strikes and threatened strikes 
for the benefit of workers, and his nominations to the Supreme Court of men 
who had open minds on the subject of labor rights. Greenberg contends that 
Roosevelt was "inevitably pro-labor" because he wanted to substitute "welfare 
capitalism guaranteed by the state" for "socially irresponsible capitalism."1 
This brings us back to the distinction between "labor" and "organized 
labor" in Roosevelt's world view. Roosevelt shared his era's widespread 
suspicion that organized labor tended to defend and even organize disorder 
rather than prevent it. We see this in Roosevelt's frequent condemnations of 
labor violence and his insistence upon maintaining some form of injunctive 
power to deal with union lawlessness.2 The same suspicion appears in the 
1 Greenberg, TR and Labor, 84, 355-356. This study also includes evidence supporting 
Hofstadter's speculation that Roosevelt was motivated by the fear of socialism. The ultimate 
question here, however, is where organized labor fit within Roosevelt's approach, regardless 
of his social motivation. 
2 As a Roosevelt scholar notes, TR's "exercise of power at home, the concerts of power the 
world over, were intended first of all to provide order. · Blum, Republican Roosevelt, 6. 
writings of his era's intellectuals, whether they were conseNatives like John 
Hay and Octave Thanet or radicals like Henry George and Herbert Croly.3 
That Roosevelt gravitated toward Thanet's view of labor problems 
should not, however. obscure the evidence that he was willing to make 
common cause with organized labor when it served his larger purposes, as 
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shown by his intervention to resolve the anthracite coal strike, his alliance with 
Gompers to amend the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the inclusion of union 
leadership in the foundation he conceived to promote industrial peace through 
collective action. It is nevertheless difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
Roosevelt's tolerance for union activism was thin. This was not limited to his 
disapproval of organized labor's manifestations of violence and attempted 
justifications of violence. To the same effect, labor union insistence on 
mandatory union membership offended Roosevelt's democratic instincts by 
seeming like a discriminatory bid for special interest power that would 
complicate his goal of a society that benefited all classes. 
Horrified by the specter of bloody class conflict that he had condemned 
in the French Revolution's reign of terror, Roosevelt believed that a 
democratically elected government should be the primary and indispensable 
instrument for obtaining social and industrial justice. This remained true even 
when politicians like Speaker of the House Cannon and the courts thwarted 
3 J use the words •conservative" and 'radical" only in a relative sense, with due regard for 
Roosevelrs aforementioned disdain for their "inexactitude In terminology.' 
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legislation that was beneficial to working people. Union leaders like Gompers 
were welcome in Roosevelt's ethical universe, provided they were willing to 
accept the government's- and especially TR's --guidance. 
Arguments have been made that for Roosevelt labor issues were just 
politics. Sometimes, those arguments attribute his positive rhetoric and actions 
regarding organized labor as designed merely to gain worker votes. The 
inverse arguments focus on the less union-friendly aspects of his rhetoric and 
actions as reflecting his protection of privilege and the necessity to curry favor 
with the businessmen who financed the Republican Party. The first set of 
arguments fails to account for Roosevelt's actions that were politically 
unpopular with unions and their labor constituency, e.g., those regarding 
. mandatory union membership, the Western Federation of Miners, and labor 
injunctions. The second set fails to account for the sincerity of his efforts 
generally to improve social and industrial conditions and his criticism of 
businesses that did not treat their workers with respect. 
Roosevelt's labor words and actions went deeper than political 
calculation. Their roots are visible in his admiration for Octave Thanet's literary 
descriptions of labor problems, namely, her positive view of the potential 
fairness of non-monopolistic employers, ethically motivated workers, and 
occasionally an exceptional union leader; and her negative depiction of the 
suffering inflicted by union-led labor conflict on union supporters, antagonists, 
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and neutrals. Roosevelt did not always follow the Thanet creed, but his 
fondness for it shows his philosophical starting point for approaching union 
issues. 
If his attitude toward organized labor was fundamentally skeptical, 
rather than politically generated, the question remains where organized labor 
fit within his ethical universe. There is some guidance in a series of lectures he 
gave at the University of California, Berkeley, in the spring of 1911, when he 
placed the phrases "applied ethics" and "realizable ideals" on the same plane. 
They both stood for "the only spirit which I think counts for anything in 
preaching," he said. It was incumbent on the nation to have a "lofty ideal," but 
it was deSirable to avoid preaching "ideals which cannot be measurably 
attained" because "[i)f we consciously or carelessly preach ideals which 
cannot be realized and which we do not intend to have realized, then so far 
from accomplishing a worthy purpose we actually tend to weaken the morality 
we ostensibly preach.'14 
When Roosevelt commented in the Berkeley lectures about labor 
unions, they were not part of a lofty ideal. A wageworker, he said, should be 
wary of candidates who condone violence or "recognize the rules of a labor 
organization of any kind as standing above the Constitution and the laws of his 
country," because that was the road "where democracy would come to an end, 
4 Theodore Roosevelt, Realizable Ideals (San Francisco: Whittaker & Ray-Wiggin , 1912), 2, 
32. 
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where self-rule would come to an end." For Roosevelt, it was shameful if "a 
multi-millionaire or a wage-worker, whether the member of a big corporation or 
the member of a labor union," ever placed "loyalty to cast or class ahead of 
loyalty to good citizenship." In his declaration that the way to stand up to big 
corporations was "to replace our individual strength by the strength of all of us 
collectively," the collective entity that he invoked was the government, not a 
union.5 
Unable to dissuade union leaders from what he regarded as their 
misguided defenses of mandatory union membership, labor violence, and total 
insulation against labor injunctions, Roosevelt may have wondered whether 
the. tactics of organized labor would ever enable America to realize his ideals 
for social and industrial justice. This may also explain why he never offered a 
comprehensive legislative or administrative program to define union rights, 
because he regarded union responsibilities as equally important and did not 
believe that organized labor was ready to accept the responsibilities as the 
price for the rights. 
Nevertheless, Roosevelt traveled a long way from his early doubts 
about the societal value of unions and his approval of President Cleveland's 
unhesitating use of the courts and the army to quell union militancy. He arrived 
at a general acceptance of union involvement in bettering social conditions. As 
he put it in a 1910 Labor Day speech, "Wherever there is organized capital on 
5 1bid., 103, 115-116, 134-135. 
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a considerable scale I believe in the principle of organized labor and in the 
practice of collective bargaining. "6 There were tangible manifestations of this 
acceptance in his responses to actual (coal) and threatened (railroad) strikes, 
in his efforts to bring greater fairness to the labor injunction process, and in his 
willingness to address the AFL's fears that organized labor faced jeopardy 
under the antitrust law. 
The greatest impact of Roosevelt's labor journey as it affected unions 
was in the intangibles. Instead of the perceived government approach 
represented by President Cleveland's dispatching the army to control unions, 
President Roosevelt was more interested in vindicating the rights of organized 
labor (excluding those of the Western Federation of Miners). He may not have 
treated organized labor as an equal partner in his welfare capitalism, but he 
was willing to give it a "respectable" partnership interest. 7 He shared many of 
organized labor's industrial and social goals. Where he departed from 
organized labor was in the details of how to arrive at the destination. 
' 
A relatively recent appraisal of TR's presidency concludes that, "In his 
policies and such preachments as the Square Deal, Roosevelt posed some of 
the right questions about conservation, the control of corporations, the welfare 
of the average American, and what constitute~ a just society."8 Posing 
6 Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 128-129. 
7 Compare Greenberg, TR and Labor, 85, 173-175, 451 . 
8 Gould, Presidency of TR, 300. See also the introduction by Henry Steele Commager and 
Richard Brandon Morris in George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: 
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questions is admittedly not equivalent to developing policy answers. Before 
criticizing Roosevelt's failure to develop policies and procedures for what he 
identified as the needs and tendencies of organized labor, however, we should 
consider a crucial point. He was no different in that respect from other leaders 
of his time or those in the generation that immediately followed him. 
For a quarter of a century after his presidency, both Democratic and 
Republican national governments also failed to frame comprehensive labor 
policies. Even the New Deal Congress and the second President Roosevelt 
answered only some of the questions that the first President Roosevelt had 
posed about the proper governmental treatment of organized labor. Congress 
did not address the full sweep of those questions until after World War II. 
The first step occurred twenty-six years after Theodore Roosevelt left 
the White House. Senator Robert F. Wagner, Democrat of New York, 
introduced a bill that became the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, often 
referred to as the Wagner Act.9 As finally passed and signed into law by FOR, 
a distant cousin of TR who had married TR's niece, the Wagner Act began by 
blaming "strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest" on employer 
denials of union organization rights and collective bargaining. Its solutions to 
Harper, 1958), xi-xii, stating that Roosevelt •ushered in a revolution" with respect to "the 
relations of the different elements of the economy- capital, labor, and agriculture -to each 
other." Mowry makes the same point in his earlier book, TR and Progressive Movement, 16 
(while TR "did little himself to solve the numerous questions he broached, he did create a 
national demand that these questions be met and answered."). 
9 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1949; reprint, 1985), 1:1295-1310. 
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that declared problem were establishment of government-run procedures for 
employee selection of union representatives through whom employees could 
collectively bargain, legalization of their further right "to engage. in concerted 
activities [including strikes] for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection," and enumeration of prohibited employer "unfair labor 
practices." What the Wagner Act did not address was the idea of union unfair 
labor practices or the existence of other reasons for strikes. 
Theodore Roosevelt had advocated for employee rights to engage in 
collective bargaining. Yet, only one reference to him appears in theWagner 
Act's legislative history. A Republican congressman from California, who 
supported the bill, invoked TR's name, along with the names of Lincoln, 
Woodrow Wilson, Pope Leo Ill, former British Prime Minister William E. 
Gladstone, and Bismarck, "the great Iron Chancellor" of Germany, for the 
proposition that "[t]he right of collective bargaining has been subscribed to by 
many of the greatest minds this world has ever produced."1° Flattering 
company for TR, but it also diminished his groundbreaking role as the 
American president who first articulated government's support of the rights of 
organized labor and, at key moments, provided such support. 
10 National Labor Relations Act Legislative History, 1 :clxv, 2:3183. 
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Despite its good intentions, the Wagner Act did not end labor conflict. 11 
In the winter of 1945 and the first half of 1946, the country experienced what a 
congressional leader called an "unprecedented wave of strikes." Although the 
House of Representatives passed a bill to broaden the reach of the Wagner 
Act, the Senate did not- until, as one Republican congressman sarcastically 
observed, "John L. Lewis came to the rescue." 
Lewis was a successor of John Mitchell as head of the United Mine 
Workers, the union that TR helped in the 1902 anthracite coal strike. The post-
World War II strike militancy of Lewis's UMW against coal operators "closed 
down industry after industry, while across the nation cities and towns dug up 
wartime 'brownout' regulations to conserve power." In contrast to the positive 
outcome for the UMW under Mitchell, Lewis's UMW galvanized the Senate to 
curb union powers. The result was congressional passage of the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947, familiarly called the Taft-Hartley Act, over 
President Harry S. Truman's veto.12 
The Taft-Hartley Act contained the responsibility side of TR's view of 
organized labor, the side that saw a need to restrain unions and protect non-
union workers. It prohibited union unfair labor practices. These prohibitions 
11 Its backers stressed that securing employee rights to union organization would "remove a 
primary cause of strikes" and promote industrial peace. Other arguments for the act included 
political recognition of organized labor and smoothing out business cycles by increasing 
employee purchasing power through collective bargaining. J. Joseph Huthmacher, Senator 
Robart F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 191-193. 
12 Fred A. Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy: The Taft-Hartley Act and the Next Steps 
(New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1948), 18-20. 
included bad faith collective bargaining and secondary boycotts against 
employers not directly involved in a particular labor dispute. It also allowed 
states to prohibit mandatory union membership within their jurisdictions.13 
Although Theodore Roosevelt had advocated for something akin to these 
concepts, no legislator invoked his name during the debates over the Taft-
Hartley Act.14 
The failure to give TR credit for the principles underlying either the 
Wagner Act or the Taft-Hartley Act suggests that his two-sided, though 
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structurally Jacking, reactions to organized labor did not fit neatly into either a 
pro-union or a union-restraint perspective. Because TR's labor record did not 
unequivocally support either side of the conflict between unions and 
employers, neither camp could claim him as its unqualified champion.15 
After well over a half century of experience with the two post-TR laws 
that were intended to accomplish labor peace, their goal has still not been fully 
realized. As society continues to grapple with labor problems, it is worth 
recalling that Theodore Roosevelt was the first president who actively 
abandone'\the old government hostility to unions. His importance to American 
13 For a graphic comparison of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, see Legislative History of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1948; reprint, 1985), 2:1661-1680. 
1
• An irony of the Taft-Hartley· Act was that it was named after Senator Robert A. Taft, who 
shepherded it through the Senate. He was the son of President William Howard Taft, whose 
defeat for re-election in 1912 was ensured by TR's decision to run against him as the 
candidate of the Progressive Party. 
15 With respect to organized labor's views of Roosevelt after his death, it is interesting that a 
1920 compilation of Gompers's public statements did not contain any reference to TR. 
Gompers, Labor and the Employer. 
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labor history is that he was the first president who committed, albeit irregularly, 
to seeking peaceful solutions to labor conflict based more or less on 
government neutrality, rather than on a partisan perspective. That he did so 
despite his philosophical concerns about organized labor is a tribute to his 
capacity for separating his public actions from his personal views and to his 
refusal in labor matters to subordinate his office and his sense of the public 
good to the interests of either business or organized labor. 
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